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Abstract 
A mixed-methods quasi-experimental methodology was used to identify 
relationships between primary-school students‟ beliefs about intelligence, 
mathematics self-efficacy, and achievement, by investigating the effects of two 
interventions. One intervention aimed to strengthen students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, and the other aimed to develop in students‟ an incremental theory-of-
intelligence – a belief that intelligence is malleable. In one group, teachers 
implemented both interventions with their students; in a second group, teachers 
implemented only the mathematics self-efficacy intervention, and the third (control) 
group were involved in no intervention. Year 4 and 5 students (n = 152) completed 
a questionnaire on three occasions, at intervals of about 7 months, to measure their 
theory-of-intelligence and their mathematics self-efficacy. Students made self-
efficacy judgments in relation to specific number problems, which they were 
subsequently required to solve for the mathematics achievement measure. Both 
achievement and self-efficacy were then calibrated for each participant using the 
difficulty parameters for test items. Teachers completed questionnaires about their 
theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy for teaching mathematics. Sub-samples of 
teachers and students were interviewed to develop a deeper understanding of what 
their questionnaire responses signified. 
The combined interventions had no significant effect on students‟ beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, or achievement. In contrast, 
positive effects on students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and achievement were 
evident for students who experienced only the self-efficacy intervention. Teachers 
in this intervention group reported increased use of three strategies aimed at 
building students‟ mathematics self-efficacy: providing students with strategies for 
coping when learning became difficult; increasing their use of descriptive teacher-
student feedback; and increasing their use of similar peers as models. For the self-
efficacy intervention group, increases in students‟ mathematics achievement and 
self-efficacy appeared to be reciprocally related. 
The combined quantitative and qualitative evidence from the study showed that the 
complexity of some students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs about increasing intelligence 
was not reflected in their total scores on the theory-of-intelligence items used 
widely in earlier studies. In interviews, all students and most teachers described 
intelligence as malleable to varying degrees, which did not support previous 
dichotomous interpretations of theory-of-intelligence data. From students‟ 
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definitions of intelligence, two related dimensions were established, one a fairly 
stable capacity for acquiring knowledge and skill in a given domain, and the 
second, the more malleable rate at which such knowledge and skill can be 
acquired. A variety of beliefs were expressed by students about which of these 
dimensions intelligence includes, and about how malleable the dimensions are. The 
findings raise questions about the value of advocating an incremental theory-of-
intelligence for all students, regardless of their ability and how they conceptualise 
intelligence.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Background 
The present study was undertaken to investigate the relationships between primary 
students‟ achievement in mathematics and two aspects of their beliefs about 
learning – their mathematics self-efficacy, and their beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence, referred to here as their theory-of-intelligence. The former is specific to 
mathematics and, in fact, to particular mathematics problems, and the latter is a 
global belief that some researchers (for example, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & 
Dweck, 2007; Dweck, 2000) have suggested influences a student‟s learning.  
The aim of the present research was primarily to test the effects of two 
interventions, by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies. Priority was given to the quantitative data, with qualitative data intended 
to assist interpretation of the quantitative data. Even though the international 
research literature has firmly established the correlation of self-efficacy with student 
achievement (for example, Chen, 2003; Pajares & Miller, 1994; Schunk & Hanson, 
1985), only one study (Siegle & McCoach, 2007) has included an in-class 
intervention to investigate ways in which primary students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy can be influenced by their teachers in order to improve student 
achievement in mathematics. No classroom-based intervention studies were found 
that aimed to strengthen primary students‟ beliefs in the malleability of intelligence. 
Furthermore, many studies related to mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence (for example, Ahmavaara & Houston, 2007; Law, 2009; Pajares & 
Graham, 1999; Schunk & Hanson, 1985) report only data gathered from Likert-type 
scales on questionnaires, whereas the present study used a mixed-methods design 
to give the investigation greater depth. Finally, findings from cross-sectional studies 
have been used to try to build a picture of how students‟ beliefs vary from year to 
year. In the present study, data were collected from the same students over a 14-
month period to identify changes in their beliefs. 
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Definition of key terms  
One of the issues that will be highlighted in the review of relevant research 
literature is the problems caused by researchers failing to provide clear definitions 
of the constructs and terminology that are central to their studies. Definitions are 
given here of mathematics achievement, mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-
intelligence, and intelligence itself. Mathematics achievement is defined as a 
student‟s level of attainment in mathematics skills, as estimated by their 
performance on a sample of items from a standardised test. Also directly related to 
mathematics, an individual‟s mathematics self-efficacy is their judgment of their 
ability to successfully solve specific mathematics problems (Pajares, 1996a). A 
more general construct than mathematics self-efficacy, a person‟s theory-of-
intelligence is their belief about the malleability of intelligence – whether they 
believe that intelligence is a fixed entity (an entity belief), or that intelligence can be 
increased through applying effort (an incremental belief) (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Defining intelligence proved more challenging. Drawing on Sternberg (1985a), 
intelligence is conceptualised as comprising three dimensions: one, the complexity 
of knowledge and skill that can be learned in a given domain; two, the capacity for 
such learning; and three, the rate at which such knowledge and skill can be 
acquired. 
The New Zealand mathematics education context 
For the first decade of this century, primary teachers‟ professional development in 
mathematics was driven by the goal of improving student achievement by building 
teachers‟ professional capability. This goal was the New Zealand government‟s 
response to poor student achievement results in the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (Garden, 1997). This study was the first 
international study to compare the mathematics performance of New Zealand 9 and 
13-year-olds to that of their peers in 45 other countries, and it broke new ground in 
that previous studies had not included primary students. The relatively poor 
achievement of our students on tasks that involved an understanding of place 
value, fractions and proportions, or measurement was of particular concern.  
In 1998, an initial response was for the government to set up the Mathematics and 
Science Taskforce, which recommended professional development programmes 
that targeted teachers of Year 3 students and focused on teaching number 
concepts, in particular, place value. Year 3 was seen as a critical period for the 
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development of place value concepts, at a time when international results (Garden, 
1997) combined with findings from earlier New Zealand studies of number learning 
(for example, Young-Loveridge, 1991, 1993) to give a picture of slower-than-
expected progress for 7 to 9-year-olds.  
The government also brought together an expert group to advise them on how to 
achieve their nebulous goal of every child turning nine being “able to read, write, 
and do maths for success” by 2005 (Ministry of Education, 1999, p. 1). A key 
recommendation from this government group that was implemented was to make it 
a legal requirement for schools to make literacy and numeracy a greater focus in 
the first four years of primary school
1
. 
Building on the professional development that was being undertaken with Year 3 
teachers, and initially drawing on what was at that point a remedial mathematics 
programme, Count Me In Too (Department of Education and Training, NSW, 1998), 
pilots of components of the Numeracy Development Projects were conducted from 
2000 (Higgins, 2002; Irwin & Niederer, 2002; Thomas & Ward, 2001). During the 
Numeracy Development Project‟s first phase until 2009, the projects were gradually 
implemented up to secondary school level (Irwin, 2003, 2004), and in English and 
Māori-medium classrooms (Christensen, 2003, 2004) with an annual evaluation 
cycle supporting their development and refinement over this time.  
The focus of professional development for teachers was on both their personal 
mathematics content knowledge and their pedagogical content knowledge, 
supported by the provision of a series of booklets for teachers. The first booklet 
presented the Number Framework (see Ministry of Education, 2008a for the most 
recent iteration), which provided teachers with a framework of likely stages 
describing students‟ progress towards increasingly sophisticated number strategies 
and knowledge. The framework drew on the work of Steffe (1994) and Wright 
(1998), who had developed learning pathways for early number learning that took 
developmental trajectories into account. 
  
                                               
1
 In New Zealand, children attend primary school (Years 1 to 8) between approximately 5 and 
12 years old, many having the option of attending a separate intermediate school for the last 2 
years of this time. Where primary students are referred to here, it represents students within this 
age range. 
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In the Numeracy Development Projects, number strategies were defined as mental 
processes that students use to solve number problems involving operations 
(addition, subtraction, multiplication, and so on), and number knowledge referred to 
the key items of knowledge, such as basic facts and place value knowledge. As 
each of the ordered stages (up to eight in some domains) became more advanced, 
progressively more sophisticated mathematics had to be learnt. Subsequently, the 
revised national curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) incorporated the Number 
Framework, aligning stages on the framework with curriculum levels and making its 
implementation mandatory for all New Zealand schools. 
A second, closely-related feature of the Numeracy Development Projects was the 
assessment of individual students by the teacher, using a scripted diagnostic 
interview (Ministry of Education, 2008b). Undertaking this assessment was 
originally intended as professional development for teachers
2
, helping to acquaint 
them with the range of student behaviours that were consistent with each stage of 
the Number Framework. However, it was the data from these interviews that were 
analysed as part of the on-going evaluation and which informed the continued 
review and development of the implementation and support materials for teachers 
(Higgins & Parsons, 2011). 
The end of phase one coincided with the introduction of national standards in 
mathematics (Ministry of Education, 2009). The standards are now mandatory, 
having been incorporated into the National Administration Guidelines (available at 
www.minedu.govt.nz). There has, however, been resistance from some schools to 
the introduction of the national standards, with much of the debate centering on 
concern about the potential for the use of student data to compare schools, 
teachers, and students. The possible effects of labelling students as being below 
the standard for their year have also been the topic of much discussion, as has the 
perception of increased workload for teachers. At the same time, national 
standards sit comfortably alongside existing assessment and reporting practices in 
some schools, where they have been accepted as a means of strengthening 
teachers‟ communication with families about students‟ learning, and supporting the 
identification of students whose achievement is below the expectation for their age. 
                                               
2 Some schools have made the decision to provide resources for teachers to complete these 
interviews with every student at either the start or end of the school year, as the detailed 
information that teachers gain about their students is helpful in developing teaching 
programmes and reporting students‟ progress. 
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Since 2010, the second phase of the Numeracy Development Projects has focused 
on their in-depth sustainability, with facilitators supporting schools to incorporate 
the curriculum and national standards requirements into mathematics programmes 
that result in improved learning outcomes for students.  
Such was the concentration on the on-going development of this initiative that only 
relatively recently has Ministry of Education funding been available to explore the 
effects of other mathematics interventions with primary students. A group of 
Ministry of Education-funded intervention studies, collectively named “Accelerating 
Learning in Mathematics” (see Neill, Fisher, & Dingle, 2010) was trialled in 39 
schools around New Zealand during 2010. These interventions aimed to accelerate 
learning for students who were achieving below expectations for their year in 
mathematics. Each intervention involved collaboration between a numeracy 
facilitator and a teacher (or teachers) who developed an intervention for targeted 
students‟ identified learning needs. Each school had input into deciding a specific 
focus for their number intervention, with basic facts and place value the two most 
commonly chosen foci. Evaluation of the various interventions was based on the 
results of two assessments: the Numeracy Development Projects‟ diagnostic 
interview (Ministry of Education, 2008b), and Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics (Darr, Neill, & Stephanou, 2007), a multi-choice test. Results indicated 
that the achievement of students increased “by an average of eighty per cent of a 
year's growth over the ten weeks of the intervention” (Neill et al., 2010, p. v). One 
of the factors to which participating teachers and facilitators attributed students‟ 
improved achievement was anecdotally reported as “increased student confidence 
and self-efficacy” (p. v). However, the evaluation of these studies did not include an 
exploration of the association between data that were gathered on changes in 
students‟ attitudes towards mathematics and changes in their achievement; no 
mathematics self-efficacy data were collected. Like the Numeracy Development 
Projects, these interventions directly targeted students‟ mathematics 
understandings, and did not explicitly intervene to change students‟ beliefs.  
Other recent mathematics education research in this country, much of which was 
associated with the Numeracy Development Projects evaluation research, has 
added to what is known about teaching and learning mathematics by incorporating 
students‟ viewpoints. Such studies have included: students‟ perspectives on 
communicating their mathematical thinking (Young-Loveridge, Taylor, & Hāwera, 
2005); what students think mathematics is about (Walls, 2007; Young-Loveridge, 
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Taylor, Sharma, & Hāwera, 2006); the views of Māori students about learning 
mathematics/pāngarau (Hāwera, Taylor, Young-Loveridge, & Sharma, 2007); and 
Māori students‟ views on the use of equipment in mathematics (Hāwera & Taylor, 
2010). Investigating students‟ interactions with teachers during mathematics 
lessons has been a particular focus in studies of discourse in mathematics 
classrooms (Hunter, 2007; Irwin & Woodward, 2005), patterns of teacher-student 
interaction (Higgins, 2003), and teacher-student questioning (Bonne & Pritchard, 
2007). Teacher-student feedback practices during mathematics lessons have been 
described (Knight, 2003) using the typology devised by Tunstall and Gipps (1996a), 
in a study that was descriptive and explanatory in nature, rather than interventional.  
Explicit investigation of ways in which primary students‟ self-beliefs are associated 
with their achievement in mathematics appears to be lacking. One study (Thomas 
& Tagg, 2009) touched on this by surveying 83 Year 7 students‟ attitudes about 
learning mathematics and describing connections between students‟ attitudes and 
achievement. In their synthesis of studies that provided evidence of what is thought 
to constitute effective mathematics pedagogy, Anthony and Walshaw (2007) 
acknowledged the important roles played by students‟ confidence, motivation, and 
self-efficacy in their association with achievement. To date, however, no New 
Zealand study has investigated how interventions that aim to change primary 
students‟ beliefs about learning might be associated with improvements in 
mathematics achievement. 
Primary students’ mathematics achievement 
In New Zealand primary classrooms, student achievement is measured in relation 
to a variety of reference points. Primary teachers monitor students‟ mathematics 
learning in relation to specific learning intentions, usually derived from curriculum 
expectations (Ministry of Education, 2007), to identify individual students‟ progress 
and any misconceptions they might have, and to pinpoint their future learning 
needs. Learning intentions may be developed by teachers to address an identified 
learning need among their students, so may vary from class to class, and from 
school to school. One of the advantages of the recently-introduced national 
standards (Ministry of Education, 2009) is that they have the potential to provide 
key reference points, linked to curriculum levels, which will be more uniform across 
the whole of New Zealand.  
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Achievement information can also be used to group students for mathematics 
instruction, either within a class, or by cross-grouping between classes of similar 
age groups. In New Zealand primary schools, a student‟s achievement in 
mathematics and reading is often a key consideration when devising class 
groupings, allowing teachers to combine individuals with similar learning needs in 
instructional groups. Such ability-based grouping is perceived to be a way of 
meeting students‟ academic learning needs (Dharan, 2010). As students reach 
secondary school, where mathematics, along with science, is typically perceived as 
an academically difficult subject, ability-based differentiations become more 
pronounced. Traditionally, achievement in mathematics at secondary school has 
been a filter for entry to tertiary mathematics courses, and then to the high-status 
careers for which such courses are prerequisites (Betz & Hackett, 1983). Stinson 
(2004) described mathematics as a “gate-keeper for economic success, full 
citizenship, and higher education” (p. 11).  
Although international comparisons of student mathematics achievement such as 
the 2007 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (Gonzales et al., 
2008) indicated overall improvements for New Zealand Year 4 students from 1994 
to 2007, this has made little difference to our country‟s international ranking, 
particularly in the area of number. Over a 10-year period, the Numeracy 
Development Projects spearheaded substantial changes in mathematics teaching, 
and their impact on primary student achievement was closely monitored at a 
national level (for example, Thomas & Tagg, 2009; Thomas, Ward, & Tagg, 2010; 
Young-Loveridge, 2009, 2010).  
Although there has been evidence of students making substantial progress, 
particularly in the additive and multiplicative domains (Young-Loveridge, 2010), the 
achievement of students in particular groups continues to be of concern. Ministry-
funded evaluation research has shown that during the first year of this initiative in 
schools, students have made substantial progress in some areas, but that not so 
many students in Years 6-9 are attaining curriculum expectations for their year 
(Young-Loveridge, 2008, 2009, 2010). Consistent with this, in 2009 38% of the 78 
Year 8 students in Thomas et al.‟s (2010) longitudinal study were achieving below 
the Ministry of Education‟s expectations. This has raised questions about whether 
the curriculum expectations are perhaps set unrealistically high, and whether it is 
reasonable to expect students at this level to make greater progress than they have 
been making. However, using the combined data for 307 students from 2006, 2007, 
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and 2008, Johnston, Thomas, and Ward (2010) found that Year 8 students had 
actually made quite steady progress in number strategy development over that 
time. This progress only became apparent when students‟ data were calibrated to a 
Rasch measurement scale, rather than progress being counted in discrete stages 
on the Number Framework.  
Young-Loveridge (2010) suggested that treating the stages on the Number 
Framework – particularly the early stages – as equal, was a misconception among 
some teachers. As a result, these teachers‟ expectations for student achievement 
might not have been sufficiently high, especially in the first years of school where 
teachers should be “moving through those early stages at a reasonably brisk pace” 
(p. 31). If this is the case, then further teacher education about implications of the 
Number Framework for classroom teaching may be necessary.  
Looking at how achievement might be associated with ethnicity, the 2007 data 
indicated the achievement of Māori students continued to trail that of students of 
European descent (Ministry of Education, 2008c), with Māori students 
proportionally over-represented among those who were identified as below or well 
below the expectations for their age
3
. In the 2008 end-of-year data, Māori students‟ 
average stages on various domains of the Number Framework continued to be 
lower than those of New Zealand European students (Young-Loveridge, 2009). 
Māori and Pasifika students tend to be disproportionately represented in low decile4 
schools, so distinguishing the effects of ethnicity from those of socio-economic level 
is difficult. However, Young-Loveridge (2010) compared the numeracy stages of 
Māori students in low and high-decile schools, and showed that being in a low-
decile school appeared to compound the disadvantage for Māori students. 
Since the year 2000, the New Zealand government has made a significant financial 
investment in the Numeracy Development Projects with the aim of building 
teachers‟ professional capability in order to raise student achievement. The 
additional imperatives of a new curriculum and national standards for mathematics 
                                               
3 Students who are identified as being below are one year below the expectation; those who are 
well below are those whose achievement is below the expectation by more than one year. 
4 A school‟s decile is an indicator of the proportion of students a school draws from low socio-
economic communities, with decile 1 schools having the highest proportion and decile 10, the 
lowest. 
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have strengthened this focus. Teachers around the country have worked to 
implement these changes in their mathematics teaching practices, and after an 
initial improvement in overall achievement, further gains have proved more difficult.  
Assessing students’ mathematics achievement  
Assessment can vary in its purpose, form, and formality. Assessments of students‟ 
mathematics achievement can be used for diagnostic or formative purposes (Black 
& Wiliam, 1998); to determine what a student knows or can do; to inform 
instructional groupings, planning, goal-setting; and to provide feedback to the 
student. Assessments can also be used for summative purposes, to provide a 
summary of performance for reporting purposes. In primary schools, assessment 
can include teacher-student conferencing, verbal or written peer and self-
assessment, and recorded ideas in the form of work samples (including photos) 
and tests. Informal assessments can include teacher-student conversations, or a 
teacher‟s incidental observation of a student interacting with peers in the 
playground. At the more formal end of the spectrum, assessments can take the 
form of timed written tests, completed individually in silence.  
A range of assessment tools has been developed in New Zealand to estimate 
primary student achievement in mathematics. Several of these were developed 
from the work of Wright (1998) to support the Numeracy Development Projects, key 
among which was the one-to-one diagnostic interview (Ministry of Education, 
2008b). With young students, the interview might be shorter than 10 minutes, but in 
the case of students whose mathematics understandings are very advanced, it is 
not unusual for an interview to last more than 30 minutes. So while teachers 
complete the diagnostic interview with each of their students, they generally need a 
colleague to teach their classes, which in most schools is not financially feasible 
over the long term. Because of this disadvantage of the full interview, the Global 
Strategy Stage assessment and Knowledge Assessment for Numeracy were both 
developed as a shortened form of the interview, and can be administered during a 
mathematics lesson to assess individual students‟ number strategies and 
knowledge, respectively. These assessments provide teachers with an 
approximation of a student‟s stage on the Number Framework, and yield less 
reliable data than the full diagnostic interview.  
One of the difficulties associated with the assessments for the Numeracy 
Development Projects has been interpreting student achievement data in 
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meaningful and consistent ways. The full diagnostic interview (or its proxies 
described above) provides information regarding the stages on the Number 
Framework at which a student is operating across the various domains, such as 
addition and subtraction, or multiplication and division. Although the numbered 
stages represent an ordered learning progression, the intervals between the stages 
are not uniform, making these data ordinal in nature. This characteristic of the 
structure of the Number Framework has made comparison of data from one year to 
the next problematic, an issue that Johnston et al. (2010) addressed by calibrating 
data to a measurement scale.  
Other assessment tools created to support New Zealand teachers include two that 
comprise collections of individual assessment items. The Assessment Resource 
Banks (available at http://arb.nzcer.org.nz/) are a large collection (around 3,000) of 
free assessment items for mathematics, science, and English, available online. The 
items were designed to provide teachers with some diagnostic information related 
to students‟ responses, including common misconceptions. Individual items can be 
used to monitor students‟ achievement of a specific learning intention, or groups of 
items can be amalgamated to create a written test. Assessment Tools for Teaching 
and Learning (e-asTTle) is another Ministry of Education-funded assessment 
resource. It is an electronically-available assessment tool (see http://e-
asttle.tki.org.nz/) that allows teachers to create their own written tests, which can 
also be completed by students online. A variety of reports of results can be 
produced, and it allows comparison of student outcomes with national norms. Both 
of these tools are collections of individual items that teachers can assemble as they 
see fit, rather than a set written test. 
A collection of set written tests that is widely used in New Zealand is the Progressive 
Achievement Test: Mathematics (Darr et al., 2007), designed for use with Year 3 
students and upwards. Each year-appropriate assessment is a multi-choice, written 
test that can be readily administered with a whole class of students at the same time. 
Other progressive achievement tests are available to assess reading comprehension 
and vocabulary, and listening comprehension. Since the 1960s, New Zealand primary 
schools have administered these near the beginning of the school year to provide 
information for planning mathematics programmes and to report to parents. Following 
their revision in 2006, the updated mathematics tests were aligned with the Numeracy 
Development Projects‟ stages as well as the curriculum levels (Ministry of Education, 
2007). Strengths of these standardised assessments are the reliability and validity of 
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the data (see Darr et al., 2007, p. 27 for details), and the ability to administer the 
assessment with a whole class. By applying a Rasch measurement model (Rasch, 
1980), a student‟s total score locates their achievement on an interval scale – the 
“PAT: Mathematics scale” (Darr et al., 2007, p. 22) – allowing their progress to be 
tracked from year to year on the same scale. Furthermore, the difficulty of individual 
items has been mapped against this scale, furnishing specific information about item 
difficulty. Online reports of individual and class achievement results, broken into 
mathematics domains, can support teachers to plan for students‟ learning needs and 
report to parents.  
Using collections of these items that have been statistically calibrated for difficulty has 
the potential to yield fairly precise measurements of students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy beliefs to be made. For instance, when a student strongly agrees that they can 
solve a problem with a low difficulty level, it does not convey the same information as 
the same response for a very difficult problem. Previous studies (for example, 
Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008; Relich, DeBus, & Walker, 1986; Schunk & Hanson, 
1989) have used number problems or problem types of varying difficulty, but including 
more specific information about where individual items are located on a difficulty scale 
was intended to add to the rigour of the present study‟s findings.  
One final feature of the assessment landscape in New Zealand is the national 
standards for reading, writing, and mathematics (Ministry of Education, 2009) that were 
implemented in New Zealand schools in 2010. These involve teachers making overall 
judgments about a student‟s achievement relative to individual standards in these key 
learning areas. Teachers‟ judgments may incorporate students‟ performance on formal 
assessments, although the prime source of information is intended to be teachers‟ 
observations of students when working with the teacher, and when working 
independently. The intention is that by monitoring students‟ achievement against 
national standards, students who are not achieving the expectations for their year can 
be identified early and teachers and schools can devise ways to support those 
students‟ learning. The implementation of national standards has also emphasised 
regular “plain English” reporting to parents of their children‟s achievement in literacy 
and mathematics. The Ministry of Education has been developing support materials to 
help teachers use moderation processes to consistently align their judgments of 
student achievement of the standards with – in the case of mathematics – stages on 
the Number Framework and therefore approximate curriculum levels, and performance 
in Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics and e-asTTle.  
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Students’ beliefs about learning mathematics 
The present study of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence was intended to help build our understanding of how students‟ 
perceptions of their “personal success and capability” (Ministry of Education, 1999, 
p. 3) are associated with their achievement in mathematics. Although there is an 
array of assessment tools available to New Zealand teachers to furnish estimates 
of student achievement in mathematics, instruments to measure students‟ self-
beliefs as learners of mathematics are not presently available. A small number of 
psychological tests are available to gauge primary students‟ more general self-
concept, self-esteem, and emotional literacy (see http://www.nzcer.org.nz/tests).  
An emphasis on the importance of students‟ self-efficacy and beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence has been implicit in recent Ministry of Education 
publications that have shaped education in New Zealand. The Report of the 
Literacy Taskforce (Ministry of Education, 1999) stated that, “Student achievement 
is influenced by personal, cultural, family, and school factors. Feelings of personal 
success and capability, as well as personal interests and liking for a subject, have a 
strong bearing on progress and learning outcomes” (p. 3). In the current curriculum 
document (Ministry of Education, 2007), the key competencies include “Managing 
self”, which “is associated with self-motivation, a „can-do‟ attitude, and with students 
seeing themselves as capable learners” (p. 12). However, the key competencies do 
not have specific achievement objectives as do the learning areas such as the arts, 
social sciences, and mathematics. Although the role of students‟ motivation and 
self-belief is alluded to in these documents, there are no explicit messages that 
compel any action in this regard. 
Teachers are expected to report on students‟ progress with reference to curriculum 
expectations, and more recently, national standards. Because there are no 
curriculum expectations or national standards related to students‟ self-beliefs, these 
are unlikely to be monitored by teachers, and most teachers probably have neither 
evidence of how their students see themselves as learners of mathematics, nor 
strategies with which to respond to students‟ reported perceptions. In line with the 
curriculum‟s focus, recent professional development programmes and development 
of assessment instruments have concentrated on mathematics content, rather than 
on students‟ beliefs.  
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The researcher’s background 
A background of primary teaching, mathematics education, and mathematics-
related research contributed to the foundation from which I undertook this study.  
My experience over a number of years as a primary-school teacher, lecturer in 
primary mathematics education, and facilitator for the Numeracy Development 
Projects, gave me a depth of knowledge related to teaching mathematics to primary 
students, and to teaching teachers. In order to apply this in a school setting, in 
2004 I took up a teaching role that included the leadership of mathematics in a 
large, suburban primary school, where I later became assistant principal. 
Responsibilities included teaching groups of students who were identified as gifted 
and talented in mathematics, and students who were struggling to keep up with 
their peers in this important learning area. While there, I pursued my interest in 
research by collaborating with a university-based researcher and a group of 
teachers across a small group of Wellington schools to investigate the nature of the 
questions teachers ask during mathematics lessons (Bonne & Pritchard, 2007). 
Teacher-student interactions were also important in the present study, which 
investigated ways in which these can be shaped to strengthen students‟ beliefs 
about learning mathematics, with the goal of increasing their achievement. 
The present study was motivated by my experience of teaching groups of 7 and  
8-year-old students who had been identified by their teachers as achieving below 
the expectation for their age, and who were withdrawn from their classrooms for 
remedial mathematics lessons. Although diagnostic assessment information 
indicated that these students should have been able to successfully complete the 
mathematics activities with which they were presented, they were initially reluctant 
to engage with them, and it seemed likely that for these students to improve their 
achievement in mathematics, something more than their understanding of 
mathematics concepts needed to be attended to.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Students’ Mathematics Self-efficacy 
Educational practices should be gauged not only by the skills and 
knowledge they impart for present use but also by what they do to 
children‟s beliefs about their capabilities, which affects how they 
approach the future. Students who develop a strong sense of self-
efficacy are well equipped to educate themselves when they have to rely 
on their own initiative. (Bandura, 1986, p. 417) 
Theoretical underpinnings of self-efficacy 
Simon (2009) described the use of theories in mathematics education research as 
using lenses through which particular aspects of research might be illuminated, 
while others are left in the shadows. The use of multiple theories can shed light on 
a given situation from different angles, providing a better explanation than a single 
theory might (Cobb, 2007).  
Theories of learning seek to explain the complexities of learning and to 
demonstrate predictive power, and have the potential to help identify ways in which 
behaviour might be modified to improve learning outcomes. The seeds of social 
cognitive theory can be traced back to at least the 1940s, when social learning 
theory (Miller & Dollard, 1941) explained learning as a combination of drives, cues, 
responses and rewards, and included the role of observation and imitation in the 
learning of animals and people. At the time, it gained little traction due to the 
dominance of behaviourist theory, which asserted that an organism‟s behaviour is 
shaped by a combination of external stimuli in their environment and inherited 
characteristics. Also somewhat overshadowed at the time by behaviourism, Maslow 
(1943) developed a theory of motivation, based on a hierarchy of needs that must 
be met in order for an individual to achieve full psychological maturity (self-
actualisation).  
The 1950s saw a move away from behaviourist theory towards both humanistic 
psychology, of which Maslow is often referred to as the father, and cognitive 
psychology, associated with Chomsky. Around that time, Skinner‟s radical 
behaviourism was strongly criticised by Chomsky (1959), and the next two decades 
saw something of a renaissance of interest in cognition, motivation and affective 
processes, and the role of self-theories in psychology.  
Social learning theory – later expanded and renamed social cognitive theory – was 
originally based on tenets drawn from behaviourist operant conditioning. Then in 
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the 1970s Bandura distanced himself from behaviourism because, he claimed, it 
“reduces individuals to passive respondents to the vagaries of whatever influences 
impinge upon them” (1977a, p. 6). Furthermore, he stated, “A theory that denies 
that thoughts can regulate actions does not lend itself readily to the explanation of 
complex human behaviour” (p. 10).  
By the 1980s, Bandura‟s programme of research had expanded beyond a focus 
purely on learning, and social cognitive theory was well-established, proposing that 
a person‟s individual agency, cognitive functioning and self-beliefs played important 
roles in determining behaviour. By then, neo-behaviourists (for example, Wheldall, 
1987) were incorporating a cognitive element into their theory. During this decade, 
there was an increase in the focus on cognitive processes and information-
processing views of learning that had been a parallel stream since the 1960s, and 
the focus on the self waned. This was partly in response to perceptions about 
falling academic standards and the need to prioritise raising achievement. More 
recently, studies involving self-theories have increased, perhaps partly due to 
increased research into brain functioning, supported by advances in technology. 
Social cognitive theory 
Social cognitive theory is most closely associated with the work of Bandura (1977a, 
1977b, 1978, 1986), and seeks to explain human behaviour as a product of direct 
and indirect learning. Direct learning – also referred to as trial-and-error learning – 
occurs when the learner‟s behaviour is reinforced by rewards or punishments. 
Indirect learning – also referred to as vicarious learning and observational learning 
– occurs when the learner changes their behaviour without external reinforcement. 
In social cognitive theory, a distinction is also made between learning and 
performance, with the underlying thinking being that learning can occur by 
observing, but that what is learnt may not necessarily ever be performed.  
 
 
Figure 2.1.   Bandura’s (1978) triadic reciprocal causation. 
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Central to social cognitive theory is the tenet of triadic reciprocal causation 
(Bandura, 1978) (see Figure 2.1), which refers to the interactions of behaviour, 
internal personal factors (cognitive, affective, and biological states), and external 
environmental factors. An important feature of triadic reciprocal causation is that 
the individual is conceptualised as having opportunities to exercise some control 
over their life, rather than the environment and genetic inheritance on their own 
determining a person‟s destiny. In this dynamic relationship, different factors will 
have greater influence on other factors for different people, in different situations. 
Furthermore, it can take some time for a factor to exert its influence. As Bandura 
(1986) pointed out,  
Because the triadic factors do not operate simultaneously as a wholistic 
entity, it is possible to gain some understanding of how different 
segments of two-way causation operate without having to mount a 
Herculean effort to study every possible interactant at the same time. 
(p. 25) 
This is of particular relevance in the present study, where identifying relationships 
between personal factors and behaviour, and the effects of interventions that target 
environmental factors, was the focus. In the present investigation, the position is 
taken that the effect of teacher strategies such as the use of feedback 
(environmental factor) on students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and theory of 
intelligence (personal factors) is mediated by students‟ interpretation of and 
reaction to those strategies (behaviour). Although Bandura (1977a) claimed that 
behaviour, personal factors, and environmental factors “all operate as interlocking 
determinants of each other” (p. 10), the direct influences of personal and 
environmental factors on one another are not a focus of the present study.  
In social cognitive theory, achievement behaviours are influenced by a number of 
personal factors, key amongst which is a person‟s self-efficacy – the focus of  
this chapter. The attributions a person makes for their successes and failures will 
be included in the discussion of self-efficacy, so an overview of attribution theory is 
presented next. 
Attribution theory 
Attribution theory is included here because it is needed to explain aspects of self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence (discussed in Chapter 3). Like triadic reciprocity 
(Bandura, 1978), attribution theory can also be conceptualised as interactions of 
behaviour, personal factors, and environmental factors. Heider‟s (1958) work 
17 
 
included an attributional approach that distinguished between “factors within the 
person and factors within the environment” (p. 82). In the following decade, this 
was strengthened by Rotter‟s (1966) focus on internal/external factors, and then 
was further extended in the 1970s to include stability and controllability as factors 
(Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972). The four causes to 
which achievement success or failure is most often attributed were identified by 
Weiner (1979) as ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty, and to this list Clifford 
(1986) added the use of learning strategies. More recently, Dweck (2000) 
expanded on Weiner‟s (1979) ideas relating to the internal attributions of ability and 
effort to develop the concept of theory-of-intelligence. 
Weiner also devised three dimensions of attributions. The first is the location of 
responsibility for the outcome in relation to the student – internal or external – and 
builds on Rotter‟s (1966) work on the locus of control. Internal factors include 
ability, effort, and use of learning strategies, and external factors include task 
difficulty and luck. The second dimension differentiates stable and unstable causes 
according to how variable the perceived cause might be over time. Attributions vary 
in stability; unstable causes are attributed to temporary factors, such as succeeding 
with an assignment due to having extra help, while other causes are stable, such 
as an improved basic facts test score due to constant practice. The last dimension 
is the degree of control a student perceives they have over a cause. Luck is clearly 
an uncontrollable factor, while effort, on the other hand, is considered controllable.  
Understanding the difference between concepts of effort and ability is also 
important to attribution judgments, and Nicholls‟ (1978) development of four levels 
of reasoning helped explain this (Nicholls‟ levels are described in greater detail in 
the following chapter, in the section, The development of students’ conceptions of 
intelligence and ability). The research in this area in the late 1970s explored 
differences between the sexes. For instance, Nicholls (1978) found that boys 
tended to have higher self-concepts of ability and were more likely than girls to 
choose to tackle a challenging mathematics task. He noted that boys‟ confidence 
levels were “probably unrealistically higher” (p. 810). Dweck and Bush (1976) found 
some striking differences in the responses of girls and boys to feedback after 
failure, and to their predominant attributions. When girls were given feedback by an 
adult, they tended to attribute their failure to lack of ability, whereas boys tended to 
do this when the feedback came from one of their peers.  
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Attribution theory plays an important role in perceptions of self-efficacy by 
explaining how people account for behaviour and outcomes. In order to form 
efficacy assessments when a task is successfully completed, Schunk (2008) 
proposed that students consider ability, effort expended, task difficulty, how much 
help they needed, and their track record of successes and failures, as well as 
whether or not the student perceives the task to be worthwhile. If a student found a 
task very easy, for instance, and completed it successfully with a minimum of effort, 
this might have little impact on their self-efficacy. Similarly, a failure that can be 
attributed to events outside the student‟s control is likely to have only a slight effect 
on self-efficacy.  
Self-efficacy is connected to social cognitive and attribution theories. In social 
cognitive theory, individuals‟ self-beliefs are critical to their motivation and 
achievement, and involve their forming beliefs about what they can do, setting 
goals for themselves, anticipating likely outcomes, and planning courses of action 
to achieve their goals. Attribution theory helps to explain why a student‟s self-
efficacy might be influenced by the outcomes they achieve. In this way, a student‟s 
self-efficacy is postulated to influence, and in turn be influenced by, achievement.  
Disentangling self-efficacy from other self-constructs  
In the self-efficacy literature, other self-constructs are sometimes confused with 
self-efficacy. Ill-defined terminology and unclear differentiations in ways constructs 
are operationalised has plagued studies of self-constructs for many years. In 1968, 
Wylie commented on the need for “more clearly differentiated literal meanings and 
correspondingly differentiated operational definitions” (p. 753). More recently, Bong 
and Skaalvik (2003) have pointed out, “[A]cademic motivation researchers 
sometimes struggle to decipher the distinctive characteristics of what appear to be 
highly analogous constructs” (p. 1). A case in point is the tendency in the literature 
to confuse self-concept, self-esteem, and self-efficacy.  
Bandura (1986) defined self-efficacy as:  
… people‟s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute 
courses of action required to attain designated types of performances. It 
is concerned not with the skills one has but with judgments of what one 
can do with whatever skills one possesses. (p. 391)  
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The various ways in which researchers have interpreted this definition have 
resulted in its meaning sometimes seeming remarkably similar to other self-
constructs, further blurring the distinctions between constructs that already tend to 
overlap. These different interpretations have implications for the assessment of 
self-efficacy. 
Self-efficacy and self-concept seem to be closely-related constructs, similar to one 
another in that they both draw on self-evaluation of past performances, and also 
because perceived competence contributes to both. To varying degrees, both have 
been shown to predict achievement, as described in Valentine, DuBois and 
Cooper‟s (2004) meta-analysis. At the domain-related level, Pajares (1996a) 
suggested that the two might in fact be indistinguishable, according to evidence 
from a study involving secondary students (Skaalvik & Rankin, 1996). However, 
Pajares and Graham (1999) conducted an observational study that measured  
11-year-olds‟ mathematics self-efficacy and self-concept at the start and end of the 
same year, and found the latter to be more stable than the former. They reported 
that, after controlling for self-concept, “mathematics self-efficacy was the only 
motivation variable to predict mathematics performance both at the beginning and 
end of year” (p. 133).  
Bong and Skaalvik (2003) explained that the two constructs differ in some 
important ways. Self-concept, they suggested, involves an aggregated judgment, is 
oriented towards the past, and is thought to be fairly stable over time. It is 
sometimes assessed with items that ask students to make social comparisons, 
such as “Compared to others my age I am good at mathematics classes” (Marsh, 
1999, p. 2). Self-efficacy, on the other hand, is a context-specific judgment that 
Bong and Skaalvik described as future-oriented, and more malleable than self-
concept. The malleability of self-efficacy beliefs was illustrated by the results of 
Schunk‟s (1981, 1983a, 1983b, for example) experimental studies that identified 
increases in primary students‟ self-efficacy over short time periods, typically less 
than a week. The lack of evidence from experimental studies of self-concept (Bong 
& Skaalvik, 2003) makes it difficult to be certain how malleable it might be in 
comparison to self-efficacy.  
Self-concept and self-efficacy vary in specificity and abstraction. To illustrate the 
difference between these two constructs, when a person makes a judgment about 
their general academic ability, they are thought to be evaluating their self-concept,  
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and when they judge whether or not they will be able to correctly solve a given set 
of mathematics problems, they are evaluating their (in this instance, mathematics) 
self-efficacy. However, the lines become blurred when researchers (for example, 
Bong, 2006; Meyer, Turner, & Spencer, 1997) talk about mathematics self-efficacy 
as referring to a student‟s perception of their ability to succeed in the subject of 
mathematics, thereby demanding a future-focused, but aggregated judgment of 
their abilities in a wide variety of mathematics contexts. Context-specific self-
efficacy beliefs have been found to have greater predictive power for future 
achievement than do aggregated self-concept beliefs, and in fact, task-specific self-
efficacy beliefs are even more accurate predictors (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; 
Pajares & Miller, 1994, 1995).  
Self-efficacy judgments relate to a person‟s perceptions of what they can do – their 
task-specific capabilities – rather than a person‟s overall affective evaluation of their 
self-worth and the degree to which their behaviour matches their personal 
standards, otherwise known as self-esteem (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Schweinle & 
Mims, 2009). For example, a mathematician may have low self-efficacy for singing, 
but because this may be quite acceptable to them, it does not necessarily diminish 
their overall feelings of self-esteem, or affect their perception of themself as a 
mathematician. Although there appears to be no consistent association between 
self-esteem and self-efficacy, Bandura (1986) pointed out that “in many of the 
activities people pursue, they cultivate self-efficacies in what gives them a sense of 
self-worth” (p. 410). It is when self-efficacy is interpreted as a global self-belief that 
distinguishing it from self-esteem is likely to become more difficult (Chen, Gully, & 
Eden, 2004). Self-efficacy is a specific and contextualised judgment, made with 
reference to a particular goal, yet to be achieved. Its malleable nature has 
implications for teachers – through their interactions with students they can 
influence self-efficacy positively or negatively.  
Issues of interpretation and assessment 
Ways in which the construct of mathematics self-efficacy is interpreted by a 
researcher have implications for how it is assessed. To operationalise mathematics 
self-efficacy as a measurable entity, Bandura (1986) recommended that its 
assessment should require students to judge their ability to use the skills that are 
demanded by the performance tasks with which it will later be compared. Pajares 
(1996a) emphasised that for a measurement of self-efficacy to be reliable, it should 
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require students to make judgments about their ability to solve specific problems, 
rather than to make global judgments about how able they judge they are to do 
mathematics in general: 
Domain-specific assessments, such as asking students to report their 
confidence to learn mathematics or writing, are more explanatory and 
predictive than omnibus measures and preferable to general academic 
judgments, but they are inferior to task-specific judgments because the 
subdomains differ markedly in the skills required. (p. 547) 
As Skaalvik (1990) noted, Bandura‟s (1977b) definition of self-efficacy has been 
interpreted in different ways. Most of the empirical studies that included a measure 
of mathematics self-efficacy fall into two groups: those that interpreted mathematics 
self-efficacy beliefs as relating to specific mathematics problems or problem types, 
and those that interpreted these beliefs as relating to mathematics as a domain.  
Task-specific assessment of mathematics self-efficacy  
In 20 studies, predominantly from the US and dominated by Schunk and his 
colleagues (Anjum, 2006; Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Lloyd, Walsh, & Yailagh,  
2005; Norwich, 1987; Pajares & Graham, 1999; Relich et al., 1986; Schunk, 1981, 
1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1984, 1985, 1996; Schunk & Gunn, 1985, 1986; 
Schunk & Hanson, 1985, 1989; Schunk, Hanson, & Cox, 1987; Stevens, Olivárez, 
& Hamman, 2006), primary students as young as 7 years old were asked for their 
perceived ability to correctly solve particular mathematics problems or types of 
problems, prior to being asked to solve similar types of problems, to give an 
achievement measure. Many of these studies were experimental pre-test/post-test 
designs that included treatments of less than one hour‟s duration, over consecutive 
days (from two to seven). Most of the studies conducted by Schunk, a former 
student of Bandura‟s, involved students whose mathematics achievement was 
below expectations for their age. Generally, students‟ scores from Likert-scale 
items were totalled and averaged, with the data then (spuriously) treated as 
continuous for statistical analysis. Data such as these have often been incorrectly 
treated as interval data in the literature, assuming equal differences between any 
two adjacent points on the measurement scale, with means and standard 
deviations reported, as Jamieson (2004) highlighted. More correctly, the median 
and mode should have been reported, along with results of non-parametric tests 
such as the Kruskal-Wallis which is used to test whether the medians of three or 
more samples are equal. 
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The task-specific assessment method is consistent with Pajares‟ (1996b) 
recommendation that capabilities about which self-efficacy judgments are made 
should be the same capabilities that are later tested. This method also yields data 
about students‟ performance, to compare with their perceptions of their abilities to 
correctly answer these types of questions.  
More recently, a small group of studies (Chen, 2003, 2006; Chen & Zimmerman, 
2007; Ewers & Wood, 1993; Klassen, 2004; Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008; 
Skaalvik, 1990) has assessed mathematics self-efficacy at an even greater level of 
specificity. In these studies, of which only one (Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008) is 
an intervention study, the maths problems that primary students were asked to 
judge their ability to correctly solve were the identical problems they were later 
asked to actually solve. This allowed direct comparison of mathematics self-efficacy 
for specific problems with achievement on those same problems.  
What all these studies have in common is that they were underpinned by 
interpretations of mathematics self-efficacy that typically included some specificity. 
For example, Schunk (1981) defined perceived self-efficacy as being “concerned 
with judgments of one‟s capability to perform given activities” (p. 587), and then 15 
years later as “personal beliefs about one‟s capabilities to learn or perform skills at 
designated levels” (Schunk, 1996, p. 360). Similarly, Anjum (2006) explained self-
efficacy as a belief that one “is able to organize and apply plans in order to achieve 
a certain task” (p. 62). Such task-specific interpretations are consistent with 
Pajares‟ (1986c) claim that students‟ confidence to solve particular mathematics 
problems is a more powerful predictor of their actual ability to solve those same 
problems than is their domain-related judgment of their ability to achieve a top 
grade in mathematics. Based on the findings of comparative studies, such as 
Barrios (1985), Bandura (1986) recommended that self-efficacy should be 
measured in task-specific ways, as task-specific measures have greater 
explanatory and predictive power than global measures.  
It is important to note the apparent decline in intervention studies in this area 
reflected in the studies described above. This trend is in line with the findings of 
Hsieh et al. (2005), who examined the intervention studies reported in four key 
educational psychology journals. They analysed articles published in 1983, 1995, 
and 2004, and found that in 1983, 55% of all articles were intervention studies, 
dropping to 47% in 1995, and then to 35% in 2004. They also noted that the 
duration of interventions had decreased, with 26% of interventions in the 1995 
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journals lasting more than one day, but fewer than 16% of the 2004 articles 
describing interventions that exceeded a single day. The reasons for this, they 
suggested, were the increasing popularity of qualitative methods coupled with the 
costs and perceived challenges associated with conducting intervention studies. 
Domain-related assessment of mathematics self-efficacy 
The second group of studies measured mathematics self-efficacy using items that 
related to students‟ perceived ability to succeed in mathematics more generally (for 
example, Bong, 2009; Chamorro-Premuzic, Harlaar, Greven, & Plomin, 2010; 
Kung, 2009; Meyer et al., 1997; Schunk & Lilly, 1984; Tait-McCutcheon, 2008). 
What these studies measured is a more general, domain-related interpretation of 
Bandura‟s (1986) definition of self-efficacy, resembling self-concept. Their 
definitions of mathematics self-efficacy were generally related to mathematics as a 
subject, rather than specific mathematics problems. For example, Davis-Kean et al. 
(2008) described self-efficacy as “beliefs about ability to perform a behavior” (p. 
1257).  In the only New Zealand study of primary students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, Tait-McCutcheon (2008) defined mathematics self-efficacy even more 
broadly as “the judgements we make about our potential to learn successfully and 
the belief in our own capabilities” (p. 507). Bandura (1986) was critical of such 
interpretations, and proposed that measures of such general self-efficacy basically 
assess students‟ broad belief that they can make things happen without specifying 
what these things actually are. 
Three additional studies took an interpretation that fell somewhere between a broad 
interpretation and one that related to solving specific problems. Schweinle, Turner, 
and Meyer (2006) explained efficacy beliefs as “whether students believed that they 
had skills to perform mathematics tasks” (p. 278) more generally, and assessed 
this in relation to the overall content of students‟ daily mathematics lessons. Siegel 
and McCoach (2007) elicited students‟ self-efficacy in relation to judgments of their 
measurement skills, and Panaoura, Gagatsis, Deliyianni, and Elia (2010) asked for 
students‟ judgments of their perceived ability to work with decimals. Though their 
focus was narrowed from mathematics in its entirety to a given area of 
mathematics, no specific problems were used to elicit students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy judgments, so students were essentially being asked to judge their ability 
to solve imaginary problems. What was measured in these studies cannot be 
meaningfully aligned with studies that have adhered to recommendations regarding 
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specificity (Bandura, 1986; Pajares, 1996a). Because these studies are heading 
towards domain-related interpretations, their results do not contribute in a helpful 
way to an understanding of mathematics self-efficacy. 
Comparing these three different ways of interpreting and assessing mathematics 
self-efficacy, the task-specific approach provides students with the detail of specific 
problems, and students are presented with a visual representation of those 
problems. In contrast, the domain-related approach demands that students think 
abstractly about the general domain of mathematics, without particular details. 
Although other studies narrowed the focus slightly to a particular area of 
mathematics such as measurement, students were still expected to think in 
abstract terms, rather than in relation to concrete problems. Not only do the non-
task-specific interpretations fail to comply with Bandura‟s definition of self-efficacy, 
and his recommendations for assessment, they also have implications for the age 
at which thinking abstractly about mathematics as a domain might become 
developmentally appropriate. In some of the studies mentioned above, what is 
being represented as self-efficacy is probably indistinguishable from self-concept. 
What has emerged from analysing the treatment given to primary students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy in empirical studies is that the interpretation of 
mathematics self-efficacy needs to be commensurate with any variable with which 
it is to be compared. So, if a student‟s mathematics self-efficacy is to be compared 
to their performance on a set of measurement tasks, then they should be asked to 
make self-efficacy judgments in relation to those particular problems, or a parallel 
set of problems. This then allows some meaningful comparison of the mathematics 
self-efficacy and achievement data. If, on the other hand, a wider interpretation is 
adopted, then students might be asked to judge their ability to achieve a top grade 
for the term, and this could be compared to the relatively broad term grade data 
and still, according to Pajares (1996b), “remain highly predictive” (p. 1). However, 
Pajares (1996a) also suggested that domain-related self-efficacy is probably 
indistinguishable from self-concept, and that “the two may be measures of the 
same construct” (p. 563), so the validity of using this broader type of measurement 
to represent mathematics self-efficacy is questionable. The proliferation of different 
mathematics self-efficacy assessment instruments makes comparison across 
studies problematic. Comparison becomes even more challenging when studies 
have assessed mathematics self-efficacy at varying levels of specificity, perhaps 
measuring entirely different constructs. 
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The mismeasurement of mathematics self-efficacy 
An appeal of conceptualising mathematics self-efficacy as being domain related, 
rather than task specific, is that it has been possible for researchers to use the 
same items as those in a previous study, eliminating the need to pilot items each 
time. Examples of general academic self-efficacy assessment instruments used in 
the context of mathematics learning include the Patterns of Adaptive Learning 
Survey (Midgley & Maehr, 1991) that includes six self-efficacy items, subsequently 
used by Meyer et al. (1997). The Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire 
(Pintrich & De Groot, 1990) included nine generic items for measuring self-efficacy 
for a given subject, later used by Metallidou and Vlachou (2007). The participants in 
both of these studies were 10 to 12-year-olds, by which age students are likely to 
be able to understand the abstract demands of domain-related assessments better 
than younger students might. In an investigation of the mathematics self-efficacy of 
students younger than this, it is appropriate to make the items more concrete and 
to present students with specific problems, in pictorial form where possible, as 
reference points for their mathematics self-efficacy judgments.  
When a researcher has made the decision to interpret mathematics self-efficacy as 
task specific, they undertake to gauge students‟ mathematics self-efficacy using a 
range of problems that are appropriate to the students‟ ages and abilities, as well 
as the mathematical concepts that are of interest. Because this assessment is 
context specific, it is generally inappropriate to use pre-existing assessment 
instruments, and new items are typically developed. The development of 
mathematics self-efficacy assessment items must also take into consideration their 
alignment with curriculum and cultural contexts. The creation of appropriate 
assessments can be guided by models and instructions for constructing self-
efficacy scales included in Bandura (1986, 2006), although, as Pajares and 
Kranzler (1995) pointed out, little use seems to be made of the guidelines provided, 
resulting in the mismeasurement of self-efficacy.  
Having no universal items for gauging (task-specific) mathematics self-efficacy 
presents researchers with opportunities and challenges. Tailoring assessment 
items for a particular group of students has the advantages of presenting students 
with mathematics tasks that are meaningful in their cultural context, relevant to the 
target area of mathematics, and of an appropriate range of difficulty levels. As 
such, it can be an opportunity to generate authentic estimates of students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy. The challenge relates to the proliferation of assessment  
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instruments making their alignment with one another uncertain, particularly when 
the difficulty of the tasks presented is not rated on some universal difficulty scale. In 
the present study, items with statistically tested difficulty calibrations, from the 
Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics (Darr et al., 2007), allowed more 
precise measurements of students‟ mathematics self-efficacy beliefs to be made. 
For instance, when a student strongly agrees that they can solve a problem with a 
low difficulty level, it does not convey the same information as the same response 
for a very difficult problem. Previous studies (for example, Ramdass & Zimmerman, 
2008; Relich et al., 1986; Schunk & Hanson, 1989) have used number problems or 
problem types of varying difficulty, but including more specific information about 
where individual items are located on a difficulty scale was intended to add to the 
rigour of the present study‟s findings.  
In the measurement of latent variables such as mathematics self-efficacy, 
measures are only ever estimates of the target construct, and some variation must 
be tolerated. Where the aim is to investigate the relationship between mathematics 
self-efficacy and achievement, the precision of these estimates might be improved 
by including more exact information about the difficulty of the mathematics 
problems used. A judgment of low self-efficacy for a task that should be easy for a 
given age group, for instance, differs from a judgment of low self-efficacy for a 
much more challenging task. In studies that have assessed mathematics self-
efficacy and achievement of primary school students, it is usually reported that the 
mathematics problems were of varying difficulty levels. Sometimes these relative 
levels are judged by teachers (for example, Ewers & Wood, 1993; Norwich, 1987) 
and at other times they are estimated by researchers (for example, Bandura & 
Schunk, 1981; Chen & Zimmerman, 2007; Schunk, 1982). For instance, Chen and 
Zimmerman (2007) used items that were easy, moderately difficult, or difficult, to 
compare the mathematics self-efficacy of Taiwanese and American students. Using 
problems that have been statistically calibrated for difficulty might afford a greater 
degree of accuracy when self-efficacy and achievement data related to that 
problem are analysed, and therefore has the potential to add further information to 
the analysis. In contrast, when mathematics self-efficacy is assessed at an abstract 
level, it does not allow for self-efficacy to be scaled to task difficulty to give an 
indication of the calibration of self-efficacy with actual achievement. What is 
missing from the literature is research that uses a collection of problems whose 
difficulty levels have been statistically rated on a continuous scale. 
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Looking across studies of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, there are 
other factors that vary widely. Although a number of studies mention a pilot of 
assessment instruments prior to the research being conducted (for example, 
Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Ewers & Wood, 1993; Klassen, 2004; Schunk, 1982), 
details of what the piloting revealed are not included. Few research papers 
(Klassen, 2004; Relich et al., 1986) reported that a factor analysis of their 
mathematics self-efficacy items had been undertaken to provide evidence in 
relation to the extent to which their items are indeed measuring the same factor. In 
addition, ordinal data generated from Likert-type scales have typically been treated 
as quantitative, predominantly using mean scores for analysis, and statistical 
methods such as analysis of variance and multiple regression have been applied. 
In some studies (Ewers & Wood, 1993; Schunk, 1981, 1983c; Skaalvik, 1990), 
mathematics self-efficacy scores have been dichotomised, allowing for more direct 
comparison with performance success on similar, or the same, tasks. For instance, 
in Ewers and Wood‟s (1993) study with 10 to 11-year-old participants, students 
indicated their self-efficacy for particular problems on a 5-point Likert-type scale. 
The total number of problems for which they rated their self-efficacy 3 or higher was 
used as their mathematics self-efficacy score.  
Because of the many variations and limitations of previous studies, it is important to 
closely examine the claims made about how primary students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy is related to other variables – the focus of the following section. 
Factors that contribute to self-efficacy 
Factors that contribute to self-efficacy have been identified from empirical studies 
discussed in this section. The latent structure of these factors has been confirmed 
(Lent, Lopez, Brown, & Gore, 1996; Usher & Pajares, 2009) by testing the fit of 
different models to the data. Bandura (1997) listed the information sources that are 
thought to contribute to a student‟s self-efficacy in order of magnitude of effect:  
a student‟s past performances; vicarious experiences; social persuasion; and 
somatic (physiological and emotional) states. Although these are predominantly 
personal factors, there is also interaction with behaviour and environment factors. 
Collectively, these factors are appraised by the student to arrive at a self-efficacy 
judgment. Each of these factors is discussed here, with reference to relevant 
empirical research.  
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Past performances 
According to Usher and Pajares (2009), a student‟s past performances have the 
greatest influence on their self-efficacy. Their multiple regression analysis indicated 
that mastery experiences explained more than 20 per cent of the variance in the 
mathematics self-efficacy of Grade 6 to 8 students. Put simply, successes tend to 
raise self-efficacy and failures to lower it. If a student has been successful at 
applying a particular skill in the past, then they are likely to believe that they will be 
successful at this again in the future. However, there are many nuances relating to 
the connection between past performances and self-efficacy, with the influence of 
successes and failures modulated by the attributions a student assigns to these 
outcomes. Generally speaking, successful performances that might have the 
greatest positive impact on self-efficacy are those which have demanded effort and 
perseverance, together with skills application, to realise an appropriately 
challenging goal. It is important to note, though, that the same achievement might 
not have the same impact on all students. Klassen (2004) suggested there would 
be different effects on students‟ mathematics self-efficacy of gaining a B grade 
because while this might be a notable success for one student who usually 
achieves a C grade, for another who is used to attaining an A grade, it might 
represent disappointment. Empirical testing of this point might help further explain 
the association between mathematics self-efficacy and achievement suggested in 
previous studies. 
Self-efficacy also predicts subsequent achievement, so the relationship between 
self-efficacy and achievement is reciprocal in nature. In Bandura‟s (1984) paper, he 
highlighted a group of studies with adult participants for whom their self-efficacy 
beliefs were actually a better predictor of later behaviour than was past 
performance. In Feltz‟s (1982) study of 80 university students – experienced 
swimmers – who attempted four dives from diving boards of different heights, a 
path analysis showed that performance was a significant predictor of subsequent 
self-efficacy for diving, and that the strength of the predictive power increased for 
each successive dive. A similar predictive relationship was evident between self-
efficacy for diving and subsequent performances. This supported the idea that the 
relationship between achievement and self-efficacy is reciprocal, and that as one 
strengthens, so should the other in something of a spiral effect. Whether or not it 
makes a difference if the student is learning a physical skill or an abstract concept 
needs to be the focus of further research before any claims can be made. 
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Vicarious experiences  
Vicarious experiences have less impact on self-efficacy than do a student‟s own 
past performances. According to Bandura (1986), observations of success by 
similar peers raise a person‟s self-efficacy, and observed failures lower self-efficacy 
beliefs. Schunk and Hanson (1985) found that observation of peer models had a 
greater positive impact than observing teacher models on the self-efficacy of a 
group of primary students for whom subtraction was difficult. Schunk (1981) had 
already established that observing a teacher model who verbalised their thinking as 
they solved division problems was more beneficial to students‟ learning than 
instruction in the form of explanatory written notes. Both forms of instruction 
enhanced students‟ self-efficacy.  
In 1987, Schunk, Hanson, and Cox built on this work with a pair of experimental 
studies. In the first, students assigned to four treatment groups completed pre-tests 
of their self-efficacy and fractions skills before they were shown videotapes of a 
teacher and a student who was learning to solve fraction problems. The peers in 
the videotapes varied by gender and by the behaviour they modelled – either 
mastery or coping behaviour. After students viewed the tapes, they rated their 
interest, self-efficacy for solving fraction problems, and perceived similarity to the 
model. In the second study, the treatments were similar except that this time, 
students were shown videotapes of either one or three peer models. They were 
then asked to nominate which of the models they perceived to be most similar to 
them. The findings from these two experimental studies indicated that observing 
either a single model or multiple models of a peer who gradually overcame initial 
difficulties had more positive effects on self-efficacy and performance than 
observing mastery models. The authors cautioned, though, that coping models 
might be interpreted differently by students who had experienced more success 
with learning than these remedial students had, and therefore might have different 
effects on their self-efficacy and achievement. 
In a further component of their work relating to the use of models, Schunk and 
Hanson (1989) experimented with showing students videotapes of themselves 
solving fractions problems, and found that students who observed themselves 
modelling successful problem solving showed higher self-efficacy and performance 
than students who did not. The benefits of self-modelling were similar to those 
yielded by observing similar peers, and coping and mastery self-models appeared 
to be equally effective. As Schunk and Hanson pointed out, simply showing 
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students videotapes of themselves solving fractions problems will not, on its own, 
improve students‟ self-efficacy and achievement; instruction and feedback from the 
teacher are also needed to build students‟ mathematics self-efficacy. 
Social persuasion, including feedback 
Students‟ interactions with their parents, siblings, peers, and teachers can influence 
their self-efficacy. Teacher-student interactions, including verbal persuasion and 
feedback, have less influence on self-efficacy than either students‟ past 
performances or vicarious experiences, according to Bandura (1986). 
Encouragement and persuasion from teachers will be effective only if students 
subsequently experience success. Teachers can capitalise on this; when they 
encourage a student to engage in a task and the student succeeds with that 
particular task, the teacher can reinforce the student‟s self-efficacy by giving them 
specific feedback that describes what they did that made them succeed. On the 
other hand, to tell a student, “Come on. You can do it!” will not build their self-
efficacy if they then perform poorly.  
The difficulty of the task is a factor in determining what type of feedback might build 
a student‟s self-efficacy and also contributes to a teacher‟s decision about the 
degree of scaffolding they will provide the student as they work on a task. If a 
student finds a task easy, it gives them no new information about their ability, and 
to give them feedback about how hard they worked is unlikely to strengthen their 
self-efficacy (Schunk, 1983a). There is some evidence that effort-attributional 
feedback is effective with tasks of moderate difficulty (Weiner et al., 1972). But the 
more difficult the task, the greater amounts of both effort and ability that are likely to 
be needed for success, and to give students feedback about either effort or ability 
alone may lose credibility, according to Schunk.  
The effects of attributional feedback to students was investigated in the 1980s, in a 
series of experimental studies (Schunk, 1982, 1983a; Schunk & Gunn, 1986) 
whose participants were all in the 7 to 11-year range and had difficulties learning 
mathematics. Teacher-student feedback that attributed these students‟ past 
performances to effort promoted self-efficacy and achievement, and was more 
effective in building self-efficacy than feedback about future effort (Schunk, 1982). 
However, Schunk‟s (1983a) study found that students given only ability-attributional 
feedback had higher self-efficacy and performance than students who received 
effort-attributional or a combination of ability and effort-attributional feedback, and 
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that these students in turn had better results than those in the no-feedback 
treatment. Schunk and Gunn‟s (1986) study, with fifty 9 to 10-year-olds, showed 
that students who attributed their problem-solving success to ability had greater 
improvements in achievement than those who attributed their success to effort. 
This might be partly related to these students‟ ages, at which they are likely to be 
developing greater clarity about the concepts of ability and effort (Nicholls, 1978). 
The students in these studies were all achieving poorly in the target area of 
mathematics, and it is possible that ability- and effort-attributional feedback from 
teachers might have different effects on students whose achievement is meeting, or 
beyond, the expectations for their age.   
Relich et al.‟s (1986) experimental study with 84 students (11 to 12-year-olds) who 
had poor division skills, comprised treatments that varied by the presence of 
teacher modelling and feedback that combined effort and ability attributions, for 
example, “„That‟s correct; see, you have the ability to do divisions when you try 
hard‟” (p. 204). Thirty-minute treatment sessions were held over eight consecutive 
school days. Their results showed that teacher modelling alone was associated 
with improved student achievement and that when this was coupled with 
attributional feedback, self-efficacy was raised and achievement further enhanced. 
What cannot be discerned from their results, though, is whether students might 
have responded to the ability component of the feedback, the effort component, or 
both.  
For feedback to impact on a person‟s self-efficacy, they must have confidence in 
the person giving it, according to Bandura (1986). Where the perceived credibility 
and expertise of the person providing feedback is high, the feedback they give is 
thought to influence self-efficacy. Empirical studies in this area appear to have 
focussed on students at the tertiary level, due in part to convenience for university-
based researchers. In Crundall and Foddy‟s (1981) experimental study with 
psychology undergraduates, students performed perceptual tasks that involved 
tracking the path of a light using a wand. As well as timing how long they held the 
wand over the light, students completed a self-assessment that included estimating 
their total score and their certainty about their estimate (later interpreted as an 
indicator of their self-efficacy). Treatments varied by: the presence of an evaluator 
during the tasks; whether or not the evaluator was introduced to them as someone 
who had considerable experience in observing people undertake this task or as 
someone like themselves, who had never done this before; and whether or not 
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participants were provided with an estimated score by the evaluator. The findings 
indicated that the students were more accepting of evaluations made by evaluators 
with greater vicarious experience of a task than their own, rather than similar 
experience. Although no studies were located that examined the question of 
whether confidence in the evaluator makes a difference with younger students, it 
seems likely that primary students would generally have a high degree of 
confidence in their teachers and in the feedback their teachers give them.  
The relative influence of learning goals is not yet clearly defined. Both the focus of 
the goal and its proximity to a student‟s current capabilities have been shown to be 
associated with self-efficacy. In a pair of studies in 1996, Schunk found that goals 
related to learning strategies for fractions problem solving were associated with 
higher achievement than performance goals, related to correctly solving given 
fractions problems. In addition, one of the studies involved students‟ self-evaluation 
of their problem-solving capabilities. The results showed that students‟ self-efficacy 
and skill increased where their goal was learning, with or without self-evaluation, 
and students whose goal was performance also experienced higher self-efficacy 
and skill when they self-evaluated.  
Working with 7 to 10-year-olds who had difficulty with subtraction, Bandura and 
Schunk‟s (1981) experimental study found that proximal goals were associated with 
the most statistically significant increases in self-efficacy and achievement, 
compared to no goals or distal goals. Schunk‟s (1983b) experimental study also 
identified a significant main effect of proximal goals on 9 to 12-year-old students‟ 
self-efficacy for division problems. In another of his experimental studies, Schunk 
(1985) found that self-set goals were associated with higher self-efficacy and skill 
acquisition than teacher-set goals, or no goals. More recently, Schunk and Pajares 
(2002) have proposed that proximal and specific learning goals provide students 
with a yardstick against which to monitor their learning progress and success. 
Without clear learning goals, Schunk (1990) argued, students may not recognise 
the progress they have made, so goal-setting can impact positively on self-efficacy. 
What is more difficult to pinpoint is where achievement belongs in the ordering of 
causal relationships. For example, might proximal goals influence learning which 
then causes an increase in self-efficacy, rather than proximal goals causing 
increased self-efficacy which then impacts on learning? For that matter, might 
learning and self-efficacy develop almost simultaneously? What these studies have 
shown is that goals, or learning intentions as they are more commonly referred to in 
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New Zealand, need to be proximal and challenging, with clear success criteria. The 
power of goals seems to lie in their potential to inform students of their learning, 
which in turn can motivate students to strive to achieve their goals.  
Physiological and emotional states  
Finally, physiological and emotional states – coupled here because both are 
considered to affect the body – help to shape self-efficacy judgments. For example, 
physical signs of anxiety such as a rapid heartbeat or sweaty palms can undermine 
a student‟s belief that he or she can successfully complete a task (Bandura, 1986). 
Although this might apply to academic tasks, in relation to physical tasks – in this 
case, diving – Feltz (1982) found that heart rate and self-efficacy were not 
consistently related. Bandura (1997) also suggested that fatigue and stress might 
influence self-efficacy. How events are interpreted can be influenced by mood 
states, according to Isen (1987). High levels of anxiety can lead to task avoidance 
and negative self-efficacy for that type of task. By the same token, self-efficacy can 
be enhanced by feeling happy and relaxed. It seems likely that for different 
activities there may be optimal levels of arousal for performance, which may also 
be associated with optimal levels of self-efficacy. 
Although several studies have confirmed physiological and emotional factors as 
contributing to self-efficacy of secondary school and university students (for 
example, Lent, Brown, Gover, & Nijjer, 1996; Lopez & Lent, 1992), studies that aim 
to elaborate how physiological and emotional factors influence the self-efficacy of 
primary students are lacking in the literature. This might be related in part to the 
difficulties associated with obtaining reliable information about younger students‟ 
emotional and physiological states. The identification of these four contributing 
factors – past performances, vicarious experiences, social persuasion, and 
physiological and emotional states – has provided a starting point for intervention 
studies, such as the present investigation and those described later in Interventions 
to raise students’ mathematics self-efficacy. 
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The effects of students’ mathematics self-efficacy 
Bandura (1997) stated that self-efficacy beliefs:  
…influence the courses of action people choose to pursue, how much 
effort they put forth in given endeavors, how long they will persevere in 
the face of obstacles and failures, their resilience to adversity, whether 
their thought patterns are self-hindering or self-aiding, how much stress 
and depression they experience in coping with environmental demands, 
and the level of accomplishments they realize. (p. 3)  
The most relevant of these links, and the nature of their relationships, are 
scrutinised in the following section by examining empirical studies whose 
participants were primary students, wherever such studies could be located. 
Students with high self-efficacy are more likely to try hard, persevere at difficulty, 
and seek help at appropriate times, while those with lower self-efficacy are likely to 
exert less effort, give up easily, and seek help that will enable them to complete the 
task without necessarily engaging in the intended learning.  
Bandura (1977b) hypothesised that self-efficacy influences how much effort a 
person is willing to apply. In their experimental study with 90 psychology students, 
Bandura and Cervone (1983) found that self-efficacy was a predictor of 
performance. The stronger that students‟ self-efficacy was for achieving their goals 
and the higher their dissatisfaction with a previous substandard performance, the 
greater were students‟ subsequent effort and achievement. Students with high self-
efficacy were more likely to set challenging goals in Locke, Frederick, Lee, and 
Bobko‟s (1984) study, and to choose to take on more difficult levels of performance 
than those whose self-efficacy was low. As already discussed, the former students 
are also more likely to persevere with these tasks, while the latter are likely to give 
up more easily. Pre-requisite conditions for increased achievement might include 
students having clear proximal goals, and high levels of self-efficacy, which then 
might motivate students to apply the necessary effort. Also important is a 
foundation of skills on which to build, and the provision of tasks that present 
students with an appropriate degree of challenge. 
Effort and persistence are often discussed together in the literature. They are 
differentiated by the manner in which they are operationalised and measured, with 
effort generally measured by self-evaluation (for example, Salomon, 1984), and 
persistence indicated by the time students nominate to spend on a challenging task 
(for example, Bandura & Schunk, 1981).  
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Empirical studies have investigated the relationship between the mathematics self-
efficacy and persistence of primary students with difficulties in mathematics 
(Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Schunk, 1983a, 1983b, 1983c). In these studies, 
students were asked to solve a set of easy tasks and a set of tasks that were 
difficult for them. Persistence was measured by timing how long they spent on the 
difficult tasks. The findings, though, have been mixed. In Bandura and Schunk‟s 
(1981) study, moderate positive correlations were found between mathematics self-
efficacy, perseverance, and correctly solving difficult problems. Schunk‟s (1982) 
study, however, found that as students became more skilful at subtraction, they did 
not spend less time post-treatment on the same easy problems they had solved 
pre-treatment. He suggested this might be because some students simply prefer to 
work slowly. Then in his 1983a study, Schunk found that post-intervention self-
efficacy and skill were negatively correlated with persistence. Several factors might 
influence this measure of perseverance. For example, a student might spend only a 
short time on a problem because they quickly realise it is beyond their current 
understanding, because the task does not engage them, or because they do not 
perceive the task as worthwhile. The reasons that underpin the time spent on 
problems by students of a wider range of abilities needs to be clarified by further 
research, in particular, research that investigates the optimal gap between actual 
ability and self-efficacy, using calibrated items. 
That mathematics self-efficacy is a predictor of achievement is well established 
across a range of education contexts (for example, Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 
1999; Pajares & Miller, 1994; Schunk, 1981; Schunk & Hanson, 1985). In their 
study of secondary school students‟ mathematics self-efficacy in a problem-solving 
context, Pajares and Kranzler (1995) used path analysis to identify a direct effect of 
self-efficacy on performance (β = .35). Stevens (2009) described mathematics self-
efficacy as mediating the effect of ability on achievement. Other studies in contexts 
as diverse as musical performance anxiety (Kendrick, Craig, Lawson, & Davidson, 
1982) and smoking cessation (Mermelstein, Lichtenstein, & McIntyre, 1983) have 
found that self-efficacy is a better predictor of behaviour than is past performance. 
In an education setting, the relationship between self-efficacy and achievement is 
thought to be reciprocal (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, 2008) (see Past performances, 
earlier in this chapter).  
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Looking beyond primary school, mathematics self-efficacy has also been found to 
be associated with US students‟ intentions to enrol in future mathematics courses 
at high school (Stevens, Wang, Olivárez, & Hamman, 2007) and college (Lent, 
Lopez, & Bieschke, 1993). Hackett and Betz‟s (1984) study identified gender 
differences in career choices that were associated more strongly with perceived 
mathematics self-efficacy than with actual mathematics achievement, with young 
women more likely than men to avoid careers that necessitated using aspects of 
mathematics. 
Trends in mathematics self-efficacy 
The identification of trends in data is important in explaining and understanding a 
phenomenon. Data from empirical studies that have gauged mathematics self-
efficacy of students of primary school and beyond have been used to identify trends 
associated with students‟ age and gender, both of which were investigated in the 
present study. Although a number of empirical studies have investigated 
relationships between self-efficacy and ethnicity, this literature is not included here 
because examining differences associated with ethnicity was not an aim of the 
present study.  
Students’ age 
There is disagreement about the way self-efficacy develops over the primary school 
years. On the one hand, Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1990) found an increase 
in mathematics self-efficacy from fifth to eighth grades. On the other hand, some 
assessments of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy have indicated that it 
tends to decline with age (Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 1993; Frey & 
Ruble, 1987), although in addition to maturation this change might also be due to 
the increasing difficulty of mathematics tasks as students progress through school, 
and accumulated environmental effects of the school system (for example, ability-
based grouping and the type of teacher-student feedback). As students‟ cognitive 
skills develop during primary school, they are thought to develop more accurate 
self-appraisal skills (Nicholls & Miller, 1984). However, the studies cited above were 
all cross-sectional in nature; a lack of longitudinal studies makes it difficult to know 
what the typical trajectory of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy over time 
might in fact be. 
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According to Pajares (1996a), students‟ self-efficacy tends to be high in the early 
primary school years, and at this age students often over-estimate their capabilities. 
He suggested that when a student‟s self-efficacy is just slightly over-estimated, it 
should result in their increased effort and perseverance at a task, thereby positively 
influencing their performance. Bandura (1997) also maintained that the ideal is for a 
student‟s self-efficacy beliefs to be slightly beyond their actual skill level. However, 
it is not helpful for a student‟s learning when their self-efficacy for completing a 
particular task goes well beyond their actual skill level, because they are unlikely to 
seek the help they probably need to successfully complete the work.  
Students‟ self-efficacy has been found to slip at transition points, such as the shift 
from primary to intermediate schools (Eccles & Midgley, 1989). This is thought to 
be related to the many associated changes. For example, instead of spending their 
whole day with the same teacher, students are likely to rotate around several 
teachers with the result that their relationships with teachers may not be as close 
as those they had during primary school. Additionally, they will probably have their 
peer networks disrupted by re-grouping of students across classes. Teaching is 
likely to be less focussed on the concrete experiential learning that is generally a 
hallmark of the primary years, and instead to introduce content of a more abstract 
nature, in line with typical developmental stages.   
More measurement of mathematics self-efficacy has focused on the self-efficacy of 
intermediate and secondary school students than those at primary school. A 
significant body of research has investigated aspects of the relationship between 
mathematics self-efficacy and outcomes at secondary and tertiary levels (for 
example, Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Pajares & Miller, 1994; Zimmerman, Bandura, 
& Martinez-Pons, 1992), using a mixture of task-specific and domain-specific self-
efficacy measures. What the majority of these studies have in common is that they 
aimed to establish relationships between self-efficacy and other constructs, such as 
interest or achievement, and generally involved one-off, self-report measures of 
self-efficacy. 
To reliably identify how mathematics self-efficacy might change with age, 
longitudinal studies are necessary rather than piecing together results from studies 
with participants of different ages, in a jigsaw-like fashion. Two longitudinal studies 
of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy (Kenney-Benson, Pomerantz, Ryan, 
& Patrick, 2006; Liew, McTigue, Barrois, & Hughes, 2008) have taken non-task- 
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specific interpretations of mathematics self-efficacy. For instance, Kenney-Benson 
et al. (2006) asked 10 to 13-year-olds to respond to statements such as, “I can do 
even the hardest maths work in my class if I try” (p. 16), and Liew et al. (2008) 
asked 6 to 9-year-old students whether they were “good at numbers” and “good at 
adding” (p. 518).  
One longitudinal study of primary students‟ mathematics self-efficacy (Pajares & 
Graham, 1999) operationalised self-efficacy in a task-specific manner. The 
mathematics self-efficacy of 11 to 12-year-olds in their first year at a middle school 
in the US was assessed on two occasions, 6 months apart, using two different 
exams. The data showed similar moderate positive correlations between the 273 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and achievement on both occasions. A 
decrease in mean self-efficacy at the second data collection point was attributed by 
the researchers to the more difficult exam content. However, using two different 
achievement measures that were not calibrated for difficulty makes drawing reliable 
conclusions problematic.  
Students’ gender 
A subset of mathematics self-efficacy research has examined the specific 
relationship between gender and mathematics self-efficacy, with mixed results. In 
Schunk and Hanson‟s (1985) experimental study of the influence of peer models on 
8 to 10-year-olds‟ subtraction learning, no significant gender differences in 
mathematics self-efficacy or achievement were identified. Neither were gender 
differences in self-efficacy or achievement found among the Norwegian Grade 6 
students in Skaalvik‟s (1990) study. Soon after that, however, a comparison of the 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement of gifted and average ability 10 to  
11-year-olds in the US found boys had higher self-efficacy ratings, irrespective of 
ability, and that boys tended to over-estimate more than girls did (Ewers & Wood, 
1993). This study did not identify any differences in the achievement of girls and 
boys. Gender differences in self-efficacy for different school subjects were identified 
by Eccles et al. (1993) who found that boys in Grades 1, 2, and 4 had higher self-
efficacy for mathematics and sport, while girls‟ self-efficacy was higher for reading 
and music, perhaps reflecting gender stereotypes at that time. No measure of 
students‟ achievement was included in Eccles et al.‟s study. More recently, Lloyd et 
al. (2005) identified that the Grade 4 and 7 girls in their study tended to have higher 
achievement than boys, although their mathematics self-efficacy was lower than 
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boys‟. The different results in this small collection of studies involving primary 
school students might reflect a gender difference emerging over the years, with 
cultural differences another possible contributor to the studies‟ disparate results. 
Moreover, different self-efficacy measures were used in each study, making it 
difficult to draw comparisons. 
Interventions to raise students’ mathematics self-efficacy  
Since Bandura‟s early work on self-efficacy, there has been a wealth of studies that 
seek to describe and explain self-efficacy and its role in student achievement, but 
fewer that have also explored the effects of interventions. Intervention studies have 
an independent variable that is manipulated by the researcher to identify the effects 
this has on a dependent variable. Experimental studies include the additional 
condition of random assignment of participants to treatment groups. From the data 
generated by studies that investigated the effects of such manipulations, 
associations can generally be reasonably inferred. However, in a systematic review 
of non-intervention studies that were published in 1994 and 2004, Robinson, Levin, 
Thomas, Pituch, and Vaughn (2007) noted that an increasing number of authors of 
descriptive studies have been making unfounded claims about causality and from 
these, prescriptive statements.  
Internationally there is still a relatively small body of research into the effects of self-
efficacy interventions with primary students. Schunk and his colleagues (Bandura & 
Schunk, 1981; Schunk, 1981, 1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1985, 1996; Schunk & 
Gunn, 1985, 1986; Schunk & Hanson, 1985, Schunk et al., 1987), however, have 
contributed much in this area, conducting a variety of experimental studies that 
identified associations between increases in the mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement of primary students – typically, students who struggled in the target 
learning area. From these studies, strategies to help build self-efficacy have been 
suggested, such as using similar peers as models rather than teacher models, and 
providing students with clear proximal learning goals. More recently, Farkota (2003) 
demonstrated positive effects on Year 7 students‟ mathematics self-efficacy of a 
direct-instruction intervention designed to increase students‟ academic skill levels. 
The intervention also increased students‟ mathematics self-efficacy levels during 
their first year at secondary school in Australia – a transition period for students that 
often has negative effects on achievement and self-efficacy.    
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Few interventions have involved teachers implementing strategies aimed at directly 
building students‟ mathematics self-efficacy in classroom settings; more commonly, 
students were withdrawn from the classroom to work one-to-one with a researcher 
(for example, Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008). In addition, reported interventions 
have tended to be short in duration, with no follow-up assessment to identify 
enduring or delayed effects, impacting on the strength of their findings.  
One recent, American study (Siegle & McCoach, 2007) included a four-week 
intervention, and showed that the 10 to 11-year-old participants reported increased 
self-efficacy for measurement tasks after a unit on measurement, during which their 
teachers modified their instructional strategies to include: 
 Sharing learning intentions with the students at the beginning of 
the lesson, making connections to these during the lesson, and 
revisiting their progress towards these at the end; 
 Supporting students to attribute poor performances to lack of 
effort (rather than lack of ability); 
 Highlighting students‟ progress, and praising their skill 
development;  
 Having students keep a record of their learning; 
 Using peer models (rather than teacher models) wherever 
possible, to help students see that they can master the material. 
Siegle and McCoach‟s (2007) study did not result in clear achievement gains for 
the students in the treatment group over and above those of the control group. 
They surmised this may have been because students were given insufficient 
opportunities to apply their increased effort and persistence, as the 4-week 
measurement topic comprised a number of sub-topics for which students had only 
one or two instructional sessions. As no follow-up data were collected, it is not 
known if students‟ increased self-efficacy levels endured and whether this might 
have had a delayed effect on their achievement. From the study‟s description it is 
unclear whether the mathematics self-efficacy items were measurement task 
specific, or related to measurement in general.  
In their meta-analysis of the relationships between self-efficacy, academic 
performance, and persistence, Multon, Brown, and Lent (1991) suggested that self-
efficacy interventions may be of greatest benefit to low-achieving students. 
Furthermore, they supported such work with primary students: 
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Perhaps a by-product of such interventions is that they accelerate the 
accuracy of self-appraisal processes that improves naturally over time. 
At any rate, given the potential value of primary prevention programs for 
school achievement problems … further research on self-efficacy-based 
interventions for younger students seems warranted. (p. 35) 
It has been suggested that by identifying a student‟s perceived self-efficacy early in 
their education, teachers can compare this information to the student‟s 
achievement data to help identify any disparity, and plan interventions to work 
towards their closer alignment, or to improve both, as appropriate (Pajares & Miller, 
1994). However, as Bandura (1977a) pointed out, because individual students have 
each had their own collection of efficacy-influencing experiences, each will interpret 
in their own way any new source of efficacy information so that changes in self-
efficacy across a class, following an intervention, will not be uniform.  
The lack of mixed-methods designs in mathematics self-efficacy 
studies 
Because self-efficacy research comes from the psychology tradition, one of the 
striking features of the mathematics self-efficacy empirical studies is the dominance 
of quantitative methods. Indeed, only three mixed-methods studies of mathematics 
self-efficacy were located, one of which related to college students (Goodykoontz, 
2008), and the second, to teachers‟ mathematics self-efficacy (Kahle, 2008). The 
third instance, Meyer et al.‟s (1997) study, prioritised their qualitative data from 
interviews conducted before, during, and after project-based mathematics 
instruction, with 14 students. Quantitative data comprised students‟ achievement 
information and their responses to a survey in which their self-efficacy was 
measured by items that were not problem specific, such as “I can do almost any 
problem if I keep working at it” (p. 507). Results from the quantitative data from 
such a small sample should be interpreted with caution. 
In the overwhelming majority of studies of primary students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, quantitative measures of mathematics self-efficacy and achievement are 
included, often with measures of other variables such as students‟ goal orientation 
or teachers‟ perceptions of students‟ abilities. The current knowledge has been built 
on a strongly quantitative foundation. Adding qualitative data that examine what 
underpins students‟ (and teachers‟) reported self-efficacy beliefs, could extend this 
knowledge.  
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Chapter summary 
The theoretical perspectives and relevant empirical evidence that underscore the 
importance of strengthening students‟ mathematics self-efficacy have been 
discussed. One central issue relating to existing studies of primary students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy is the persistent inconsistencies in interpretation and 
assessment of self-efficacy that preclude any meaningful discussion of the 
collective findings of self-efficacy studies. Self-efficacy is sometimes 
operationalised at a domain-related level and confused with self-concept, and at 
other times is interpreted at a task-specific level, as originally intended by Bandura. 
Typically, assessments have not included a consideration of the specific difficulty 
levels of mathematics problems about which self-efficacy judgments are made. A 
tendency to use data analysis methods developed for use with interval data, with 
data that are ordinal in nature, was evident in the research literature. 
A second issue is the paucity of longitudinal and mixed-methods studies to build a 
reliable picture of how students‟ mathematics self-efficacy changes over time, and 
how this might be associated with developments in achievement. Furthermore, past 
interventions in this area have generally been very short, with intervention effects 
assessed immediately afterwards rather than investigating the enduring effects – if 
any – of the short-term changes reported. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Students’ Beliefs about Intelligence  
A working definition of intelligence 
The assumption that everyone shares a common definition of intelligence is made 
even by researchers who seek to investigate differences in people‟s beliefs about 
intelligence. The term intelligence has been used by various researchers to mean 
different things, although their conceptualisations of intelligence have not been 
explicitly stated. Furthermore, ability and intelligence have often been used 
synonymously by researchers in education contexts.  
In this thesis, intelligence is conceptualised as comprising three dimensions: one, 
the complexity of knowledge and skill that can be learned in a given domain; two, 
the capacity for such learning; and three, the rate at which such knowledge and 
skill can be acquired. This working definition is compatible with Gardner‟s (1983) 
multiple intelligences, and with the knowledge acquisition component of Sternberg‟s 
(1985a) triarchic theory of intelligence, from which it was developed. 
Theoretical background 
Sternberg (1985b) explained that psychologists had been unable to agree on a 
definition of intelligence (or definitions for two other psychological constructs, 
creativity and wisdom). This lack of definition, he pointed out, made the 
development of explicit theories about intelligence difficult. In lieu of explicit theories 
of intelligence, he suggested that implicit theories – “constructions by people … that 
reside in the minds of these individuals” (p. 608) – could provide a useful 
conceptual framework from which explicit theories might then be developed. 
Sternberg described the purpose of eliciting people‟s implicit theories of intelligence 
(and other psychological constructs) as being to learn more about the nature of the 
construct under investigation.  
That same year, Sternberg (1985a) tackled the issue of defining intelligence, and 
proposed his (explicit) triarchic theory of intelligence which comprised three sub-
theories: creative intelligence, contextual intelligence, and analytical intelligence. In 
his broad conceptualisation of intelligence, creative intelligence is concerned with 
the way in which an individual responds to novel situations, and how he or she 
thinks innovatively to solve problems. Contextual intelligence relates to the way in 
44 
 
which individuals understand, adapt to, and shape their environments, and how 
they deal with everyday tasks. Analytical intelligence is responsible for analysis and 
critical evaluation, and resembles psychometric definitions of intelligence as 
measured by academic problem solving.  
Analytical intelligence was, in turn, conceptualised by Sternberg as being multi-
dimensional, comprising three components concerned with information-processing: 
meta-components, the higher-order processes responsible for controlling and 
monitoring cognitive functioning such as analysing a complex mathematics problem 
and choosing a strategy to solve it; performance components, the basic operations 
of cognitive processing, such as actually performing mental calculations or 
retrieving information from long-term memory; and knowledge acquisition 
components, the lower-order processes used for gaining new knowledge and 
developing new skills, for example, strategies for memorising basic facts. 
Researchers working in education contexts who have investigated students‟ beliefs 
about intelligence in academic settings seem to have adopted a knowledge-
acquisition interpretation of intelligence, focussing on an individual‟s capacity for 
learning.  
A few years after the publication of Sternberg‟s (1985a) triarchic theory of 
intelligence, Dweck and Leggett (1988) aligned their research to a social cognitive 
model in order to help explain students‟ behaviour – in this case, students‟ 
achievement. Based on a collection of Dweck and associates‟ studies, they 
proposed a model positing that students‟ achievement is influenced by their implicit 
theory of intelligence, and by the types of goals to which their theories of 
intelligence would predispose them. They conceptualised both theory of intelligence 
and learning goals as personal factors. Dweck and Leggett‟s (1988) model built on 
an earlier publication in which the effects of theory of intelligence had first been 
hypothesised (Dweck & Bempechat, 1983). The central tenet of the 1988 model 
was that individuals have one of two implicit theory of intelligence beliefs: an 
incremental belief that they can increase their intelligence; or an entity belief that 
their intelligence is stable and unalterable. According to Dweck and Leggett‟s 
theory, a student who believes intelligence is fixed has an entity theory of 
intelligence, and is likely to choose performance goals that will lead to positive 
judgments for good performance. These students will avoid negative ability 
judgments by avoiding challenges that might result in failure, according to the 
theory. In contrast, an incremental theorist believes intelligence can be increased, 
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and according to Dweck and Leggett, their goals are likely to focus on learning, so 
that they seek challenges, persist when these prove difficult, and are not as worried 
about consistently performing well. Under the theory, incremental theorists accept 
that making mistakes is associated with the learning process, and are not deterred 
by this. The underlying implication in studies of implicit theory of intelligence has 
been that having an incremental theory has positive effects, and an entity belief, 
negative effects, on students‟ achievement. Since proposing this model in 1988, 
Dweck and colleagues have conducted a number of studies in which students‟ 
achievement and their beliefs about the malleability of intelligence have been 
measured. Associations between implicit theory of intelligence and achievement, 
and ways theory of intelligence has been manipulated in intervention studies, are of 
particular interest for their potential to raise student achievement. 
The lack of definitions of intelligence in the research literature 
Dweck and her colleagues conducted a number of studies of what they termed 
implicit theory of intelligence over several decades (for example, Blackwell et al., 
2007; Dweck & Bempechat, 1983; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) with participants 
ranging in age from pre-schoolers to adults. In each of these studies, the 
researchers shied away from providing a working definition of how they interpreted 
the term intelligence. The lack of a definition of intelligence over a fairly extensive 
programme of research is one of a number of reasons that the work of Dweck and 
colleagues has been examined here with a somewhat sceptical eye, and is also 
why some of Dweck‟s research methods were tested in the present study. I will 
refer to a person‟s belief about the malleability of intelligence as their theory-of-
intelligence, to differentiate this implicit theory or belief, from the explicit theories 
described elsewhere in this thesis.  
The synonymous use of intelligence and ability pervades the research literature (for 
example, Cain & Dweck, 1995; Law, 2009; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Pepi, Alesi, & 
Rappo, 2008; Pomerantz & Ruble, 1997; Stipek & Gralinski, 1996), with 
considerable overlap in the ways intelligence and ability have been interpreted by 
researchers. Just as no definition was furnished for intelligence, so is ability 
typically left undefined. Both terms appear to be used to mean a capacity for 
learning. The studies that are scrutinised in this chapter therefore include those that 
have investigated primary students‟ beliefs about both intelligence and ability where 
they appear to be interpreted as a capacity for learning.  
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Dweck and Leggett (1988) used intelligence interchangeably with ability, defining a 
student‟s theory-of-intelligence as “their implicit conception about the nature of 
ability” (p. 262). Furthermore, Dweck and Leggett did not define intelligence, and in 
her more recent work, Dweck (2000) has continued to avoid doing so, “for there is 
no agreed-upon answer” (p. 60). Although Cain and Dweck (1989) did not give their 
own definition of intelligence, they hypothesised a model of intelligence comprising 
a stable capacity and a knowledge component that can be increased through effort. 
They surmised that people‟s definitions of intelligence include both components, 
and that whether someone was an entity or incremental theorist was determined by 
whether they focussed more on the stable capacity component or the malleable 
knowledge component. However, no published report of any empirical study that 
tested their theorised model could be located. It seems possible that the stable 
capacity in their model might have been consistent with the meta-components and 
performance components of analytical intelligence in Sternberg‟s (1985a) triarchic 
theory, and their knowledge component similar to Sternberg‟s knowledge 
acquisition, but these links were not made by the researchers, and neither were 
they empirically tested. A subsequent study by Mueller and Dweck (1998) included 
students‟ definitions of intelligence; the problems with that study are outlined 
shortly. 
The development of students’ conceptions of intelligence and ability 
Very few studies have actually investigated students‟ ideas about what intelligence 
is, or in the case of young children, what being smart might mean to them. As an 
indication of the paucity of research in this area, Kinlaw and Kurtz-Costes (2003) 
reviewed research related to children‟s definitions of intelligence, and summarised 
findings from three published studies, published around 10 years apart, showing 
how little attention this question has received. In one of the studies reviewed – 
Yussen and Kane‟s (1985) cross-sectional study – 71 first, third, and fifth graders 
were interviewed for their ideas about intelligence: its malleability, the influences of 
environment and heredity, visible signs of intelligence, and children‟s definitions of 
intelligence. Students were from 6 to 12 years old, and the researchers used the 
words intelligent and smart interchangeably. For example, each child was asked 
“What does it mean to say someone is smart” and then “What does it mean to 
someone is intelligent?” (p. 238). Children‟s verbal ability was measured to give an 
indication of their level of intellectual functioning.  
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Eleven categories of definition were developed from children‟s definitions: 
knowledge, thinking, problem solving, academic skills, social skills, arrogance 
(someone who thinks they know everything), being good at something, same (for 
children who said that being intelligent was the same as being smart, when asked 
the second definition question), miscellaneous, clever, and experiences (a person 
had had more and perhaps better experiences). How the researchers differentiated 
a definition that they classified as being good at something from another classified 
as clever is uncertain. To report children‟s definitions of intelligence, Yussen and 
Kane presented the percentage of the total number of definitions provided by 
children in each year group that were given each classification. They found that 
younger students (6 to 7-year-olds) tended to include social skills in their definitions 
more than older children, who instead focussed more on academic skills. Yussen 
and Kane suggested that this difference might be associated with the teaching foci 
at different stages of schooling. The inclusion of knowledge was greatest among 
the first graders, but did not decrease significantly for the older children. Almost half 
of the sixth-grade children indicated that intelligence meant the same to them as 
smart, although no first graders suggested this.  
Children in Yussen and Kane‟s study were also asked five questions relating to the 
malleability of intelligence, including whether a person could increase or decrease 
their intelligence. The items did not ask children for their beliefs about their own 
intelligence, instead referring to people more generally. For example, they were 
asked, “If someone is (smart/intelligent) as a child, can he/she be not so 
(smart/intelligent) when he/she grows up?” (p. 240). At all grades, particularly first 
grade, children were more likely to agree that intelligence can increase than they 
were to agree that it can decrease. Although no direct links were drawn between 
children‟s definitions of intelligence and their beliefs about how a person‟s 
intelligence could change, it seems likely that if young children include social skills 
in their definitions of intelligence, then they are perhaps more likely to be optimistic 
about people‟s intelligence increasing, than older children whose definitions 
focussed on academic skills. 
Cain and Dweck‟s (1995) mixed-methods study, also reviewed by Kinlaw and Kurtz-
Costes, included 139 students (6 to 11-year-olds) being asked “‟Do you know what 
the word „smart‟ means? What does it mean to say someone is smart in school?‟” 
(p. 34). Students‟ responses were classified as either: outcomes (for example, a 
student who gets most things right); processes, such as effort or learning-related 
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behaviours (like paying attention); ability, which Cain and Dweck described as 
“references to enduring knowledge or talent” (p. 41); external factors, such as help 
from their parents; and “other”. The first two of these categories – outcomes and 
processes – were set by the researchers, based on Dweck and Leggett‟s (1988) 
model that hypothesised that entity theorists would have outcomes-focused 
definitions of intelligence, and incremental theorists would have process-focussed 
definitions. The three remaining categories were developed from students‟ responses 
that did not fit these two categories. To quantitise
5
 the resulting categorical data, “For 
each child, the number of units in each category was summed and then converted to 
a proportion of the total units in the child‟s answer” (Cain & Dweck, 1995, p. 41), 
where a unit was any part of a response that matched one of the five categories. 
Means for each category by grade level were then calculated. Using these 
quantitative analytic methods on what was originally qualitative data is dubious at 
best, so the findings of this study should be interpreted with caution.  
Focusing on students‟ definitions that had been coded as outcomes and processes, 
Cain and Dweck identified no significant differences according to students‟ year level, 
and reported that “The most frequent criterion of intelligence was ability” (p. 45) – 
something of a tautology due to the synonymous way in which they have used 
intelligence and ability in their writing. One perhaps unsurprising difference that they 
highlighted was that younger students were more likely than older students to be 
unable to give a definition of smart. For students who were able to define smart, Cain 
and Dweck identified no developmental differences. Given the age range of their 
participants (7 to almost 11 years old), and the findings of other studies (for example, 
Kurtz-Costes, McCall, Kinlaw, Wiesen, & Joyner, 2005; Yussen & Kane, 1985), this 
finding is perhaps reflective of their specious data-analysis methods.  
Students‟ theory-of-intelligence was also measured, using three entity-belief items: 
 You‟re a certain amount smart and you really can‟t do much to 
change it; 
 How smart you are is something about you that you can‟t change 
very much; and 
 You can learn new things, but you can‟t change how smart you 
really are. (Cain & Dweck, 1995, p. 34) 
  
                                               
5
 In the mixed-methods literature, “quantitise” is used to mean the numerical translation of 
qualitative data (Sandelowski, Voils, & Knafl, 2009; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2006). 
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Each item was read to the child, who was then asked, “Does this sound right to 
you?” (p. 34). After their “yes” or “no” response (no other response was accounted 
for), the child was then shown a 3-point scale ranging from “That sounds really 
right” to “That sounds a little bit right” (p. 34) (with a parallel version for a negative 
response). This 2-step process yielded a 1 to 6 score for each item, with 6 
signifying a strong entity belief. However, the ordinal data from each student‟s 
scores for the three items were then inappropriately treated as interval data and 
averaged, before an analysis of variance was conducted, again casting doubt on 
their findings.  
The final study of children‟s beliefs about intelligence included in Kinlaw and Kurtz-
Costes‟ (2003) review, was Kurtz-Costes et al.‟s study, subsequently published in 
2005. They interviewed 100 students in Germany and 115 in the US, from 5 to 14 
years old, and asked them nine questions about being smart, including “What does 
it mean to be smart?” and “How do you know if someone is smart?” (p. 222). From 
a pilot with 20 children, the researchers established response categories of: 
“knowledge/achievement”; “effort”; “good citizen” (p. 222; for example, following 
directions, being well-behaved); and “other”. Their findings indicated that definitions 
most frequently included knowledge or achievement, and that the youngest children 
in the study were less likely than the older children to mention these. Younger 
students were more likely to give responses that were classified as “good citizen” or 
“other”, although almost no discussion of this was included. The older children 
tended to relate being smart to cognitive abilities, with the role of effort mentioned 
less by older than by younger participants. No significant difference between 
students from the two countries was evident. 
In the same study, a single question was used to determine participants‟ theory-of-
intelligence: “If you‟re not very smart, can you change to get smarter?” (p. 226). 
“Maybe” and “Yes” responses were collapsed into a single category which was then 
compared to “No” responses. Treating the theory-of-intelligence data this way, they 
found that German students tended to have an entity belief more than US students, 
and that older students in both countries were more likely than younger students to 
have an entity theory-of-intelligence. However, this is based on data from one item, 
and on classifying “Maybe” (or maybe not) as an affirmative response, making the 
findings less than robust.  
In their review of what was known about children‟s judgments of their intellectual 
competence and their thinking about ability, Stipek and MacIver (1989) pointed out 
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that, particularly during the first year of school, teachers tend to focus on 
establishing appropriate social behaviour and work habits, and on reinforcing the 
value of effort. It seems likely that younger students might perceive these 
behaviours as contributing to being smart or intelligent in a school context, which 
could account for the young children in Kurtz-Costes et al.‟s (2005) study giving 
more responses than older participants that were classified as “effort”, “good 
citizen” or “other”.  
Students‟ definitions of intelligence have been the focus of only a small number of 
studies, so the means used to identify their beliefs have been limited to asking 
them directly what they think it means to be intelligent or smart (Cain & Dweck, 
1995; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Yussen & Kane, 1985) in one-to-one interview 
situations. In the first two of these studies, students‟ responses have been coded 
according to a priori categories, with additional categories developed from the data 
as appropriate. Cain and Dweck (1995) and Kurtz-Costes et al. (2005) included 
both a measure of theory-of-intelligence and students‟ definitions of intelligence, but 
their doubtful data analysis methods make their findings unconvincing. 
Although primary students‟ definitions of intelligence have been explored in terms 
of the relationship between ability and effort, whether the capacity for, and rate of, 
knowledge acquisition is included in their beliefs does not appear to have been 
investigated with this younger age group. Adults‟ beliefs about the rate of 
knowledge acquisition, on the other hand, have been examined. For example, 
Braten and Stromso (2004) investigated 80 Norwegian student teachers‟ (mean 
age 24.4 years) epistemological beliefs about the rate of knowledge acquisition, as 
well as their theory-of-intelligence, and how both of these were related to their 
achievement goals. Measures of epistemological beliefs, theory-of-intelligence 
(using Dweck‟s items), and goal orientation were taken at the start of the study, and 
the goal orientation measure was repeated a year later. Their findings indicated 
that some student teachers‟ beliefs that learning occurred either quickly or not at all 
were associated with these students being less likely to adopt mastery goals than 
those who believed learning occurred over time. A regression analysis showed 
theory-of-intelligence was not a significant predictor of mastery goal orientations at 
both Times 1 and 2, contrary to models proposed by Dweck and colleagues 
(Dweck et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Beliefs about knowledge were 
stronger predictors than was theory-of-intelligence. Defining knowledge as a stable 
capacity was a significant moderate negative predictor of mastery goals at Time 1 
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(β = -.38, p < .01), but was no longer significant at Time 2. Speed of knowledge 
acquisition was also a negative predictor of mastery goals at Time 1 (β = -.32, 
p < .01), and at Time 2 (β = -.26, p < .05), indicating that mastery goals were less 
likely to be adopted by students who believed that learning occurred quickly. In 
their discussion of the disparity between their findings and those described by 
Dweck (2000), Braten and Stromso (2004) made the point that much of Dweck‟s 
research has been conducted in laboratory-like conditions, rather than being field 
research like their study. More importantly though, the authors highlighted that 
these student teachers studied in “an innovative, co-operative instructional context” 
(p. 371), so their orientations towards grades and achievement are likely to have 
differed to those of students who have participated in studies in the US. 
In another experimental study, Mueller and Dweck (1998) investigated the effects 
of praise for ability and effort on students‟ motivation, including the effects of praise 
on students‟ theory-of-intelligence and on their definitions of intelligence. Forty-
eight fifth-grade students (mean age 10.8 years) were randomly divided into three 
treatment groups. Students were presented with three sets of 10 mathematics 
problems, each of which they were allowed 4 minutes to work on. The second set 
of problems was intended to prove more difficult for the students than the other two 
sets of problems. Regardless of students‟ actual performance, all of them were told 
that they had performed poorly on the second set of problems. (At the conclusion of 
each interview, students were told that this set of problems was difficult because 
they were intended for older students.) After each set of problems, students were 
given one of three types of praise: praise for their ability; praise for their effort; or 
praise with no attribution. Experimenters then administered a collection of 
motivation-related measures, including one of students‟ theory-of-intelligence that 
required them to rate how much they agreed with the single statement, “You have a 
certain amount of intelligence and really can‟t do much to change it” (p. 44). 
Students were also asked to complete the sentence “I think intelligence is…”. The 
definitions of intelligence that students gave were then coded using two a priori 
categories: “their use of terms that emphasized the more malleable or motivational 
components of intelligence (e.g., effort and knowledge) and their use of terms that 
emphasized the trait-like nature of intelligence (e.g., ability and smartness)” (p. 47). 
A chi-squared test indicated a significant difference between the number of 
students who had been praised for their effort who included effort in their definitions 
of intelligence, and the number who were praised for their ability who mentioned 
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effort. No significant differences were detected among the three treatments with 
regard to their use of trait-like definitions of intelligence. Nonetheless, Mueller and 
Dweck (1998) reported: 
Children praised for ability after good performance were found to be 
somewhat more likely to later describe intelligence as a trait and to see it  
as not being subject to improvement than were children praised for effort, 
who preferred to define it in malleable or motivational terms and to view it 
as something that is subject to development or improvement. (p. 48) 
There are several points to make about this study. First of all, like most of Dweck‟s 
other studies, it was conducted in a laboratory-like situation. Secondly, the 
researchers were interested in the effect of particular types of praise on students‟ 
thoughts about the malleability of intelligence, and their definitions of intelligence. 
However, these measures were not taken for the same, relatively-small sample (16 
in each treatment) pre-intervention, so the causal links suggested in the quote 
above cannot be reasonably substantiated. Thirdly, the two categories that were 
imposed on students‟ definitions were clearly designed to match the ability and 
effort categories of praise, rather than being theoretically derived in their own right. 
No information was presented regarding the frequencies with which students‟ 
definitions matched these two categories, or if any students‟ definitions might have 
matched neither category. Finally, using a single item to measure theory-of-
intelligence seems to be another short-coming of the study.  
A number of studies have explored students‟ ideas about the relationship between 
ability and effort. Key among studies of ability is Nicholls‟ (1978) investigation of 
students‟ ideas about the relative roles of ability and effort. In a cross-sectional 
study, 162 students‟ (5 to 13-year-olds) concepts of effort and ability were 
examined. Nicholls conceptualised ability and effort as being inter-dependent: 
“Ability refers to what a person can do, and evidence of optimum effort is required 
before we accept performance as indicative of ability. This concept of ability implies 
that ability limits the extent to which effort can increase performance” (p. 800). 
Participants were each shown three 90-second silent films of two students working 
on problems from a mathematics textbook. In each film, one student was engaged 
in their work for the whole time and the second student divided their time between 
working and what might be considered off-task behaviours – fiddling with their  
pencil and textbook, or gazing around the room, for example. Prior to viewing the 
films, students were told that both students in the first film answered 10 out of 10 
problems correctly; in the second film, both answered two problems correctly; and 
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in the third film, the student who at times showed off-task behaviour scored eight 
out of ten, and the student who worked consistently scored just two. Students were 
primed to think about ability and effort by asking them to think about whether one 
student in the film worked harder, and whether one is smarter than the other. 
Similar questions were asked after the student had watched each film, as well as 
asking “How come they got the same when one worked hard and one didn‟t work 
hard?”, and “If they both worked really hard would one get more than the other or 
not?”. In relation to the third film, students were asked “How come the one who 
didn‟t work hard got more than the other one?” (p. 803). 
From students‟ responses, Nicholls (1978) identified approximate age bands during 
which progressively more advanced reasoning about ability and effort were evident. 
The four levels of reasoning were:  
 Level 1: Neither effort nor ability are yet identified as related to 
outcome (approximately 5 to 6 years old); 
 Level 2: Effort and outcome are identified as cause and effect. 
Ability is not yet perceived as a cause of outcomes 
(approximately 7 to 8 years old); 
 Level 3: Effort is no longer perceived as the sole cause of 
outcomes, with ability sometimes related to outcomes 
(approximately 8 to 9 years old); 
 Level 4: “The concept of ability, in the sense of capacity which, if 
low, may limit or, if high, may increase the effectiveness of effort, 
is used systematically” (p. 812) (approximately 9 to 10 years old).  
More recently, a larger cross-sectional study (Malmberg, Wanner, & Little, 2008) 
investigated school-type and age differences in the beliefs of 1,723 students in Berlin 
by taking one-off measures of their beliefs about ability, effort, and task difficulty. 
Their findings showed that the younger students of their 10 to 16-year-old cohort did 
not differentiate ability and effort as clearly as the older students did, suggesting that 
there is further development of students‟ thinking about the ability/effort relationship 
beyond Nicholls‟ (1978) fourth level. Students‟ cognitive development would 
obviously play a role in determining their responses to questions about how they 
perceive ability and effort, as would the socio-political value system to which they are 
exposed.  
In the same year, Heyman (2008) conducted three related studies of the effects on 8 
to 12-year-olds of experimenters describing the successful performance of other 
students as either ability related or effort related. Students were read a series of 
scenarios that described fictitious students‟ achievement, for example, “Nicholas 
does very well in school. He did very well even when he was little” (p. 366). This was 
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followed with questions, such as “Does Nicholas do well in school now because of 
the kind of brain he was born with?” and “Will Nicholas do well in school when he is 
older even if he doesn‟t try very hard?” (p. 366). Students‟ “no”, “maybe”, and “yes” 
responses were coded as 0, 0.5, and 1, respectively, and analyses of variance 
were conducted – once again, with ordinal data. However, what was interesting in 
Heyman‟s study was her suggestion that presenting students with descriptions of 
high-achieving students who had struggled to overcome academic difficulties 
seemed to make participants more optimistic about overcoming their own 
difficulties through applying effort. On the other hand, the findings indicated that 
using ability-related labels, such as “maths whiz”, resulted in students being more 
inclined to attribute that person‟s success to innate ability. Heyman proposed that 
teachers should provide students with information that can help them to understand 
their successes and failures in terms of effort. Rather than giving students 
messages that they might interpret as ability being an innate quality, messages that 
highlight success following a sustained period of difficulty seem likely to make 
students more willing to work through the difficult learning they encounter. The 
implication that the importance of effort should be underscored is consistent with 
Stipek and Gralinski‟s (1996) recommendation: 
…that if our goal is to decrease students‟ concerns about performance, 
we may need to focus our efforts on changing their general beliefs about 
intelligence (i.e., the degree to which it is fixed and stable and affects 
performance). If our goal is to increase their mastery goals, we may need 
to convince them of the value of effort (p. 405). 
Students’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence 
For purposes of succinctness, theory-of-intelligence will be discussed here – as it is 
elsewhere – using the dichotomous terms of incremental and entity theories. The 
research literature in this area is characterised by discussions of whether or not 
students believe they can increase their intelligence, and has not included data 
about how much students believe they can increase their intelligence, and why they 
believe this. 
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Exactly what has been measured? 
Unlike self-efficacy, beliefs about the malleability of intelligence have not been 
supported by strong theoretical underpinnings. Furthermore, it is difficult to be sure 
of what has actually been measured in the empirical studies, due to a paucity of 
reports of rigorous statistical analysis of theory-of-intelligence items in the literature.   
Theory-of-intelligence has been interpreted in two main ways: as a global belief, 
and as a domain-specific belief relating to ability in mathematics (and other school 
subjects). In a review of research that investigated how people‟s global beliefs 
about intelligence affected their judgments and reactions, Dweck et al. (1995) 
reported a factor analysis for the three extremely similar entity-belief items (the first 
three items in Table 3.1) that found they loaded heavily on the same factor, with 
loadings in the .93 to .95 range. Dweck et al. analysed the data from five validation 
studies involving adults and found that this factor was distinct from the two other 
target factors – malleability of moral character and malleability of the world 
(assessed with items such as, “Though we can change some phenomena, it is 
unlikely that we can alter the core dispositions of our world”, p. 271). No other 
factors relating to motivation were included in this analysis. No report of a factor 
analysis for the last three items in Table 3.1 – the incremental-belief items (Dweck, 
2000) – could be found, suggesting that they have not undergone the same testing 
as the entity items. Although the near-identical nature of the six items in question 
suggests that they should probably load on the same factor, no evidence has been 
reported to confirm or refute this. 
Table 3.1: Dweck’s (2000, p. 177) theory-of-intelligence items  
The first three entity-belief items were originally in Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995, p. 271), and 
subsequently included in Dweck (2000), together with the incremental-belief items 4 to 6. 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really can‟t do much to change it. 
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can‟t change very much.  
3. You can learn new things, but you can‟t really change your basic intelligence. 
4.
 
No matter who you are, you can change your intelligence a lot.  
5.
 
You can always greatly change how intelligent you are. 
6.
 
No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit 
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Stipek and Gralinski (1996) investigated whether theory-of-intelligence was domain 
specific by comparing students‟ beliefs about the malleability of their ability in the 
dual contexts of mathematics and social studies. At the start and end of a school 
year, 319 students in third to sixth grade completed a questionnaire, making 
responses on a Likert-type scale. Their grades for mathematics and social studies 
were also collected. Stipek and Gralinski reported a factor analysis of their 12 items 
that showed two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, at both time points. 
Because both sets of data were fairly similar, only the start-of-year analysis is 
described here. Eight items had loadings of .51 to .69 on the first factor, labelled 
“entity-related beliefs”. Three of these items appeared first in the questionnaire, and 
included a reference to effort. For example, the first item was “Some kids can never 
do well in math, even if they try hard” (p. 400). These three items may have had the 
effect of priming students to think about both effort and being smart when they then 
responded to five items about being smart, such as “You have to be smart to do 
well in social studies”. Loadings on the first three items were .66 to .69, while on the 
next five items loadings were smaller, ranging from .51 to .58. Because loadings 
under .45 were omitted, it is not known whether some items may have had 
moderate cross-loadings on the other factor. Whether it was reasonable to interpret 
this factor as “entity-related beliefs” seems questionable, and in fact, Stipek and 
Gralinski later describe this factor as ability-performance beliefs.  
The second factor represented students‟ beliefs about effort. The four items 
associated with this factor, such as “Everyone could do well in math if they worked 
hard” (p. 400), had loadings of .47 to .67. Items related to mathematics and social 
studies loaded similarly on the same factors, suggesting that students‟ beliefs for 
each domain were not differentiated. Stipek and Gralinski created two sub-scales to 
use in their subsequent data analysis – ability-performance beliefs and effort-
related beliefs – which were applied to mathematics and social studies items alike. 
They found no significant correlation between the two sub-scales beyond the third 
grade, suggesting that by the age of nine or ten, at which children are thought to 
have developed an understanding of intelligence, there is no longer any association 
between their belief in the effect of effort and that of ability. Their results were not 
inconsistent with the findings of other studies (Malmberg et al., 2008; Nicholls, 
1978) that describe students at the age of 9 to 10 years developing an 
understanding that ability and effort combine to influence outcomes.  
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Pomerantz and Ruble (1997) interpreted theory-of-intelligence as a person‟s belief 
“about the extent to which they feel their intelligence is not under their control” 
(p. 1165). Interpreting intelligence as synonymous with ability, they assessed three 
related aspects: conceptions of ability as uncontrollable, as constant, and as 
capacity. However, the findings relating to theory-of-intelligence (conceptions of 
ability as uncontrollable) are doubtful because no factor analysis was reported and 
only two items were used: “Kids who are smart in school are born that way” and 
“You can‟t really change how smart you are” (p. 1169).  
A final interpretation of theory-of-intelligence is that used in Ziegler and Stoeger‟s 
(2010) pair of studies with a total of 596 students at secondary schools 
(Gymnasiums) in Germany. Dweck‟s three entity-belief items were translated into 
German (and then translated back to English for the journal article), and modified to 
relate specifically to mathematics. For example, one item was “Everyone has a 
certain amount of ability for mathematics and there is not much that can be done to 
really change that” (p. 320). Also measured were students‟ beliefs about the 
stability of existing mathematics attainment (“After I have learned something in 
mathematics, I don‟t forget how to apply it”), and their beliefs about whether ability 
deficits could be modified (“In math class, I can compensate for knowledge deficits 
by studying more”, p. 320). An array of eight additional measures included 
achievement and aspects of motivation. Their regression analysis indicated that 
students‟ incremental beliefs were a significant predictor of the mathematics grade 
to which they aspired, but did not predict actual grades. Instead, students‟ beliefs 
about the modifiability of their ability deficits specifically, proved to be a significant 
predictor of mathematics grades, and of several motivation-related variables. 
Ziegler and Stoeger‟s findings supported a further distinction to Dweck‟s theory that 
an entity belief has negative consequences and an incremental belief, positive 
consequences. Rather than an entity theory-of-intelligence having negative 
consequences across the board, they found that the only negative effect of an 
entity belief was when students believed they could not improve their perceived 
deficits. Their findings indicated that theory-of-intelligence might be more complex 
than is suggested by its treatment in research, and that for students who perceive 
their abilities as adequate or superior, a fixed view of intelligence might not have 
negative effects on achievement. 
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Measuring students’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence 
In the majority of theory-of-intelligence studies with primary students, 
questionnaires in which students respond to statements using a Likert-type scale 
have been used. Unlike mathematics self-efficacy, which is best assessed on a 
task-specific basis, it appears that students‟ beliefs about intelligence need not be 
task specific, or even domain related (Stipek & Gralinski, 1996). As a result, a 
measure of students‟ beliefs about intelligence that has been used with one group 
of students has often been used with other students of similar ages. Dweck‟s items 
are a case in point.  
To measure theory-of-intelligence, Dweck (2000) recommended the six items in 
Table 3.1, for use with students of 10 years and older. Other than being positively 
or negatively worded, there are no substantial differences between any of these 
items. Dweck maintained that theory-of-intelligence could be reliably assessed 
using the three entity-belief items (first in the list above), for which a factor analysis 
was reported in Dweck et al. (1995). Other researchers (Ablard, 2002; Ahmavaara 
& Houston, 2007; Gonida, Kiosseoglou, & Leonardi, 2006; Law, 2009; Shih, 2007; 
Vogler & Bakken, 2007) have used these three items to assess students‟ entity 
theory-of-intelligence.  
Few other researchers who have investigated students‟ beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence have included full lists of questionnaire or interview 
items, or reported factor analyses, in accounts of their research. A second 
published study that included a complete list of items, along with a factor analysis 
of the items, was Stipek and Gralinski‟s (1996) study, described earlier. Their items 
have been adopted by other researchers for use in subsequent studies (for 
example, Kӓrkkӓinen, Rӓty, & Kasanen, 2008), sometimes in modified form (for 
example, Abdullah, 2008; Leonardi & Gialamas, 2002; Malmberg et al., 2008). 
A novel approach to assessing theory-of-intelligence was described by Ablard and 
Mills (1996), reporting their cross-sectional study of academically talented students. 
They made the point that theory-of-intelligence has typically been assessed using 
items that are clearly either entity-belief or incremental-belief oriented, imposing 
what they claimed was a false dichotomy. Their solution to this was to tackle the 
question more directly and ask 8 to 17-year-olds to rate the stability of intelligence 
using a 6-point Likert-type scale that was anchored at 1 with stays the same, and at  
6 with changes a lot. In the same questionnaire, they also assessed students‟ 
perceptions of the effort they expend, their preference for challenge, and their 
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perceptions of their ability. However, they used a single item to assess each of 
these four factors, giving weak support to their claim that students‟ perceptions of 
the malleability of intelligence are a continuous rather than dichotomous variable. 
Although the present study will show that there may be merit in asking students 
how much they think intelligence can change, data from this single Likert-type item 
needed to be strengthened, perhaps by the addition of qualitative data, in order for 
the findings to have greater rigour.  
Whether a researcher decides to use items that focus specifically on the 
malleability of mathematical intelligence or items that conceptualise intelligence 
more globally, there are issues that are particular to their use when a study‟s 
participants are primary-age students. Key considerations are how young students 
might understand the word intelligence, their likely lack of familiarity with using 
Likert-type scales, and confusion that might be caused by presenting students with 
a mixture of positively and negatively-worded items.  
Stipek and MacIver (1989) suggested that young students have not yet reached a 
high enough level of cognitive functioning to have developed a concept of 
intelligence, and so may not understand the word intelligence. To address this 
difficulty, words like smart and clever have been substituted for intelligence to make 
questionnaire items accessible to younger students in the US and UK, respectively 
(Burke & Williams, 2009).  
Researchers have found various ways of making rating scales accessible to 
younger students, especially those who were not yet fluent readers. Droege and 
Stipek (1993) interviewed students between 5 and 12 years old, and asked them 
to rank their classmates according to how “smart in schoolwork” (p. 648) they 
thought they were. The younger students did this by putting their classmates‟ 
names into a series of five bowls, the smallest representing students who were 
not smart at all, and the largest bowl representing students who were very smart. 
Older students did this as a written task, using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 
interviewer then asked the students several questions related to the malleability of 
intelligence of students given different ratings, such as how smart did they think 
this student would be next year, and how smart would they be if they changed 
school. Students were also asked about the potential of effort to increase their 
classmates‟ achievement with questions such as whether a classmate from the 
second bowl could be as smart as a classmate from the third bowl if they worked 
hard, and whether they could be as smart as a classmate from the fifth bowl if 
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they tried hard. The findings indicated that it was not until students reached around 
11 to 12 years that their responses indicated limitations of effort for improving 
achievement. 
Using a method that might fall somewhere between using bowls and presenting 
students with a written rating scale, Kinlaw and Kurtz-Costes (2007) represented a 
Likert-type scale with a series of five circles of increasing size, the smallest circle 
intended to signify I really don’t agree, and the largest, I really agree. Students from 
5 to 10 years old were shown two pictures of students, described by the interviewer 
to have either an entity or incremental theory. Students indicated how much they 
agreed with the views the interviewer described by pointing to the appropriate 
circle. 
Still another method that has been explored with younger students is the use of 
puppets. Brown identified what she called the emergent theory-of-intelligence of 
103 preschool children by having the youngsters choose which of two puppets 
made comments most similar to their parents‟ about their attempts at solving four 
puzzles, the first three of which were actually unsolvable. One puppet made 
performance-focused comments, and the other‟s focused on effort. A child‟s choice 
of puppet was interpreted as a sign of emergent entity or emergent incremental 
theory-of-intelligence, respectively. Following this, the children were asked to 
choose which puzzle they would like to spend more time on, if they were given an 
opportunity. This was seen as an indication of challenge-seeking or challenge-
avoiding behaviour. However, it seems that what was being measured in this study 
was actually parents‟ theory-of-intelligence, not children‟s. Although the two might 
be associated, this has not yet been shown empirically.   
Mixing negatively-worded entity-belief items and positively-worded incremental-
belief items is another potential problem as it may cause confusion to younger 
students. Dweck and her colleagues addressed this by presenting entity and 
incremental belief items on separate pages, or by using only the three entity-belief 
items. Various strategies have been used to overcome potential issues related to 
young students‟ limited reading abilities, emergent understanding of intelligence, 
and their ability to use a Likert-type scale to show their responses to questionnaire 
items. In addition, the ways in which they have been analysed have also varied. 
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Issues of data analysis and interpretation 
The biggest problem with the ways theory-of-intelligence data have been analysed 
is that ordinal data from Likert-type items have generally been treated as 
quantitative data and analysed using means-based tests designed for interval data, 
such as analysis of variance. Interview responses have been categorised and 
subsequently treated the same way. Compared to the self-efficacy research 
reviewed in the previous chapter, a greater number of studies focussing on 
students‟ beliefs about intelligence have used interviews to collect data. Although 
interviewing might often be thought of as a qualitative method, the data have 
typically been quantitised to the point of virtually stripping them of their original 
voices. 
Another issue is that ordinal theory-of-intelligence data have often been treated as 
dichotomous. For example, Dweck et al. (1995) analysed data from six validation 
studies, all of which had presented participants (ages not stated) with the three 
entity-belief items, presented earlier, and used a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) for their responses. In each of the studies, 
the data were then dichotomised by using each participant‟s average score and 
classifying those with a score of 3.0 and below as having incremental beliefs, and 
those with 4.0 and above as entity theorists. Typically this resulted in the exclusion 
of 15% of participants, and presented the data as dichotomous even though “the 
two theory groups do not represent extreme groups” (Dweck et al., 1995, p. 269). 
Pepi, Alesi, and Geraci (2004) also took a dichotomous approach to analysing and 
interpreting the theory-of-intelligence data from their study of Italian students with 
reading disabilities. Dichotomising theory-of-intelligence data to either entity or 
incremental beliefs misrepresents participants‟ beliefs, and ignores the complexity 
of students‟ thinking about the malleability of intelligence.  
One reason that data have been dichotomised might be that very few people with 
strong entity beliefs have been identified. For instance, Blackwell et al. (2007) took 
the mean incremental theory-of-intelligence score of each student‟s six 6-point 
Likert-scale items, and found that in Study 1 the mean of these was 4.45 and the 
standard deviation was .97, while in Study 2 the mean score was 4.49 (no standard 
deviation was given). In Dweck et al. (1995), mean scores for the six studies from 
3.57 (standard deviation: 1.49) to 3.97 (standard deviation: 1.13) were reported. 
These means suggest that students‟ scores tended towards the upper end of the 
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range of 1 to 6 scores, with few students showing extreme entity beliefs. No 
information regarding quartiles was provided in either case. 
In some studies, students‟ responses in interview situations have been quantitised 
by coding them on Likert-type scales, and then treated as quantitative data (Brown, 
2009; Droege & Stipek, 1993; Kinlaw & Kurtz-Costes, 2007). In two mixed-methods 
studies from Finland (Kasanen, Rӓty, & Eklund, 2009; Rӓty, Kasanen, Kiikinen, 
Nykky, & Atjonen, 2004), categories for coding the qualitative data, elicited by 
asking students open-ended questions, were formulated from responses and were 
illustrated with examples. These were then coded according to whether or not each 
student had included them in their responses, and treated as categorical data 
which were subsequently compared to the ordinal data from Likert-scale items. As 
described earlier, Kurtz-Costes et al. (2005) analysed data from structured 
interviews in a similar way.  
Because in many instances parametric statistical analyses have been applied to 
ordinal, and even categorical, data, the findings from the studies in question must 
be dubious, at best. This casts considerable doubt on the claims made about the 
findings of such studies regarding theory-of-intelligence. 
School-related factors that contribute to students’ beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence 
Unlike self-efficacy, no statistical analyses have been used to help determine the 
relative contributions that different factors might make to a person‟s theory-of-
intelligence. For instance, a student‟s interactions with, and observations of, their 
family members and their peers probably contribute to their beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence. Whether their effect is greater than that of factors in the 
student‟s school environment is unknown.  
Students‟ beliefs about intelligence do not develop in isolation from wider society 
and in particular, from their school context. Aspects of a school environment that 
are likely to play a role in shaping students‟ theory-of-intelligence include curriculum 
differentiation, ability-based groupings, and assessment practices. In their 
comparison of American classrooms with those in China and Japan, Stevenson 
and Stigler (1992) found that American teachers adjust the curriculum so that 
students of lower ability are not expected to attempt tasks they might struggle with. 
In contrast, there was no curriculum differentiation in the Asian classrooms, where 
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students were expected to keep up with their peers by working hard. They also 
maintained that Americans valued more highly a child‟s all-round “life adjustment 
and the enhancement of self-esteem” (p. 111) than their academic learning, 
whereas in China and Japan the clear purpose of school was for children to learn 
key academic skills – reading, writing, and mathematics. So curricula in the US are 
designed to cater for students who excel and others who struggle with academic 
work, whereas schools in China and Japan expect all students to succeed, to 
varying degrees.  
Primary schools in a Western system generally allocate students to class groups 
according to age rather than attainment of set standards, and this provides  
students with opportunities to compare themselves with their peers in terms of 
academic ability (Malmberg et al., 2008, p. 532). In Germany, the wider school 
system is explicitly stratified according to ability for the purpose of closely matching 
instruction with ability. The grades a student gains by the end of primary school 
largely determine their secondary school track, which in turn affects their 
possibilities for university enrolment and, later on, lifestyle. Malmberg et al. 
explored how school type might be associated with students‟ beliefs about ability 
and effort, and found that students towards the end of primary school tended to 
have an entity theory and to believe in the value of effort. Looking at the secondary 
school students, they observed that Gymnasium students (in the track intended for 
later university enrolment) believed ability was fixed less than students in other 
types of schools did (those destined for vocational training), and appeared to apply 
effort to maximise their ability. Students in schools destined for vocational training 
might believe that applying effort is futile and tend more towards an entity theory, 
because their possibilities have been limited by the end of primary school. 
The New Zealand education system is somewhat more flexible, and it is possible to 
pursue tertiary study even after academic failure at school. This possibility could 
promote greater optimism about the malleability of intelligence than the very 
structured German system. Ability-based grouping is nonetheless a feature of most 
New Zealand primary classrooms, and students are generally ability grouped for 
mathematics and for reading instruction. In the Numeracy Development Projects, 
teachers were encouraged to “Group your students for instruction by their assigned 
strategy stages for addition and subtraction” (Ministry of Education, 2008d, p. 11), 
and strategy stages are implicitly linked to ability. A student‟s awareness of their 
class ranking for mathematics is likely to be associated with the group in which they 
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are included, informed by their perceptions of the abilities of peers in the same 
group, and by the interactions the teacher has with them in that context. 
Writing about the relationship of effort and ability, Nicholls (1978) linked a 
competitive education system that emphasised normative evaluation, with 
inevitable inequality of effort amongst students as they progress through school. He 
proposed that the “higher motivation of high achievers appears dependent on the 
presence of low achievers for whom the presence of high achievers leads to a lack 
of motivation” (p. 811). Without empirical studies, it is not possible to say whether 
or not ability-based grouping for mathematics instruction might have a similar effect 
in New Zealand primary schools.   
As students move into senior primary school, assessments become more formal 
and frequent (Midgley, Anderman, & Hicks, 1995) and take on greater importance 
for all concerned – students, teachers, and parents. One of the consequences of 
assessment is that students can be, and often are, ranked in terms of ability. As 
Kurtz-Costes et al. (2005) stated: 
Early testing that draws the attention of children, parents, and teachers 
to individual differences in current achievement levels will reinforce 
beliefs that the most important end product of education is not learning, 
but grades, and that achievement tests measure intelligence, which is 
likely to be perceived as not particularly malleable. (p. 230) 
In Droege and Stipek‟s cross-sectional (1993) study, students were asked to rank 
their classmates in order of ability, and this information was checked against their 
teachers‟ judgments. Students‟ rankings were found to be a close match with their 
teachers‟ judgments, even for the third graders. This is fairly consistent with an 
earlier study (Boehm & White, 1967) that found students in fourth grade had quite 
clear ideas about where they stood academically in relation to their peers. For 
younger students, they found their awareness of class ranking was less secure. 
The students in both studies would be at around the third level of reasoning 
proposed by Nicholls (1978), probably beginning to differentiate ability from effort. 
Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising that younger students did not rank 
their peers as their teachers did.  
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Effects of teacher-student feedback 
In Dweck‟s early (1975) work, teacher-student feedback that emphasised the role 
of effort was used to help shape students‟ attributions in failure situations, with 
results showing that students subsequently tended to attribute failure to lack of 
effort, and responded by showing increased persistence. Other studies have 
confirmed the considerable effects of teacher feedback on student attributions 
(Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Robertson, 2000). In a series of six 
experimental studies, Mueller and Dweck (1998) investigated the effects of 
experimenters praising students for their intelligence and praising them for effort in 
success and failure situations. In particular, they observed students‟ subsequent 
task choices, and whether these reflected a desire to learn or to perform well. They 
reported that students who received intelligence-focussed praise tended to choose 
performance tasks, whereas those whose effort was praised chose more 
challenging tasks, regardless of whether they had just succeeded or failed on a 
task.   
The effects on students‟ ability conceptions of adults‟ verbal descriptions of other 
students‟ performances in mathematics were the subject of three experimental 
studies involving 8 to 12-year-olds (Heyman, 2008). Heyman pointed out that 
feedback to students provides them with information they use to help develop an 
understanding of their successes and failures. For instance, she suggested that “a 
child who hears that a peer‟s success in math is a consequence of being “gifted” 
may reason that her own lack of success is due to a lack of innate ability” (p. 367) – 
of not having this particular “gift”. The flipside of labelling a student “gifted”, 
according to Mueller and Dweck (1998), is that this can cause them to focus on 
continually proving that their ability merits this label, instead of taking on challenges 
and developing their skills.  A key finding of Heyman‟s research was that teachers 
labelling students who were successful with names such as “maths whizz” seemed 
to be associated with other students having an entity theory-of-intelligence. On the 
other hand, when references were made to high achievers overcoming their 
previous difficulties, this appeared to have the effect of making other students more 
optimistic about succeeding in mathematics.  
In their study of Finnish 9 and 12-year-old students‟ beliefs about the malleability of 
their academic abilities, Kӓrkkӓinen et al. (2008) suggested that:  
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Although the school studiously attempts to avoid all normative feedback 
and related comparisons during the two elementary years in particular, 
its everyday practices in fact contain numerous routines and test-like 
situations that convey essentially normative assessment criteria and 
comparative feedback to the pupils. (p. 455) 
Comparing one‟s achievement to others‟ is one way of evaluating ability. Bong 
(2009) suggested that students begin to include social-normative information in 
evaluations of their ability at around 10 years old, about the same age at which they 
are thought to develop an understanding of ability (Nicholls, 1978). An alternative to 
these normative judgments is for a student to compare their progress to clearly-
stated, specific learning intentions, and to receive teacher feedback in relation to 
these. Teacher-student feedback has also been emphasised as an important 
component of quality teaching in New Zealand (Alton-Lee, 2003; Hattie, 1999; 
Hattie & Timperley, 2007). 
Reported effects of students’ beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence 
Achievement goals 
According to Bempechat, London, and Dweck (1991), a student‟s theory-of-
intelligence largely determines their goal orientation. Students with an incremental 
theory-of-intelligence tend to espouse learning goals that focus on mastery of 
knowledge, skills, and strategies, and they are not averse to risk making mistakes. 
In contrast, students with an entity belief focus more on performance goals and are 
concerned with avoiding negative judgments of their competence, so are risk 
avoidant (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988), avoiding failures that 
could undermine their appearance of being “smart” (Ames & Archer, 1988). 
Following this line of thought, entity-belief students (if they exist) are likely to see no 
point in trying to increase their supposedly permanently-set intelligence. 
The types of goals students choose are important, because goals are associated 
with learning outcomes. In 1988, Elliott and Dweck‟s experimental study examined 
the effect of performance and learning goals, combined with ability feedback, on 
the achievement of 101 students. The 10 to 11-year-olds were in one of four 
treatments that varied by feedback that their skill level for a given task was either 
high or low, and by instructions that emphasised the importance of either 
performance or learning goals. Students were given a choice of tasks and were told 
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that one group of puzzles they should be able to do but might not learn from, and 
the other group might be confusing and difficult at times but they would learn from 
doing them. Students in the learning goal treatments, regardless of the skill 
feedback they had received, tended to opt for the challenging puzzles, taking up 
the opportunity to learn something new and risking making mistakes in front of the 
experimenter. Elliott and Dweck concluded that the different types of goal each 
“runs off a different “program” with different commands, decision rules, and 
inference rules, and hence, with different cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
consequences” (p. 11). Achievement-wise, their results showed that students‟ 
problem-solving strategies improved for those with learning goals, as did strategies 
of the performance goal students who had been given high-ability feedback. A 
significantly smaller percentage of those who were in the performance goal plus 
low-ability feedback treatment showed an improvement in strategies. What was 
particularly interesting about their results was that the performance-goal students 
who received feedback about their high ability showed improved strategies, 
suggesting that perhaps for some students ability-focussed feedback – consistent 
with an entity theory-of-intelligence – may actually support aspects of their 
achievement. Although these students showed persistence with tasks they found 
difficult, Elliott and Dweck found they did not take advantage of opportunities to 
learn new skills that involved public mistakes, and instead opted for easier tasks. 
A student‟s goal orientation shapes their pattern of response to success and failure 
situations (Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Typically, a student with a learning goal 
orientation attributes their results to the effort they expended and the strategies 
they used, so if they initially fail, their response is likely to be to try harder or to use 
a different strategy. Such situations can in fact increase a student‟s feeling of self-
efficacy: when they succeed, this is attributed to how hard they worked, and there 
is a long-term positive impact on their self-efficacy. 
In contrast, Dweck (2000; Elliott & Dweck, 1988) described a student with a 
performance goal orientation as tending to attribute their outcomes to their ability, 
with effort playing little or no role. Their response to failure will probably include 
such behaviours as giving up, showing negative affect, and choosing an easier 
task, and will be accompanied by a drop in their self-efficacy levels. When they 
attribute their successes to their intelligence, this has a positive but temporary 
effect on self-efficacy, because the student with an underlying entity theory-of-
intelligence is only as good as their last performance; they are constantly looking 
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for opportunities that will show what they can do, rather than opportunities to 
develop their inherent intelligence. A student with an incremental theory-of-
intelligence, on the other hand, recognises challenges as opportunities to learn, 
and seeks them out, according to Dweck (2000).  
Although Stipek and Gralinski‟s (1996) study found that entity beliefs were 
negatively associated with achievement, they found only limited support for the 
hypothesis that the effect of entity beliefs was mediated by a performance goal 
orientation. Furthermore, they suggested that it should not be assumed that 
because a mastery goal orientation is associated with higher achievement than a 
performance orientation, that it is necessarily a bad thing in every student‟s case to 
have a performance goal orientation. Related to the suggestion that a performance 
goal might not always have negative consequences for students‟ learning, Bong‟s 
(2009) study of 1,196 Korean students showed that students in the first four grades 
tended to endorse mastery-approach goals (“approach” signifying these goals were 
construed by students as having positive possibilities, compared with “avoidance”, 
indicating the perception of negative possibilities). In contrast, students in Grades 5 
to 9 tended to endorse performance-approach goals. What was interesting about 
the findings from this study was that they indicated that both mastery-approach and 
performance-approach goal types were positively correlated with students‟ self-
efficacy and mathematics achievement. The study did not include a measure of 
students‟ theory-of-intelligence. It is highlighted here because it casts some doubt 
on the desirability of particular goal orientations, which have in turn been linked to 
beliefs about the malleability of intelligence.  
Task choices and persistence 
Elliott and Dweck‟s (1988) experimental study found that for students who tended 
to have more of an entity theory-of-intelligence, effort and making mistakes were 
equated with lack of intelligence. In addition, their self-efficacy tended to be more 
fragile, and they were likely to avoid challenges because these demand effort and 
they risk making mistakes. For students who believed that intelligence is a fixed 
entity, their perception was that it is beyond their control to influence their 
achievement outcomes. In contrast, students with more of an incremental theory-of-
intelligence believed they can influence the development of their intelligence 
through effort and the use of strategies, so were likely to have strong self-efficacy. 
These students genuinely want to engage in the learning process, rather than 
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wanting to look smart by error-free performances, and they are more likely to seek 
challenges and persevere at difficulty, as Smiley and Dweck (1994) also found. 
Cain and Dweck‟s (1995) study, described earlier, also investigated the relationship 
between persistence and theory-of-intelligence, presenting 139 students from 6 to 
11 years old with a series of four puzzles, three of which were unsolvable. After 
students had worked for a limited amount of time on each of the puzzles, they were 
offered an opportunity to return to the puzzle of their choice. Students who tended 
towards an entity belief chose to repeat a puzzle they had previously solved, while 
those with more of an incremental belief were more likely to return to a puzzle they 
had previously been unable to finish, indicating greater persistence. Students in the 
former group also expressed lower expectations for success in the future. 
Interestingly, it was not until the fifth grade that students‟ helpless and mastery 
orientations were associated with an entity and incremental theory-of-intelligence, 
respectively. Other work (Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; Smiley & Dweck, 1994) has 
shown an association between students‟ goal orientation and their responses after 
failure, and between persistence after failure and attribution to effort or ability 
(Weiner, 1985).  
Student achievement 
Empirical research has yet to establish clear causal links between students‟ theory-
of-intelligence and achievement. Associations between the theory-of-intelligence 
and achievement of students in the 8 to 15-year-old range have been reported, 
although in some cases, the data analysis methods used were less than rigorous. 
Cury, Elliot, Fonseca, and Moller (2006) conducted two studies of achievement 
motivation with 12 to 15-year-olds in France. They measured what they called 
students‟ implicit theory of ability using three incremental and three entity items 
which were mathematics related. For instance, one entity item was, “One has a 
certain level of ability in math, and there is not much one can do to change it” 
(p. 669). A factor analysis showed a two-factor structure: entity and incremental 
theory-of-intelligence. Also measured were the 209 students‟ perceived 
competence, achievement goals, and mathematics grades. Their findings strongly 
supported their hypotheses that an entity theory-of-intelligence would negatively 
predict achievement, and that an incremental belief would be a positive predictor. 
Similar results have been found with university undergraduates (for example, 
Aronson, Fried, & Goode, 2002).  
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Gonida et al. (2006) assessed 10 to 12-year-old students‟ theory-of-intelligence, 
mathematics achievement, and perceived competence on two occasions, 1 year 
apart. Perceived competence was measured with five items such as “Some 
children believe that they are very good in their schoolwork but other children 
believe that they are not so good in their schoolwork” (p. 229). They conducted 
their own factor analysis of Dweck et al.‟s (1995) three entity items, used in the 
study, with loadings of .70 to .83 indicated. A factor analysis of the perceived 
competence items also showed loadings on a single factor that ranged from .52 to 
.84. A regression analysis showed that prior achievement predicted theory-of-
intelligence, and prior theory-of-intelligence predicted achievement. Their findings 
add to those of earlier studies that had focused on the association of theory-of-
intelligence and achievement, and suggest that theory-of-intelligence and 
achievement might be reciprocally related.  
Blackwell et al. (2007) compared the trajectories of students‟ mathematics 
achievement to their theory-of-intelligence, in two longitudinal studies over the  
2 years of junior high school in the US. In both studies, surveys were used to 
measure students‟ theory-of-intelligence, learning goals, effort beliefs, responses to 
failure, and mathematics achievement. One of the studies also included an 
intervention that aimed to explicitly teach an incremental theory-of-intelligence. 
Structural equation modelling was inappropriately used to analyse the ordinal data. 
Findings from both studies indicated that an incremental belief was associated with 
higher achievement in mathematics than an entity theory. Similarly, an investigation 
involving Chinese 12-year-olds (Law, 2009) found that incremental beliefs about 
intelligence were positively correlated with reading comprehension.  What these 
studies appeared to show was that, where participants are between 10 and 13 
years old, an incremental theory-of-intelligence seems to be positively associated 
with achievement. 
Stipek and Gralinski‟s (1996) research, described earlier, found that students‟ 
theory-of-intelligence is probably not subject specific. They suggested that although 
an incremental or mastery orientation has been shown to be associated with 
positive effects on learning, this does not mean that an entity or performance 
orientation is necessarily a bad thing for every student. More research is needed to 
identify which students might reap the greatest benefits from particular beliefs 
about intelligence, and why this might be so.  
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Trends in students’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence 
From empirical studies, data have been used to suggest trends in theory-of-
intelligence related to age and maturation, and gender, with some overlap at times. 
Differences according to age and gender were also investigated in the present 
study, whereas ethnicity was not a focus. 
Age and maturation 
It has not yet been possible to disentangle the effects that maturational and 
environmental influences, such as a student‟s experiences at school, exert on 
theory-of-intelligence. Trends in theory-of-intelligence related to age suggest that at 
a stage in their lives when students do not yet have an understanding of 
intelligence, most young students tend to indicate an incremental view of 
intelligence, suggesting that they believe they can change how clever they are 
(Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996). Young students are more 
optimistic about improving their academic outcomes than are older students 
(Kӓrkkӓinen et al., 2008). Research by Kurtz-Costes et al. (2005) found that 13 to 
14-year-old students in both Germany and the United States were more likely than 
10 to 11-year-old students to perceive intelligence as an entity trait, and two other 
studies (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Leonardi & Gialamas, 2002) involving pre-adolescent 
students and teenagers found that the younger students were more likely to believe 
that intelligence could be increased through effort, while the older students believed 
intelligence was fairly stable. Collectively, the research literature builds a picture of 
students beginning school with a theory-of-intelligence that tends towards 
incremental and moves towards an entity belief as they progress through their 
education.  
There are a few exceptions to this pattern, though, with three cross-sectional 
studies (Bempechat et al., 1991; Cain & Dweck, 1995; Pomerantz & Ruble, 1997) 
finding no significant grade differences in theory-of-intelligence. A cross-sectional 
study in Scotland (Burke & Williams, 2009) found that the 5-year-old participants 
were more likely to believe in the stability of intelligence than the 7 and 11-year-
olds. However, this was based on students‟ responses to the item, “If someone is 
clever, they will always be clever” (p. 958) which might also be interpreted as 
asking whether it is possible for intelligence to decrease. This is quite a different 
question to asking students whether or not they can change their intelligence, 
which implies increasing intelligence. The other theory-of-intelligence item in their 
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study asked, “If someone is not clever, can they change to get cleverer?” which is 
closer to Dweck‟s items. But with just two theory-of-intelligence items included, and 
a relatively small sample of 75 students, it is not possible to draw any conclusions 
from the study.  
There are several factors which might be associated with a trend towards an entity 
theory-of-intelligence as students get older. At intermediate and secondary school, 
individual achievement results take on heightened importance, and failures can 
have significant long-term consequences. In primary school, on the other hand, 
students in the West are often protected from failure. Another factor might be the 
effect of maturation on students‟ developing concepts of intelligence. Bong (2009) 
suggested that this apparent shift during early adolescence “might begin to set in 
motion only after children learn to recognize and appreciate the potential benefits of 
achieving success with less effort” (p. 892). An alternative explanation is that the 
items typically used for measuring students‟ theory-of-intelligence do not reflect the 
complexity of students‟ beliefs about the nature of intelligence, particularly if their 
definitions of intelligence are multidimensional, as proposed by Sternberg (1985a). 
Whether this shift towards an entity belief is the effect of maturation or 
environmental factors, or some combination of both, is uncertain, and can be 
reliably established only by longitudinal studies, of which there have been a small 
number (for example, Ablard, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Pomerantz & Saxon, 
2001). Longitudinal studies are logistically more difficult to conduct than studies 
involving one-off measures, and as an alternative, some studies (for example, Cain 
& Dweck, 1995) have tried to build an overview of how theory-of-intelligence 
changes by conducting cross-sectional studies. One cross-sectional study that 
included measures of theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy (Midgley et al., 1995) 
investigated relationships between the two for 969 US elementary and middle 
school students, from Grade 4 to 7. Midgley et al. were interested to see whether 
the goals students emphasised were associated with their self-efficacy and beliefs 
about the malleability of what they termed school ability – students‟ general ability 
at school. Self-efficacy was also interpreted as being general in nature, relating to 
general school work. Using path analysis, they found that for elementary students, 
a belief that school ability is malleable does not predict self-efficacy. In comparison, 
for middle school students, path analysis indicated an incremental belief in school 
ability was associated with students‟ self-efficacy. Midgley et al. found that 
students‟ beliefs about ability and self-efficacy were associated for middle school 
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students, although not for elementary students. They did not, however, collect 
student achievement data, so were unable to comment on how these student 
beliefs might have been associated with their achievement. 
Longitudinal studies of varying length have aimed to identify how theory-of-
intelligence is associated with students‟ achievement over the primary school 
years. In Stipek and Gralinski‟s (1996) study, described earlier, the mathematics 
and social studies achievement of primary students, and their beliefs about the 
malleability of intelligence, were assessed twice over 1 school year. Their findings 
indicated that an entity belief was a negative predictor of achievement.  
In another study (Pomerantz & Saxon, 2001) that spanned 12 months, with three 
data collection points and involving 932 fourth to sixth-grade students, there was a 
tendency for low grades to be associated with a conception of ability as unaffected 
by internal forces, such as effort. On the other hand, high grades tended to be 
associated with a conception of ability as unaffected by external forces, such as 
situational changes. Had students also been asked about their definitions of – in 
this case – ability, this might have illuminated their reasons for these different 
beliefs, and whether students‟ definitions might in turn be associated with their 
achievement.  
The participants in Gonida et al.‟s (2006) study were similar ages to those in 
Pomerantz and Saxon‟s (2001) research.  Gonida et al. (2006) investigated the 
relationship between theory-of-intelligence and achievement in mathematics and 
language, with two data collection points 1 year apart. They found that high 
achievers in their sample of 10 to 12-year-olds “adopted more incremental beliefs 
and had significantly higher perceived competence” (p. 223) than other students.  
Finally, in one of a pair of studies, Blackwell et al. (2007) examined how the theory-
of-intelligence of four cohorts of seventh graders (373 students in total) was 
associated with changes in their mathematics achievement during the 2 years of 
junior high school. According to their findings, “an incremental theory-of-intelligence 
at the beginning of junior high school predicted higher mathematics grades earned 
at the end of the second year of junior high school” (p. 251).  
Taken collectively, the findings from the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies 
seem to indicate that there is a tendency for students from around 8 to 12 years 
with an incremental belief to have better academic outcomes than students with an 
entity belief. However, the studies described earlier in this section showed that 
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students tend to shift towards an entity theory-of-intelligence as they get older. Not 
all students have entity beliefs about intelligence by the time they leave primary 
school though, so it is unlikely that theory-of-intelligence is related to maturation 
alone. As Dweck (2002) pointed out, “it cannot be all a matter of cognitive 
advancement” (p. 84), or all adults would be (comparative) entity theorists. 
Gender 
The findings related to gender and theory-of-intelligence are somewhat mixed. A 
number of studies (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Kӓrkkӓinen et al., 2008) that have included 
students from 5 to 12 years old have detected no significant differences between 
girls‟ and boys‟ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. Focussing on 
academically talented students, Ablard‟s (2002) longitudinal study found that 425 
12-year-old girls and boys espoused a similar range of learning goals and 
performance goals, which was associated with their having a similar range of 
beliefs about intelligence. 
Other research in a mathematics context has indicated that girls seem to tend 
towards an entity theory-of-intelligence more than boys do. Stipek and Gralinski 
(1991) assessed students‟ beliefs about whether applying effort might improve their 
achievement in mathematics, using two items: “Everyone could do well in math if 
they worked hard” and “A few kids will never do well in math, even if they try hard” 
(p. 363). Also assessed were students‟ attributions for the outcome they expected 
from a mathematics exam. They found that boys were more likely than girls to 
attribute success to high (malleable) ability and failure to luck, and were also more 
likely to believe applying effort could result in success. Girls, in contrast, were more 
likely to attribute success to luck, and failure to low (fixed) ability. In a more recent 
study, Rӓty et al. (2004) also observed that “the boys had a stronger belief than did 
the girls in effort as a way of improving one‟s performance in mathematics” (p. 424) 
Rӓty et al. compared students‟ beliefs about their potential for improvement in 
mathematics and in Finnish, and interestingly found no difference in students‟ 
language-related beliefs that was associated with gender.  
According to Dweck (1986), girls tend to have an entity theory-of-intelligence, and 
are more likely than boys to attribute failure to ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The 
role that stereotypes might play in forming students‟ attributions for their 
performance in mathematics is difficult to isolate, but Dweck (2006) has suggested 
that these might affect girls‟ perceptions of their ability in mathematics. 
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Research methods used to investigate students’ beliefs 
Mixed methods have not been widely used to investigate primary students‟ theory-
of-intelligence. The two Finnish studies just mentioned (Kasanen et al., 2009; Rӓty 
et al., 2004) collected qualitative and quantitative data, but did not explicitly discuss 
how the data were mixed in their studies. No sequential mixed-methods studies of 
primary students‟ theory-of-intelligence, including separate quantitative and 
qualitative methods, have been published. 
In studies in which data about theory-of-intelligence have been collected by 
interviewing students, it has usually not been feasible to include the large sample 
sizes or multiple waves of data collection, more typical of quantitative studies. To 
illustrate these points, on just one occasion, Kasanen et al. (2009) interviewed 58 
students, Burke and Williams (2009) interviewed 75 students in their study, and 
Rӓty et al. (2004) interviewed 119. In each of these studies with primary-school 
students, only qualitative data were collected, and these subsequently underwent a 
content analysis process.  
Interventions to develop an incremental theory-of-intelligence 
What is of particular interest in the present study is how primary students‟ beliefs 
about the malleability of intelligence might be associated with their achievement in 
mathematics, therefore interventions that are of interest are those that include 
measures of both mathematics achievement and theory-of-intelligence in a primary-
school setting. A single experimental study (Blackwell et al., 2007) has explored the 
possibility of explicitly teaching an incremental belief to 12 and 13-year-olds, who in 
New Zealand would be at the very upper limit of the primary years. Typically, as 
students this age make a transition to secondary school, their achievement dips 
slightly (see, for instance, Cox & Kennedy, 2008). To see if they could counteract 
this, Blackwell et al. explicitly taught an incremental belief to 91 relatively low-
achieving seventh-grade students, in eight weekly 25-minute sessions. Initially, 
students in the experimental and control groups were presented with the same 
workshops, focussed on study skills, and the brain‟s physiology. Then the 
experimental group participated in sessions that focussed specifically on the 
malleability of intelligence, with the key message being “that learning changes the 
brain by forming new connections” (Blackwell et al., 2007, p. 254). In the meantime, 
those in the control group studied memory.  
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Theory-of-intelligence data were collected at the beginning and end of seventh 
grade, and three sets of mathematics achievement data were collected – students‟ 
end of sixth-grade data, plus start and end of seventh grade. Theory-of-intelligence 
was measured using Dweck‟s (2000) six items – three entity and three incremental 
belief items. The results showed that students in the experimental group 
experienced a boost to their mathematics achievement by the end of seventh 
grade, as well as enhanced motivation during class. The achievement of students 
in the control group, on the other hand, had continued to decline.  
Given the volume of research relating to students‟ beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence, and the messages in the research literature about the need to teach 
students about the value of effort and their capacity to learn – ideally before they 
reach secondary school – it is curious that so few interventions have been explored 
with primary-school students. A small number of experimental studies have taken 
pre- and post-intervention measures of students‟ beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence to see what the effects might be of manipulating a variable, such as 
feedback (Heyman, 2008; Heyman & Compton, 2006), with which students‟ beliefs 
about the malleability of intelligence are thought to be associated. The focus of 
these studies, however, was not on the association between changes in theory-of-
intelligence and achievement. 
Connecting students’ beliefs about intelligence, their mathematics 
self-efficacy and their mathematics achievement 
In their study of Grade 6 science, Chen and Pajares (2010) identified the role of 
students‟ epistemological beliefs in mediating the effect of theory-of-intelligence on 
self-efficacy and achievement in science. Students‟ theory-of-intelligence was 
related to their beliefs about scientific knowledge, with entity beliefs being 
associated with naïve views of the nature of scientific knowledge, and incremental 
beliefs with more sophisticated views. Students‟ beliefs about the nature of science 
were in turn associated with their self-efficacy for science, and their achievement.  
The effect on a person‟s self-efficacy of believing intelligence is a fixed entity has 
also been investigated in the context of adults encountering difficulty (Wood & 
Bandura, 1989). In their experimental study, 24 business studies graduates were 
given managerial decision-making roles in a simulated organisation. Before the 
simulated business scenarios were presented to participants for them to manage, 
one group was told that the skills they would need could be learnt, while the other 
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half of the sample was told the necessary skills were related to fixed intellectual 
capacity. Wood and Bandura found that entity beliefs were associated with 
decreased self-efficacy when participants met with challenges, and that those who 
were exposed to an incremental theory-of-intelligence persevered at difficulty, and 
were resilient, with no ill-effects to their self-efficacy levels. In the situations to 
which they were asked to respond, those who had been presented with incremental 
beliefs had greater success than those for whom intelligence had been portrayed 
as an inherent trait.  
Research undertaken by Dweck and her colleagues has been thorough in the area 
of assessing students‟ theory-of-intelligence but has not compared this to 
measurements of students‟ self-efficacy. There does not yet seem to be empirical 
research that shows whether or not primary students whose theory-of-intelligence 
has reportedly shifted from more of an entity theory-of-intelligence towards an 
incremental theory-of-intelligence have actually experienced a corresponding 
increase in self-efficacy. Although no research has yet explored whether increasing 
students‟ self-efficacy might be associated with changes in their theory-of-
intelligence, it seems possible that building students‟ self-efficacy through feedback 
that emphasises the value of effort may have the potential to shift students‟ theory-
of-intelligence towards an incremental belief.  
Researchers have used path analysis procedures to explain the strong influence of 
mathematics self-efficacy on achievement (Pajares & Miller, 1994; Schunk & Gunn, 
1986) for students at undergraduate and primary levels, respectively. Bandura 
(1986) proposed that self-efficacy is not totally correlated with actual ability, 
suggesting instead that self-efficacy operates partially independently of ability to 
determine achievement. Bandura (1993) connected students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, achievement, and beliefs about ability when he wrote: “Learning 
environments that construe ability as an acquirable skill… and highlight self-
comparison of progress and personal accomplishments are well suited for building 
a sense of efficacy that promotes academic achievement” (p. 125). 
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Questions that have been raised about theory-of-intelligence 
Although much of the research reviewed in this chapter supports aspects of 
Dweck‟s (1986) model, this has not been unanimous. Over the last decade, in 
particular, researchers have used empirical evidence to question the claim that a 
person‟s theory-of-intelligence always predicts their achievement, and that theory-
of-intelligence scores always mean the same thing. For example, Ziegler and 
Stoeger (2010) presented evidence that an entity view was negatively associated 
with achievement when it was related to a student‟s beliefs about their deficits. On 
the other hand, when an entity belief was related to a student‟s existing abilities, 
this was positively associated with achievement.  
Dupeyrat and Mariné (2005) tested Dweck‟s model with adults who were returning 
to school in France. They measured participants‟ theory-of-intelligence using 
Dweck et al.‟s (1995) entity items, and also included two incremental-belief items 
which they developed. The sample item provided was “My intelligence is mainly the 
result of my experience” (p. 49). Although a factor analysis indicated a two-factor 
structure, it is not clear that the second factor was consistent with an incremental 
theory-of-intelligence, as they proposed. Also measured were participants‟ 
engagement in learning, and their achievement (their exam grades for the four 
courses they completed). Although Dupeyrat and Mariné‟s findings were generally 
consistent with Dweck‟s model, the “predicted effects of implicit theories of 
intelligence on goal orientation and cognitive engagement in learning, however, 
failed to emerge” (p. 43). Dupeyrat and Mariné proposed that if, as Sternberg 
(1985a) has suggested, people conceptualise intelligence as being 
multidimensional, it seemed likely that people might believe some aspects of their 
intelligence are malleable and others, fixed. Unfortunately though, no evidence was 
provided to support this. 
Another question about theory-of-intelligence was raised by Kinlaw and Kurtz-
Costes (2007), who proposed that students might endorse elements of both an 
entity and an incremental theory. The 5 to 10-year-old students in their study 
indicated stronger beliefs in the malleability of intelligence than they did in its 
stability. One of the problems with their methods, however, was that just two items 
were used to measure theory-of-intelligence – one each to gauge how strongly 
students agreed with an incremental and entity theory-of-intelligence, weakening 
their findings.  
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Most of the questions that have been raised relate to the complexity of people‟s 
beliefs about intelligence not being reflected in instruments that include Dweck et 
al.‟s (1995) entity belief items. As part of a structural equation model, Blackwell et 
al. (2007) reported loadings on a single factor of .41 to .79 for the six theory-of-
intelligence items advocated by Dweck (2000), suggesting some items were not 
actually very strong theory-of-intelligence measures.  
Chapter summary 
There are a number of problems with research into children‟s definitions of, and 
beliefs about, intelligence.  
First, researchers‟ definitions of intelligence, and explanations of how it is 
differentiated from ability, have rarely been provided in published studies. Students 
appear to develop a conceptualisation of intelligence as a capacity for learning by 
around 9 years old. Until they do, their supposed theory-of-intelligence score may 
indicate their beliefs about an intelligence that is defined very differently – one that 
might, for instance, also include effort. Only two studies (Cain & Dweck, 1995; 
Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005)  investigated how students‟ definitions of intelligence 
were associated with their theory-of-intelligence, but the data analysis methods 
used in the first study were inappropriate for the data gathered, and the second 
study relied on a single item to measure theory-of-intelligence. Where students‟ 
definitions of intelligence are unknown, one cannot be sure exactly what it is that 
students are making malleability judgments about. If, as students get older they 
develop multi-dimensional definitions of intelligence, like that described by 
Sternberg (1985a), or two-dimensional definitions, similar to the working definition 
given at the start of this chapter, then responding to Dweck‟s (2000) items would 
demand some manner of amalgamation of beliefs.  
Second, the analysis of theory-of-intelligence data has followed a somewhat 
specious path. At times, ordinal data have been dichotomised and analysed as 
quantitative data, and have been used to build a body of research that has 
misrepresented students‟ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence as either 
strongly entity beliefs or strongly incremental beliefs. Therefore, the robustness of 
the theory-of-intelligence construct seems doubtful.  
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Third, a small number of longitudinal studies of children‟s theory-of-intelligence, and 
a small number employing mixed methods have been conducted, mostly involving 
students in senior primary school and beyond. There are almost no reports of 
intervention studies that sought to alter primary students‟ beliefs about intelligence. 
As a result, little is really known about how stable or malleable primary students‟ 
theory-of-intelligence might be. Very few studies have gathered evidence of 
associations between primary students‟ theory-of-intelligence and their self-efficacy 
beliefs – none of these in the context of mathematics. Dweck‟s six theory-of-
intelligence items are stated in absolute terms, and how Likert-type responses 
actually represent respondents‟ beliefs has had little qualitative exploration. In the 
present study, students‟ definitions of intelligence, expressed during interviews, 
were compared to their responses to Dweck‟s questionnaire items, to explain what 
responses to such items actually signify. 
From around 8 years old, students‟ theory-of-intelligence is reported to be 
associated with their achievement in mathematics, and an incremental theory-of-
intelligence positively correlated with achievement. Because of this correlation, an 
incremental theory-of-intelligence is thought to be preferable to an entity belief for 
all students. However, findings of other studies (Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005; Kinlaw & 
Kurtz-Costes, 2007; Ziegler & Stoeger, 2010) have suggested that an incremental 
theory-of-intelligence may not be equally beneficial to all students‟ learning. Rather 
than taking an absolutist approach, further research is needed to identify the 
particular situations and students for whom different beliefs about intelligence may 
be of benefit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Teachers’ Beliefs  
Introduction 
Although the focus of this thesis is on students – their mathematics self-efficacy 
and achievement, and their beliefs about intelligence – also important to consider is 
how their teachers‟ beliefs might be associated with those of their students and, 
importantly, with their students‟ achievement in mathematics. This chapter presents 
key literature related to teachers‟ beliefs about learning, more specifically, their self-
efficacy for teaching mathematics and their theory-of-intelligence. Also considered 
are the ways in which teachers‟ beliefs might influence students, and the potential 
for teachers to capitalise on any such associations in order to build students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy and their incremental beliefs about intelligence. One of 
these likely avenues is teacher-student feedback, discussed later in the chapter. 
The challenges associated with changing teachers‟ beliefs are also explored. 
The empirical studies reviewed here include teachers and occasionally pre-service 
teachers as participants. One of the difficulties with collecting data from practising 
teachers can be their distribution across different schools, which might have 
contributed to the small sample sizes in some of the studies (for example, Nespor, 
1984; Yerrick, Parke, & Nugent, 1996) presented in this chapter. Although studies 
in which the participants are pre-service teachers have the advantage of tapping 
into a large potential sample in the same location, the characteristics of the people 
in this group are obviously unlikely to include years of teaching experience, which 
may in itself have quite an effect on teachers‟ beliefs. Therefore, studies of pre-
service teachers alone have not been included in this review. 
As was the case in regard to students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and beliefs about 
intelligence, issues of interpretation and operationalisation were reflected in the 
literature related to teachers‟ beliefs.  
Teachers’ beliefs 
There is no universally agreed definition of what beliefs actually are, making the 
study of teachers‟ beliefs problematic. As Pajares (1992) described the situation, 
“The difficulty in studying teachers‟ beliefs has been caused by definitional 
problems, poor conceptualizations, and differing understandings of beliefs and 
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belief structures” (p. 307). In this chapter, a “belief” is defined as anything a teacher 
regards as true, drawing on Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). One of the challenges 
involved in studying beliefs is separating them from knowledge. In a review of 
studies of teachers‟ beliefs related to mathematics education, Thompson (1992) 
described two characteristics of beliefs – their disputability and their ability to be 
held with different levels of conviction – that distinguish them from knowledge. In 
addition to issues of defining and operationalising teachers‟ beliefs, it must also be 
acknowledged that teachers‟ beliefs and practices are affected by the school 
environments in which they work (Nespor, 1984; Timperley & Robinson, 2001), 
therefore they cannot be isolated from their contexts.    
The relationship between teachers‟ beliefs and the teaching of primary 
mathematics, in particular, has been the focus of a small number of studies. In a 
UK study, Askew, Rhodes, Brown, Wiliam, and Johnson (1997) examined primary 
teachers' beliefs related to three aspects of teaching numeracy: “beliefs about what 
it is to be a numerate pupil”; “beliefs about pupils and how they learn to become 
numerate”; and “beliefs about how best to teach pupils to become numerate” 
(p. 23). They sought to explicate associations between student achievement and 
the beliefs of effective teachers. The researchers elected to work in schools whose 
average students‟ achievement was above expectations, then asked senior 
management to indicate which teachers they believed were the most effective 
numeracy teachers.  These teachers‟ students completed the same numeracy test 
on two occasions, approximately six months apart, to identify changes in their 
achievement, as an indicator of the teachers‟ effectiveness. Teachers‟ beliefs were 
categorised as tending towards one of three orientations: transmission, discovery, 
or connectionist. Central to connectionist beliefs is that “teaching mathematics is 
based on dialogue between teacher and pupils, so that teachers better understand 
the pupils‟ thinking and pupils can gain access to the teachers‟ mathematical 
knowledge” (p. 32). This is in contrast to transmission beliefs which are focused on 
teaching mathematics routines and procedures, and discovery beliefs that are 
aligned with notions of students “needing to be „ready‟ before they can learn certain 
mathematical ideas” (p. 34). Data sources for the study included questionnaire 
responses from 90 teachers, at least two classroom observations of 33 teachers, 
and three interviews for each of 18 of these teachers. From these interviews, 
Askew et al. identified emerging themes from which they developed a further set of 
interview items for the remaining 15 teachers who had been observed. The teacher 
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data were then compared with student achievement data. The results indicated that  
teachers who were highly effective typically espoused connectionist beliefs, while 
those who were aligned more closely with transmission or discovery beliefs tended 
to be less effective.  
Muijs and Reynolds (2002) built on Askew et al.‟s (1997) study by using structural 
equation modelling to test hypothesised relationships between primary teachers‟ 
beliefs, behaviours, subject knowledge and self-efficacy, and student achievement, 
and found that connectionist beliefs “had a significant influence on achievement, 
through their impact on teacher behaviors, of which they were the strongest 
predictor” (p. 12). Relating this back to Bandura‟s (1978) triadic reciprocal 
causation, this is a further illustration of personal factors (teachers‟ connectionist 
beliefs) influencing teachers‟ behaviour, which then had an impact on student 
behaviour (mathematics achievement). However, as the authors point out, the 
teachers‟ subject-knowledge data were self-reported on both data-gathering 
occasions, and the sample of 103 teachers was fairly small. These two studies both 
identified that particular sets of beliefs are associated with students developing 
mathematical understanding – a goal of many recent mathematics education 
initiatives around the world.  
Changing teachers’ beliefs and practices 
As more is learnt about what constitutes effective teaching in different subject 
areas, there are constant demands for primary teachers to modify their teaching 
practice. Teachers‟ beliefs strongly influence their teaching practice (Cohen & Ball, 
1990; Nespor, 1987), so to make more than superficial changes to their practice 
requires changing their beliefs (Hirsch & Killion, 2009; Timperley, Wilson, Barrar, & 
Fung, 2007). Borko and Putnam (1996) proposed that it is critical that teachers‟ 
practices and beliefs both “become the object of reflection and scrutiny” (p. 702) in 
school improvement initiatives. Guskey (2002) maintained that teachers – quite 
reasonably – make enduring changes to their practice only after they have 
observed improvements in their student outcomes, on the basis of new practice 
(presumably).  
Teachers‟ beliefs, however, are notoriously difficult to change (Lortie, 1975) and in the 
context of school improvement initiatives, “teachers‟ belief systems can be ignored 
only at the innovator‟s peril” (Clark & Peterson, 1986, p. 291). Furthermore, teachers‟ 
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interpretations of schooling improvement initiatives are coloured by their existing 
beliefs, making their beliefs resistant to change and affecting what teachers learn 
during professional development (Ball, 1996).  
In this section, the focus is on studies that have investigated what is needed in 
order to change teachers‟ beliefs and practices. Lortie (1975) identified three inter-
related teacher orientations – “presentism” (“concentrating on short-range 
outcomes as a source of gratification” (p. 212), rather than long-term goals), 
conservatism (loyalty to existing systems and methods) and individualism 
(preferring to work alone in the privacy of their classroom) – as potential 
impediments to teacher change.  In a more recent study that drew on Lortie‟s 
research, Hargreaves and Shirley (2009) identified presentism as a theme in their 
data. Their study of teachers in over 300 secondary schools indicated that the 
teachers generally preferred strategies they could implement immediately, to 
working toward long-term goals.  
In the late 1980s, according to Nespor (1987), little was known about how beliefs 
are established and how they can be changed. In a theoretical paper, Nespor 
(1987) took the position that a teacher‟s beliefs strongly influence their teaching 
practice, and that in order to reform classroom practices, there are essentially two 
options. The first is to: 
… routinize teaching to the extent that teachers could be taught recipe-
like pedagogical methods, adherence to which could be closely 
monitored and regulated. That is, one could transform teaching into a set 
of well-defined tasks and thus reduce the role played by beliefs in 
defining and shaping tasks. (p. 326)  
The second possibility, Nespor suggested, involves changing teachers‟ beliefs 
through a process of helping them to develop an awareness of their beliefs, before 
providing data that challenges these beliefs, and then presenting them with 
alternative beliefs. In contrast to this, Guskey (1986) had previously presented a 
model of the teacher change process that indicated that teachers‟ beliefs change 
only after their classroom practices and then students‟ achievement have both 
changed. Unlike Nespor‟s hypothesised process, Guskey‟s model included 
changes to teachers‟ beliefs at the end of the process, rather than the beginning. 
Although some teachers might prefer practical changes to their practice that can be 
implemented with a minimum of delay, time is needed to effect deep and lasting 
change. As Dweck (2006) emphasised:  
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Even when you change, the old beliefs aren‟t just removed like a worn-
out hip or knee and replaced with better ones. Instead, the new beliefs 
take their place alongside the old ones, and as they become stronger, 
they give you a different way to think, feel, and act. (p. 208) 
Guskey and Yoon‟s (2009) synthesis focussed on the effectiveness of teachers‟ 
professional learning in improving students‟ achievement and identified an 
association between the amount of time spent on professional learning and 
improvements in students‟ outcomes, suggesting that at least 30 hours of contact 
time can be needed for positive effects. Another important factor they identified was 
sustained follow-up that helps teachers to adapt recommended practices to their 
unique teaching situation. Stipek, Givvin, Salmon, and McGyvers (1998) also raised 
concerns about interventions that include insufficient training for teachers, and went 
so far as to suggest that interventions of short duration might actually have 
negative effects on student outcomes. As Guskey (2002) highlighted, professional 
development needs to be seen as an on-going process, rather than a one-off event, 
if it is to be effective. 
Related to the time devoted to implementing and embedding an initiative, another 
factor that was identified in Hargreaves and Shirley‟s (2009) study as being likely to 
impede teacher change was teachers being expected to participate in too many 
reform initiatives. One effect of schools taking on multiple professional development 
foci over a school year was often to frustrate teachers as it did not allow them 
sufficient time to embed one initiative before they switched to a new focus 
(Education Review Office, 2009). This was supported by Hill, Hawk, and Taylor 
(2001), who looked at features of effective teacher development, and found that 
when schools restricted their professional development to one or two foci per year, 
teachers were more likely to be willing to try and make lasting changes. Similarly, in 
their synthesis of findings from investigations of professional learning and 
development for teachers, Timperley et al. (2007) highlighted teachers‟ in-depth 
learning being supported by school leaders rationalising competing demands to 
support.  
Factors that can help to build connections between teachers‟ existing practices and 
the practices advocated in reforms have also been identified. In a national report on 
professional learning and development in New Zealand primary schools, the 
Education Review Office (2009) highlighted the inclusion of in-class support to help 
teachers adapt their new learning to their unique teaching context, as a feature of  
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effective facilitation. In a mathematics education context, in-class support has been 
a key feature of both the Numeracy Development Projects in New Zealand, and 
Count Me In Too (Department of Education and Training, NSW, 1998) in New 
South Wales. Timperley et al. (2007) also suggested that when substantive change 
is the goal, teachers need collegial support from others with whom they have a 
common sense of purpose. This support might be in the form of in-class support 
from facilitators or fellow teachers, working with a researcher, or participating in 
syndicate-wide or school-wide professional learning. Also described in the 
Education Review Office report was the importance of teachers‟ commitment to 
change, with the suggestion made that if teachers believe their existing practice is 
already effective, any initial enthusiasm is likely to quickly wane. Such an 
unwillingness to persevere to achieve long-term goals is an indication of 
presentism, and this apparent loyalty to existing practices indicates conservatism 
(Lortie, 1975). Collegial support and shared goals may help sustain a teacher‟s 
commitment to change. 
Related to Lortie‟s (1975) teacher orientation of conservatism, Artigue and Perrin-
Glorian (1991) suggested that when teachers are expected to adopt an innovative 
strategy they sometimes attempt to accommodate proposed changes within their 
usual way of functioning. Similarly, in their investigation of the effects of a 2-week 
professional development programme on the beliefs of eight middle-grades science 
teachers, Yerrick et al. (1996) found that the teachers chose to adopt components 
of reforms that they could assimilate into their practice. Both of these studies 
illustrate that conservatism can contribute to changing teachers‟ beliefs being a 
difficult process, especially when teachers are not provided with convincing 
evidence of the efficacy of proposed changes.  
Marzano, Zaffron, Zraik, Robbins, and Yoon (1995) proposed that two types of 
change were made as the result of educational reform initiatives. What they termed 
first order change involved teachers assimilating new material and pedagogical 
techniques into their existing beliefs, and second order change actually altered 
teachers‟ beliefs. They suggested that the sustainability of innovations was largely 
determined by the success they had in changing teachers‟ beliefs. In the earlier 
quote from Nespor (1987), the point is made that, rather than attempting the difficult 
work of changing teachers‟ beliefs, an alternative might be for those leading 
teacher professional development to change teachers‟ practice at a surface level 
with “recipe-like pedagogical methods” (p. 326), resulting in what Marzano et al. 
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(1995) would call first order change. Timperley et al. (2007) also highlighted the 
possible tension between professional development providers working to change 
teachers‟ beliefs (second order change) when providers are also concerned with 
achieving implementation fidelity (first order change), especially in the case of 
professional development initiatives that are being implemented at scale. Indeed, if 
teachers‟ beliefs drive their practice, then demanding that teachers adopt 
alternative practices is unlikely to change their beliefs, and might result in poor 
implementation or open resistance to change. As Timperley et al. (2007) cautioned, 
“Addressing specific practices without attending to the beliefs that underpin them 
may be counter-productive” (p. 119). 
In New Zealand, a particular set of teacher beliefs has been identified as negatively 
influencing the academic achievement of Māori and Pasifika students (Bishop, 
Berryman, Cavanagh, & Teddy, 2007). Bishop et al. found that the deficit beliefs of 
some teachers were associated with their believing that students‟ academic failure 
is caused solely by their family background and other external factors beyond 
teachers‟ influence. Other teachers acknowledged that family background does 
play a role in students‟ academic achievement, and took an agentic position where 
they attributed internal factors with greater influence on student achievement than 
external factors. Surmounting teachers‟ deficit theories on which some drew to 
explain the underachievement of Māori students in mainstream classes has been a 
focus of Te Kotahitanga, an evolving professional development intervention that 
sought to reduce disparities in the achievement of Māori students with that of non-
Māori students. This innovation dealt with teachers‟ deficit beliefs by discursive 
repositioning that allowed teachers to take a more agentic position in relation to the 
achievement of Māori students. Fundamental to this innovation was challenging 
deficit theorising in a supportive way so that teachers became aware of their role in 
perpetuating power imbalances that positioned Māori students as failing at school, 
and were also provided with an alternative discursive position. Hui (meetings) for 
teachers, professional development facilitators, and members of the research team 
were often held at local marae (Māori meeting place), and were combined with in-
class support to help teachers make this shift in their beliefs and practice. Using a 
pre-test at the start of the school year and post-test at the end, indicated that the 
mathematics progress of Year 9 and 10 Māori students whose teachers 
participated in this project was greater than the progress of students of non-
participant teachers, and greater than the national norms for Māori students.  
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Another study that aimed to explicitly tackle teachers‟ deficit theorising about 
students‟ underachievement, this time in the context of literacy, included creating 
cognitive dissonance as an important feature (Timperley & Robinson, 2001). In the 
context of school improvement in teaching reading to students with low academic 
achievement, Timperley and Robinson investigated the processes involved in 
changing the beliefs of teachers in four primary schools. Participating schools drew 
their students from low socio-economic communities, and their students were 
predominantly Māori and Pasifika. In one school, Timperley and Robinson 
presented teachers with data on the skills their students had on school entry, which 
exceeded teachers‟ estimates of these students‟ skill levels. This meant that 
teachers could no longer explain students‟ poor achievement by claiming they were 
not ready to learn when they started school. Instead, teachers engaged in intensive 
professional development to focus on how they could improve their literacy 
teaching practices in order to cater for their students‟ identified learning needs. In 
another school, teachers attended an initial literacy professional development 
workshop, which prompted them to collect data on their junior students‟ letter-
sound knowledge. In this school, too, students‟ skills were greater than teachers‟ 
perceptions. At the beginning and end of the professional development, teachers 
were asked to give three reasons for students achieving below curriculum 
expectations. At the conclusion of the development, 87% of the reasons given by 
teachers for students‟ achievement levels were school-based, compared to the 
same percentage being attributed to factors associated with students and their 
family backgrounds before the development began. Teachers‟ deficit theorising 
about the underlying causes of students‟ poor achievement made them inclined to 
“explain away” discrepant data, and to highlight “the occasional child who engaged 
in eating crayons” (p. 297) as more typical.  
The models of teacher professional development described in both Timperley and 
Robinson (2001) and Bishop et al. (2007) included in-class support for individual 
teachers, as did the Numeracy Development Projects. In the USA, Kose and Lim 
(2010) surveyed 330 teachers in 25 elementary schools to identify relationships 
between teachers‟ beliefs and transformative professional development that was 
delivered in the form of workshops, conferences and academic study. They found 
that deficit thinking was difficult to overcome with these modes of professional 
development, and suggested that on-going, school-based learning would increase 
the effectiveness of such initiatives. Clearly, deficit beliefs that impact negatively on  
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the achievement of traditionally marginalised groups of students need to be re-
framed so that teachers acknowledge the difficulties students face, and take 
responsibility for the achievement of all students.  
In a synthesis of studies that included some of the New Zealand research 
described here, Alton-Lee (2003) underscored the importance of teachers having 
high expectations for students‟ learning as a factor that contributes to one of ten 
characteristics of quality teaching that could improve achievement for New 
Zealand‟s diverse student population. One of the studies illustrated this point in the 
context of the teaching of early literacy skills to Māori and Pasifika students 
(Phillips, McNaughton & MacDonald, 2001), and found that addressing teachers‟ 
low expectations for students‟ learning impacted positively on students‟ 
achievement in reading. 
The mathematics context 
Investigations of how primary teachers‟ beliefs about teaching mathematics have 
changed during their involvement in mathematics reforms (Spillane, 1999; Vacc, 
Bright, & Bowman, 1998) are few. In the context of the Numeracy Development 
Projects, some anecdotal evidence of changes in teachers‟ beliefs has been 
reported (for example, Higgins, 2002; Trinick, 2005), and changes in teachers‟ 
attitudes to teaching mathematics have been explored (Higgins, 2002; Thomas & 
Ward, 2002), but no studies specifically aimed to investigate changes in teachers‟ 
beliefs.    
Vacc et al. (1998) examined the changes in beliefs of 19 teachers during 2 years of 
the Cognitively Guided Instruction (Carpenter, Fennema, Peterson, & Carey, 1988) 
professional development programme in North Carolina. The participants were 
drawn from five teams that worked with teacher educators in the programme which 
emphasised a problem-solving approach to teaching mathematics, and catering for 
the learning needs of individual students. In addition to attending after-school 
workshops, teachers received regular in-class support. A content analysis of 
teachers‟ responses to three open-ended questions that aimed to identify their 
beliefs about teaching and learning mathematics, administered on three occasions, 
revealed mixed results. On the one hand, at the end of the 2 years around three-
quarters of the teachers were advocates for teaching mathematics through a 
problem-solving approach.  On the other hand, though, 42% of the teachers still did 
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not appear to believe there was a need to plan instruction to target individual 
needs. Earlier research (Fennema et al., 1996) found that even after 4 years‟ 
participation in the same professional development programme, there seemed to 
be no substantial changes to some teachers‟ beliefs. Because student achievement 
measures were not included in this study, no conclusions can be drawn about the 
effect of reported changes – or a lack thereof – in teachers‟ beliefs on student 
outcomes. 
Based on findings of a mixed-methods study, Spillane (1999) proposed a model to 
explain how teachers had responded to a mathematics reform in the US, in which 
teachers‟ beliefs, knowledge and dispositions mediated the opportunities with which 
teachers were presented to learn and change.  Teachers who had substantially 
changed their practice were compared with teachers who had not, in terms of their 
“zones of enactment” – essentially, the various situations in which a teacher makes 
sense of, and operationalises, reform initiatives. Teachers who had made 
substantial changes to their practice, Spillane found, were more likely to have 
enactment zones that extended beyond their classrooms and included networks of 
practice in which teachers had rich discussions about the implementation of 
reforms‟ recommendations with teaching colleagues, as well as outside experts. 
Beswick (2007/2008) described the effects on 22 teachers, 13 of whom were 
primary teachers and nine secondary, of a professional learning programme that 
aimed to more closely align teachers‟ beliefs about students generally with their 
beliefs about students who had mathematics learning difficulties. To identify their 
beliefs and attitudes in relation to students with mathematics learning difficulties, 
teachers completed a questionnaire before and after three 3-hour workshops that 
focused on effective strategies for numeracy teaching and an inclusive approach to 
teaching. Teachers‟ initial responses indicated that they did hold different beliefs 
about numeracy teaching, depending on a student‟s perceived ability to learn 
mathematics. Although at post-test there was evidence that some teachers had 
changed their beliefs in relation to their academic expectations for students with 
mathematics learning disabilities, the item on which there was the least change in 
teachers‟ responses, with more than half of the teachers still agreeing, was, “Some 
people have a maths mind and some don‟t” (p. 12). Although this was interpreted 
by Beswick as suggesting “an underlying tendency of teachers to cite the cause of 
students‟ difficulties beyond the influence of teaching” (p. 13), it might reflect 
teachers‟ belief in a predisposition to learn mathematics rather than their belief that 
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they cannot influence students‟ achievement in mathematics. Future research that 
makes connections between teachers‟ reported changes in beliefs, their classroom 
practices, and changes in their students‟ achievement, and that assesses these 
changes over time, would build on the findings from the studies presented here.  
Teacher self-efficacy 
Bandura‟s (1986) definition of self-efficacy as “people‟s judgments of their 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated 
types of performances” (p. 391) was used to shape interpretation of teachers‟ self-
efficacy in this research, as it was for students‟ mathematics self-efficacy. However, 
teacher self-efficacy (for teaching mathematics) differs from student self-efficacy 
(for doing mathematics) in the ways it has been operationalised by researchers. To 
measure students‟ mathematics self-efficacy with a high degree of specificity, 
identical sets of mathematics problems can be used with students of similar age, 
across different schools. To measure teacher self-efficacy on an equally specific 
basis, which can also be used across a range of schools, is problematic. This is 
because, for teacher self-efficacy to be operationalised at the same level of 
specificity, teachers would be required to make self-efficacy judgments in relation to 
their ability to undertake specific teaching activities for particular students, which 
teachers would subsequently be required to undertake. It is the inclusion of 
particular students that makes a uniform measurement difficult.  
Teachers‟ self-efficacy is context specific, but – as was the case with students‟ self-
efficacy – the level of specificity of the context has varied across studies. Some 
researchers have chosen a broad context of teaching in general (Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Steca, & Malone, 2006; Friedman & Kass, 2002; Gibson & Dembo, 
1984; Guskey & Passaro, 1994; Midgley et al., 1989; Woolfolk & Hoy, 1990). 
Others have opted for a subject-specific focus – in this instance, mathematics 
(Midgley et al, 1989; Philippou & Christou, 2002; Puchner & Taylor, 2006; Ross & 
Bruce, 2007) – or an area of teaching such as students with special needs (Brady & 
Woolfson, 2008). Others have narrowed the focus still further to particular domains 
within a subject (for example, Rubeck and Encohs (1991) investigated teachers‟ 
self-efficacy for teaching chemistry, as distinct from their self-efficacy for teaching 
science).  
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Teachers‟ self-efficacy functions in a similar fashion to students‟ self-efficacy; in 
both cases, it is mastery experiences that are the most powerful source of efficacy 
information. A teacher is likely to think they have performed well when they see 
evidence of their students making progress in their learning, and this success feeds 
their self-efficacy (Dellinger, Bobbett, Olivier, & Ellett, 2008), motivating them to 
maintain their effort and persist to achieve their goals, resulting in a snowball effect. 
A teacher with strong self-efficacy is also likely to influence student achievement by 
showing greater perseverance when teaching a student who is struggling (Gibson 
& Dembo, 1984). So teachers‟ and students‟ self-efficacy are to some degree 
interdependent. Two studies have concluded that teachers with strong self-efficacy 
are often more receptive to innovative approaches and are more inclined to value 
and implement these (Evers, Brouwers, & Tomic, 2002; DeForest & Hughes, 1992), 
suggesting that teachers with high self-efficacy levels are likely to show less 
conservatism than teachers with weak self-efficacy.  
Developing these ideas further, other studies (such as Goddard, Hoy, & Woolfolk 
Hoy, 2000, 2004) have explored the effect of collective efficacy, which they 
explained is more than the sum of the efficacy beliefs of individual teachers in a 
school. Instead, it represents “the group‟s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to 
organize and execute courses of action required to produce given levels of 
attainments” (Bandura, 1997, p. 477). In Bandura‟s (1993) study, teachers‟ 
perceived collective efficacy for promoting students‟ academic progress in 
mathematics and reading was investigated. The findings indicated that factors such 
as student transience and absenteeism, and their families‟ socioeconomic levels 
were associated with a school‟s collective efficacy. Although in New Zealand the 
role of teachers‟ collective efficacy has been acknowledged in reports of studies 
that have focused on raising the achievement of Māori and Pasifika students (for 
example, Phillips et al., 2001), it has not actually been measured, or discussed in 
relation to their findings. Whether there might be an association between changes 
in teachers‟ deficit beliefs about students‟ poor achievement, teachers‟ collective 
efficacy, and – most importantly – students‟ achievement, remains to be 
investigated. 
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An ill-defined construct 
For the last three decades, confusion about the meaning of the terms teacher 
efficacy, teacher sense of efficacy, and teacher self-efficacy has abounded in the 
research literature and various definitions have been proffered with the result that 
teacher self-efficacy remains ill-defined. This section outlines the development of 
teacher self-efficacy measures since the 1970s to help identify where the 
misconstructions began. In an effort to avoid misrepresenting the construct of 
“teacher self-efficacy”, the exact labels researchers used for the constructs they 
claim to have measured are indicated by italics. 
In early studies (Armor et al., 1976; Berman & McLaughlin, 1977) that included a 
measure of what was referred to as a teacher‟s sense of efficacy, just two items 
were used, drawn from Rotter‟s (1966) locus of control construct. Because both 
studies were funded by the Rand Corporation, these items have often been 
referred to in the literature as the “Rand items” (for example, Woolfolk & Hoy, 
1990). Subsequently described as measuring teachers‟ self-efficacy in relation to 
internal and external influences respectively, these items were: 
 If I try really hard, I can get through to even the most difficult or 
unmotivated students 
 When it comes right down to it, a teacher really can‟t do much 
(because) most of a student‟s motivation and performance depends on 
his or her home environment. (Armor et al., 1976, p. 23) 
A number of subsequent studies included one or both Rand items (Gibson & 
Dembo, 1984; Guskey & Passaro, 1994; Midgley et al., 1989; Woolfolk & Hoy, 
1990). Building on these two items, Gibson and Dembo (1984) developed and 
statistically tested what was to become the first widely-used instrument that 
measured teacher efficacy. Sixteen of the 30 items on their initial Teacher Efficacy 
Scale loaded on two independent factors, thought to represent two dimensions of 
teacher efficacy:  
 Personal teaching efficacy – “belief that one has the skills and abilities 
to bring about student learning” (Gibson & Dembo, 1984, p. 573). An 
example of a personal teaching efficacy item is: “When I try really hard, 
I can get through to most difficult students” (p. 573), very similar to the 
first Rand item, above; and  
 Teaching efficacy, relating to teaching more generally. An example of a 
teaching efficacy item is: “The amount a student can learn is primarily 
related to family background” (p. 573), similar to the second Rand item. 
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Items from Gibson and Dembo‟s scale were subsequently used in a number of 
studies (Anderson, Greene, & Loewen, 1988; Guskey & Passaro, 1994; Philippou & 
Christou, 2002; Ross, 1992; Woolfolk & Hoy, 1990).  
Guskey and Passaro (1994) supported the two-dimensional nature of teacher 
efficacy, but with an interpretation that reflected Rotter‟s (1966) locus of control, 
from which the Rand items were originally developed. Guskey and Passaro 
maintained that the two factors that resulted from their factor analysis of items 
adapted from Gibson and Dembo‟s (1984) instrument were not personal and 
general teaching efficacy, but were distinguished by whether teachers attributed 
influences to internal or external causes. They claimed that personal teaching 
efficacy represented (internal) personal influence, and general teaching efficacy 
comprised teachers‟ beliefs about (external) influences outside the classroom, such 
as students‟ background. At this point, it appears that interpretations of efficacy 
items had come full circle. This interpretation was later supported by Philippou and 
Christou (2002) in their study of primary teachers‟ mathematics teaching efficacy 
beliefs.  
Bandura‟s seminal paper expounding self-efficacy theory was published in 1977, 
after the publication of Amor et al.‟s (1976) study, and within a month of Berman 
and McLaughlin‟s (1977) (Rand) work. Looking back over the development of 
teacher self-efficacy measures, it seems reasonable to suggest that the two Rand 
items were not developed with self-efficacy theory in mind. Items that were 
originally designed to indicate a teacher‟s beliefs about locus of control were 
embraced by researchers as measuring teachers‟ efficacy. This appears to be the 
point from which much of the confusion about teachers‟ self-efficacy stems. After 
these early measures had established a foothold, Bandura‟s (1977b) work was 
used to support studies claiming to measure teachers’ self-efficacy (and teacher 
efficacy, and teachers’ sense of efficacy).  
Tschannen-Moran, Woolfolk Hoy, and Hoy‟s (1998) theoretical paper presented the 
two Rand items along with items from Gibson and Dembo (1984) in an instrument 
intended to measure teacher efficacy, which they defined as “… the teacher‟s belief 
in his or her capability to organize and execute courses of action required to 
successfully accomplish a specific teaching task in a particular context” (p. 233). 
Their definition was very close to Bandura‟s, although seems to represent a lesser 
degree of specificity than that intended by Bandura (1986). Tschannen-Moran et 
al.‟s definition has been cited by other researchers as “the prevailing conception of 
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teacher efficacy” (Ross & Bruce, 2007, p. 53). The items that Tschannen-Moran et 
al. (1998) compiled have subsequently been adopted – or adapted – for use in 
other studies (for example, Brady & Woolfson, 2008; Caprara et al., 2006). As with 
most teacher self-efficacy assessments, teachers are asked to show how much 
they agree with statements, using Likert-type scales of five or six points. Although 
Tschannen-Moran et al.‟s (1998) definition of teacher efficacy was fairly consistent 
with Bandura‟s definition, their items did not operationalise self-efficacy at a similar 
level of specificity as students‟ mathematics self-efficacy has been operationalised.  
To try to address the issue of specificity, Dellinger et al. (2008) developed an 
alternative teacher self-efficacy beliefs instrument – the Teachers‟ Efficacy Beliefs 
System–Self Form – which they designed to be more closely related to the 
classroom context. They also intended their conceptualisation of teacher self-
efficacy to more closely adhere to Bandura‟s (1986) definition of self-efficacy. 
Dellinger et al. (2008) defined teacher efficacy as “focused on successfully affecting 
student performance” (p. 753), and teacher self-efficacy as “a teacher‟s individual 
beliefs in their capabilities to perform specific teaching tasks at a specified level of 
quality in a specified situation” (p. 752), neither of which include “for a specific 
student” as part of the definition, although it is perhaps implied in the latter. They 
explained that the former is thought to be based on outcome expectancies, while 
the latter relates to behaviours that should help achieve the expected outcomes, 
and is aligned with Bandura‟s definition (see Teacher self-efficacy, above). 
Dellinger et al.‟s questionnaire, tested with a large sample of 2,373 elementary 
school teachers, asked them to respond to items that shared the common stem, 
“Right now in my present teaching situation, the strength of my personal beliefs in 
my capabilities to…”, such as “plan activities that accommodate the range of 
individual differences among my students” (p. 764). The 1-4 Likert-type scale 
ranged from 1, Weak beliefs in my capabilities to 4, Very strong beliefs in my 
capabilities. Although Dellinger et al. (2008) used items that asked teachers to 
make self-efficacy judgments in relation to their “present teaching situation”, this 
still meant that elementary teachers (who are not generally subject specialists) had 
to amalgamate their self-efficacy judgments of teaching across a variety of subject 
areas, and with a variety of students.  
Three studies (Evers et al., 2002; Friedman & Kass, 2002; Tschannen-Moran & 
Woolfolk Hoy, 2001) have included reports of an analysis of the factor structure of 
their various interpretations of teacher self-efficacy since Gibson and Dembo‟s 
96 
 
(1984) early construct validation study. Fairly recently, Fives and Buehl (2010) 
conducted such an analysis of Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy‟s (2001) 
Teachers‟ Sense of Efficacy Scale, a later version of their 1998 questionnaire. For 
practising teachers, they identified three distinct factors: “efficacy for classroom 
management, instructional practices, and student engagement” (p. 118). When this 
structure was applied to data from pre-service teachers, however, items loaded on 
more than one factor and theoretically meaningful interpretation was not possible. 
Fives and Buehl suggested that the self-efficacy of pre-service teachers is less 
clearly differentiated that that of more experienced teachers.   
Teacher self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
Narrowing the focus further, empirical studies that have investigated primary 
teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics, specifically, might define teacher 
self-efficacy as a teacher’s judgments of their capabilities to organise and execute 
effectively, a particular mathematics teaching activity for a specific student, 
consistent with Bandura‟s (1986) definition of self-efficacy. In three of the four 
relevant studies located, the research was conducted over the last decade, with 
generalist primary teachers.   
The single study that was undertaken over 20 years ago, and that included 
specialist mathematics teachers as well as generalist teachers who taught 
mathematics, was Midgley, Feldlaufer, and Eccles‟s (1988, 1989) longitudinal 
study, that investigated the relationship between teachers‟ self-efficacy and 
students‟ beliefs in mathematics, over the transition to junior high school. Four 
waves of data were collected over 2 years – students‟ final year at elementary 
school and their first year at junior high school. Data comprised students‟ 
performance on a statewide mathematics test, a student questionnaire about their 
mathematics-related beliefs, and a teacher efficacy questionnaire that included one 
of the Rand items. Midgley et al. (1989) found that: 
Generally, the beliefs of students who had low-efficacy teachers became 
more negative as the school years progressed, whereas the beliefs of 
students who had high-efficacy teachers became more positive or 
showed less negative change from the beginning to the end of the school 
years. (p. 254)  
More than a decade later, Philippou and Christou (2002) used an instrument 
developed from Gibson and Dembo‟s (1984) items to measure 157 primary 
teachers‟ personal teacher efficacy and their general teaching efficacy, which they 
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collectively termed teachers‟ efficacy beliefs (p. 211). Personal teaching efficacy 
was assessed using items such as, “I can teach successfully and achieve good 
results, even in mathematical topics considered difficult”, and general teaching 
efficacy with items such as, “Taking into account all factors influencing mathematics 
learning, then the possibilities of the teacher are very limited” (pp. 222-3). They also 
conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 respondents at different stages in 
their teaching careers to help identify how efficacy beliefs might change over time, 
and also how particular pre-service training courses whose graduates teach in 
Cyprus schools might have been associated with this. Their findings indicated that 
teachers‟ level of efficacy for teaching mathematics tended to decrease early in 
their careers, and then to increase. Longitudinal studies are needed to give a more 
reliable picture of what happens over time to individual teachers‟ levels of self-
efficacy for teaching mathematics.  
Puchner and Taylor (2006) explored teacher efficacy in the context of mathematics 
lesson study groups, with eight teachers divided evenly among two groups. 
Qualitative data from the researchers‟ participant observations of the groups‟ 
meetings was triangulated with interviews with individual teachers, and documents 
that were collected. Their findings suggested that the teachers‟ collaboration in 
lesson study groups increased their self-efficacy for teaching mathematics as the 
teachers developed greater awareness of the impact on students‟ engagement 
made by their planning. Puchner and Taylor stated that “teacher efficacy can be 
defined as a teacher‟s judgment of their ability to bring about student learning or 
development” (p. 925). This definition focuses on the expected outcome of a 
teacher‟s behaviour – student learning – rather than their “capabilities to organize 
and execute courses of action required” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391), and also omits 
“for a specific student”, and therefore is not consistent with the definition used in the 
present study. 
Ross and Bruce (2007) assessed the teacher efficacy of 106 Grade 6 teachers in 
one Canadian district, in their experimental study. Over a 3-month period, teachers 
in the treatment group participated in professional development that was intended 
to increase their teacher efficacy. Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy‟s (2001) 
teacher efficacy items were adapted for a mathematics context by adding the words 
“in mathematics” to existing items. Thus, “How much can you do to motivate 
students who show low interest in schoolwork?” (Tschannen-Moran & Woolfolk 
Hoy, 2001, p. 800) became, “How much can you do to motivate students who show 
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low interest in mathematics?” (Ross & Bruce, 2007, p. 55). These modifications 
narrowed the teacher self-efficacy focus to a mathematics context. In both these 
studies, rather than the items being statements with which teachers were asked to 
indicate their level of agreement, items were phrased as questions to which 
teachers responded using a 4-point scale: not at all, somewhat, important, or 
critical (Tschannen-Moran & Woolfolk Hoy, 2001), or a 5-point scale: with anchors 
nothing and a great deal (Ross & Bruce, 2007). Ross and Bruce conducted a factor 
analysis of teachers‟ responses to their mathematics-specific items, and identified 
three factors that they interpreted to represent three sub-categories of “teacher 
efficacy”: 1) “efficacy for engagement”; 2) “efficacy for teaching strategies”; and 
3) “efficacy for student management” (p. 53). These were the same three factors 
identified in Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (2001).  
Ross and Bruce‟s (2007) data analysis indicated that only in efficacy for student 
management did the treatment teachers report significantly higher efficacy levels 
than teachers in the control group. Furthermore, like Puchner and Taylor (2006), 
Ross and Bruce (2007) adopted a definition that reflected an outcome expectancy 
rather than self-efficacy: “Teacher efficacy is a teacher‟s expectation that he or she 
will be able to bring about student learning” (p. 50, italics in original). Again, this 
interpretation is not consistent with Bandura‟s (1986) definition that was adopted in 
the present study. 
Only a small number of studies have focused on primary teachers‟ self-efficacy for 
teaching mathematics, and their interpretations have varied in perhaps subtle, and 
certainly important, ways. The only intervention study that aimed to increase 
teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics (Ross & Bruce, 2007) reported 
fairly weak results. Just one study (Midgley et al., 1989) assessed teachers‟ self-
efficacy for teaching mathematics over a time-frame that exceeded 4 months. 
Further investigations are needed that explore how teachers‟ self-efficacy for 
teaching mathematics might be influenced by interventions, and how this belief 
changes over the course of time.  
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Teachers’ beliefs about intelligence  
Thus, teachers who see student achievement in school as something 
that can be cultivated, through effort, also believe in their own ability to 
help their students make progress, and thus to play a determining role in 
their students‟ academic success. (Leroy, Bressoux, Sarrazin, & 
Trouilloud, 2007, p. 539) 
Midgley et al. (1988) identified an association between teachers‟ entity theory-of-
intelligence and their need for control. This was investigated further in Leroy et al.‟s  
(2007) study, which investigated the roles played by particular teacher beliefs in 
establishing an autonomy-supportive climate in their classrooms. They measured 
the teacher efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and perceived work pressures of 336 
fifth-grade teachers in France, and used path analysis to identify the respective 
roles of these factors. Their findings indicated that a climate that supported 
students‟ autonomy was indirectly associated with teachers having an incremental 
theory-of-intelligence because this belief tended to be related to high levels of 
teacher efficacy. They did not, however, find any association between an entity 
belief and self-efficacy level.  
Leroy et el.‟s (2007) findings are consistent with those of Askew et al.‟s (1997) 
study, in which a transmission orientation to teaching mathematics was 
characterised by prioritising teaching over learning, and basing teaching on 
teachers explaining their methods to students. Students‟ autonomy was not a goal 
for a teacher with this orientation. Whether or not a transmission orientation might 
be associated with an entity theory-of-intelligence has not yet been explicitly 
investigated.  
Teachers‟ beliefs about ability have also been explored in the context of their 
beliefs about the ability to teach. In Fives and Buehl‟s (2008) two-part exploratory 
investigation, the degree to which pre-service and practising teachers believed that 
“some people are born teachers” was examined. Open-ended questionnaire items 
were given to pre-service and practising teachers who were enrolled in a university 
course. No comment was made regarding whether the responses of pre-service 
and practising teachers varied. Themes were generated from their responses, and 
these were developed into questionnaire items that required responses on Likert-
type scales, for validating in the second part of the study with 351 pre-service 
teachers. The final Teaching Ability Belief Scale comprised 28 items, such as 
“Individuals are born with the ability to teach” and “Teaching is a learned activity” 
(p. 161). Those who indicated a belief that teaching ability is innate tended to rate  
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the importance of teaching strategies and instructional practices more highly than 
pedagogical content knowledge and knowledge of theory, which were rated more 
highly by those who believed teaching ability is learned.  
In a mathematics context, Stipek, Givvin, Salmon, and MacGyvers (2001) 
hypothesised that more traditional beliefs about teaching and learning that focus on 
the importance of correct answers, rather than the current emphasis on developing 
students‟ understanding of mathematics, would be associated with an entity theory-
of-intelligence. Their study involved 21 fourth to sixth-grade teachers and their 437 
students, all of whom completed questionnaires at the start and end of a school 
year to identify their beliefs. In addition, videotapes were made of at least two 
lessons for each teacher, from which their teaching practices were later coded. The 
multiple data sources allowed the comparison of teachers‟ beliefs and practices. 
The results showed that teachers‟ beliefs were very similar on both occasions, and 
that sets of beliefs tended to cluster together. So a teacher who believed that 
students‟ goals should be to learn procedures so that they can produce correct 
answers, and that the teacher should be in complete control of mathematics 
activities, tended to also perceive mathematics ability to be fixed. On the other 
hand, a teacher who believed mathematics ability can develop was also likely to 
believe that students‟ goal is to develop understanding, and that students should be 
encouraged to have some autonomy. Associations between teachers‟ reported 
beliefs and observed practices were evident, with those who indicated traditional 
beliefs also demonstrating traditional practices in the classroom – emphasising 
correct answers and speed, and “[maintaining] a social context in which mistakes 
were something to be avoided” (p. 223). 
In a review of studies investigating children‟s theory-of-intelligence, Dweck and 
Bempechat (1983) claimed that a teacher with an entity theory-of-intelligence is 
likely to attribute a student‟s poor progress to the students‟ limited, fixed intelligence 
and to factors beyond their control such as a student‟s home background, and to 
show less effort and persistence with helping this student learn, and is likely to give 
up on such “hopeless” cases. In contrast, they said, a teacher with an incremental 
theory-of-intelligence is more likely to believe that each student is capable of 
learning, that it is their responsibility to ensure that learning occurs, and that 
through effort and persistence they can achieve this. However, no teacher data 
were presented to support any of these claims. 
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Looking beyond individual teachers‟ beliefs, Murphy and Dweck (2010) have 
suggested that an organisation might essentially have its own collective theory-of-
intelligence that results in its employees presenting themselves as matching the 
dominant belief. They claimed that their four related studies with 242 university 
students indicated that “people systematically shift their self-presentations when 
motivated to join an entity or incremental organization” (p. 283). However, changing 
the way a person presents themselves to others does not necessarily equate with a 
change of beliefs – about intelligence, or anything else.  
Associations between teachers’ and students’ beliefs, and students’ 
mathematics achievement  
Teachers‟ beliefs can be mirrored to some degree in their students. For instance, 
Stipek et al. (2001) found that “teachers‟ self-confidence as mathematics teachers 
was significantly correlated with students‟ perceptions of their own competence as 
mathematics learners” (p. 224). No studies were found that presented evidence for 
a similar relationship between teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence and that of their 
students. Neither have empirical studies explored the possibility of an association 
between primary teachers‟ beliefs about intelligence and students‟ achievement in 
mathematics. 
The relationship between teachers‟ self-efficacy beliefs and those of their students 
is also a little-researched area. Anderson et al. (1988) reported that students‟ self-
efficacy beliefs were positively correlated with their teachers‟ self-efficacy, with 
more statistically significant correlations at Grade 3 than Grade 6. However, the 
student self-efficacy measures comprised four modified Rand items, such as “Most 
kids can do well in school if they work and study hard” and “When I really try hard I 
get good grades in school” (p. 151).These items are not consistent with Bandura‟s 
(1986) recommendation that self-efficacy judgments should be task-specific, 
therefore the relationship between teachers‟ and students‟ self-efficacy beliefs 
needs further empirical testing.  
Only Gibson and Dembo (1984) have investigated how elementary school 
teachers‟ self-efficacy was associated with their instructional practices. They found 
that teachers with high self-efficacy levels tended to spend more time on students‟ 
academic learning, including the provision of support for students with particular 
learning difficulties, than teachers with low levels of self-efficacy, who instead  
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focussed more on non-academic activities, and typically did not persevere with 
students who found learning difficult. Although the characteristics associated with 
different self-efficacy levels seem likely to affect students‟ achievement, there was 
no empirical evidence available to support this.  
Communicating teachers’ beliefs to students: Teacher-student 
feedback 
One of the most explicit ways in which teachers‟ beliefs are communicated to 
students – teacher-student feedback – has the potential to be pivotal where 
building students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and incremental beliefs about 
intelligence is the goal. This section will outline the role played by teacher-student 
feedback – broadly defined here as verbal interaction that focuses on the student‟s 
progress towards their learning goals – in the relationships between the teachers‟ 
and students‟ beliefs and students‟ achievement in mathematics.  
Although student-student interactions are also an important element of numeracy 
discourse, the focus of the present study was on teacher-student formative 
feedback as a means of shaping students‟ beliefs about intelligence and self-
efficacy. This is consistent with evidence that effective feedback can be one of the 
greatest influences on students‟ learning (Alton-Lee, 2003). Information included in 
feedback needs to be used by students in order for it to be considered formative 
(Black & Wiliam, 1998). Some of the key studies in the area of teacher-student 
feedback are presented next. 
In a year-long study (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996a, 1996b) that explored students‟ and 
teachers‟ perceptions of teacher-student feedback as a means of formative 
feedback, interviews were conducted with 49 six and 7-year-olds and eight 
teachers in six schools. Over the course of a school year, between 24 and 36 hours 
of classroom observations and tape-recording of classroom dialogue were also 
made for each teacher, providing a substantial data collection from which to 
develop their grounded typology of teacher-student feedback (see Figure 4.1). 
They found that “every teacher observed used each type of feedback at some 
point, although individuals had particular styles” (1996a, p. 402) and that all 
feedback types occurred in all subjects. Furthermore, examples of each feedback 
type were evident in students‟ feedback descriptions (1996b). 
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Positive feedback …………………..……..……………………… Achievement feedback 
Evaluative feedback Descriptive feedback 
Type A Type B Type C Type D 
Rewarding 
Rewards 
Approving 
Positive personal 
expression; general 
praise; warm 
expression of 
feeling; positive 
non-verbal 
feedback. 
Specifying 
attainment 
Specific 
acknowledgement of 
attainment; use of 
criteria in relation to 
work/behaviour; 
more specific praise. 
Constructing 
achievement 
Mutual articulation 
of achievement; 
praise integral to 
description. 
 
Punishing 
Punishments 
Disapproving 
Negative personal 
expression; 
reprimands; 
negative 
generalisations; 
negative non-verbal 
feedback. 
Specifying 
improvement 
Correction of errors; 
more practice given. 
 
 
Constructing the 
way forward 
Mutual critical 
appraisal; provision 
of strategies. 
Evaluative feedback Descriptive feedback 
Negative feedback ………………….…..………………………… Improvement feedback 
Figure 4.1.   Tunstall and Gipps (1996a) typology of teacher feedback. 
Tunstall and Gipps made connections between their findings and previous work on 
achievement goal theory, synthesised in Ames‟ (1992) theoretical paper. Ames 
proposed that different classroom learning environments lead to different goal 
orientations in students, and Tunstall and Gipps (1996a) suggested that teachers‟ 
feedback to students was a feature of the classroom environment that would affect 
students‟ goals. From their findings, Tunstall and Gipps (1996a) hypothesised that 
Feedback Types A and B “can lead to a performance-goal orientation”. Feedback 
Type C, on the other hand, “can lead to a mastery goal orientation”. They described 
Type D feedback as “learning-oriented in that it includes many of the strategies 
described in constructivist approaches to learning”, and emphasised that “both 
types C and D are crucial to pupils‟ learning” (p. 403). Concluding their 1996b 
paper, Tunstall and Gipps argued that “all learners of whatever age need the same 
support: praise and reward linked with the recognition of competence, together with 
the provision of strategies for developing critical appraisal” (p. 202, italics in 
original). Their aim was to develop a framework for teachers to use to analyse their 
practice, rather than to identify relationships between particular types of feedback 
and student achievement. 
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In New Zealand, feedback has been emphasised as an important component of 
quality teaching (Alton-Lee, 2003: Hattie, 1999; Hattie & Timperley, 2007). 
Regarding the relationship between teacher feedback and student achievement, 
Hattie (1999) suggested that: 
The most powerful single moderator that enhances achievement is 
feedback. The simplest prescription for improving education must be 
“dollops of feedback” – providing information how and why the child 
understands and misunderstands, and what directions the student must 
take to improve. (p. 11) 
Hattie stressed the importance of feedback that bridges the gap between a 
student‟s current achievement and the student‟s learning goal, informing the 
student of what they need to do in order to reach that point. The exact nature of 
feedback that can foster students‟ mathematics self-efficacy remains uncertain, and 
Hattie and Timperley (2007) described the many factors that a teacher must 
consider in order to give feedback that supports students‟ self-efficacy, for example, 
“having exquisite timing to provide feedback before frustration takes over” (p. 103). 
They suggest that in order to make effective feedback the teacher‟s focus, other 
aspects of the classroom programme must be securely established and operate 
with a minimum of teacher attention.  
In the context of the Numeracy Development Projects, Knight (2003) investigated 
the feedback given by six primary teachers to their students during numeracy 
lessons, and categorised the feedback according to Tunstall and Gipps‟ (1996a) 
typology. Of the 349 instances of oral feedback to students, only 17 per cent was 
descriptive, and no examples were categorised as Constructing the way forward in 
Type D. Knight concluded that with 74 per cent of feedback instances being coded 
as Approving Type B feedback, “Many valuable learning opportunities seemed to 
be being lost in the desire to be positive” (p. 44). 
Teacher-student feedback plays a central role in building students‟ self-efficacy 
(Schunk & Zimmerman, 1997), although the features of such feedback continue to 
be the focus of debate. In their exploration of motivation and affect in senior primary 
mathematics classes, Schweinle et al. (2006) reported that “When feedback was 
frequent, elaborative, positive, and used to help students develop understanding, 
… students reported higher affect, efficacy, and importance” (p. 288). Schunk 
(1982) reported that effort-attributional feedback raised students‟ self-efficacy and 
positively affected performance, but in another study (1983b) reported that ability-
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attributional feedback had a greater impact on both self-efficacy and performance. 
Schunk‟s (1984) pair of experimental studies further explored the effects of different 
combinations of effort- and ability-attributional feedback on 80 primary students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy, over four sessions. The findings of both studies indicated 
that students who received ability-focused feedback in the first two sessions had 
higher mathematics self-efficacy and higher subtraction achievement at the studies‟ 
end, regardless of whether the feedback in the last two sessions focused on effort 
or ability. The students in Schunk‟s studies, however, were all students who were 
having difficulties learning mathematics, so to be praised for their ability in this 
domain might have had a greater positive effect than it might with all students.  
A teacher‟s theory-of-intelligence seems likely to shape the feedback they tend to 
give students, which in turn might influence students‟ beliefs about intelligence. 
According to Black and Wiliam‟s (1998) review, the feedback teachers give 
students can be powerful because students‟ self-perception is “strongly influenced 
by teachers‟ beliefs about the relative importance of „effort‟ as against „ability‟” 
(p. 24). Dweck (2000) argued that only feedback related to students‟ effort and 
strategy use will support an incremental theory-of-intelligence. Even if a teacher 
were to have a formula for effective feedback, Dweck cautioned that the ways a 
teacher interacts with students may be governed by the teacher‟s beliefs about 
intelligence; a teacher with an entity belief, for instance, might favour students they 
perceive to have greater ability.  
Black and Wiliam (1998) interpreted Tunstall and Gipps‟ (1996a) typology as “a 
spectrum, ranging from those that direct attention to the task and to learning 
methods, to those which direct attention to the self” (p. 49) – the former having 
more positive effects on students‟ performance. This is consistent with Dweck‟s 
(2000) claim that feedback that focuses on effort and strategies can support an 
incremental theory-of-intelligence in students. However, Schunk‟s (1983, 1984) 
studies found that feedback that directed students‟ attention to their ability had a 
positive effect on the mathematics self-efficacy and achievement of students who 
had experienced difficulties learning subtraction, suggesting that the type of 
feedback that has the most positive effect is likely to vary for different students. 
What is unclear is the exact nature of teacher-student feedback that has the most 
positive effects on the achievement of the diversity of students in a typical primary 
classroom.  
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Chapter summary 
Teachers‟ beliefs are resistant to change, making it difficult to effect deep and 
lasting changes to their practice. Considerable time is needed to change teachers‟ 
beliefs, which in turn guide their teaching practice and influence students‟ beliefs 
and mathematics achievement. Teacher orientations of presentism, conservatism, 
and individualism can hinder change in teachers‟ beliefs and practices beyond 
short-term, surface-level change. The inclusion of in-class support for teachers 
seems to be associated with initiatives that effect deep and lasting change. 
Presenting teachers with sound evidence that is dissonant with their existing beliefs 
provides teachers with a reasonable basis for reconsidering what they believe and 
why, and entertaining alternative perspectives.  
The research methods used in the studies of teachers‟ beliefs reviewed here were 
much more varied than those used to investigate students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence, with mixed methods more widely used with 
teachers. In the literature, teachers‟ self-efficacy has been represented in a variety 
of ways, which has made interpretation of the collective findings difficult. In the 
present study, a teacher‟s self-efficacy for teaching mathematics is defined as a 
teacher’s judgment of their capability to organise and execute effective 
mathematics teaching activities. Tschannen-Moran et al. (1998) encouraged 
researchers to include qualitative methods in their studies of teacher efficacy, as 
“Interviews and observational data can provide a thick, rich description of the 
growth of teacher efficacy” (p. 242).  Experimental or intervention studies that have 
explored possibilities for changing primary teachers‟ beliefs that relate to their 
mathematics teaching were relatively scarce, probably because teachers‟ beliefs 
are notoriously difficult to change. 
Teachers‟ beliefs about teaching and learning are conveyed to their students via 
teacher-student feedback, which appears to have the potential to help shape 
students‟ beliefs about intelligence and their mathematics self-efficacy, and 
therefore might also be associated with students‟ mathematics achievement. In the 
present study, teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence was assessed so that associations 
with the beliefs and achievement of their students could be investigated. Although 
changing teachers‟ beliefs was not an explicit aim of this study, it was an implicit 
aim of the interventions.  
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Research questions and hypotheses 
The main purpose of the present study was to investigate the effects on students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement of two 
sequential interventions over a 14-month period. A secondary purpose was to 
scrutinise Dweck‟s notion of theory-of-intelligence by checking students‟ responses to 
her six questionnaire items for convergence with their definitions of intelligence, 
described during interviews. Each participating school was allocated to one of three 
groups: the Control group, the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, or the 
Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group 
(also referred to as the Combined interventions group).  
The main research question relating to student outcomes was: 
Over the three data collection points, do individual student differences in 
mathematics self-efficacy, achievement, and theory-of-intelligence vary as a 
function of treatment group? 
Furthermore: 
Among treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender or year level? 
Within treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender or year level? 
First, it was hypothesised that students in the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence interventions group would show greater increases in theory-of-
intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, and achievement, than students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention and Control groups, as suggested by Blackwell 
et al.‟s (2007) findings.  
Secondly, it was hypothesised that students in the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group would show greater increases in mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement than those in the Control group, consistent with the findings of Siegle and 
McCoach (2007). These first two hypotheses were also expected to be reflected in 
between-group differences according to gender and year level. 
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Thirdly, it was hypothesised that mathematics self-efficacy would be stronger for Year 4 
students than Year 5 (Eccles et al., 1993; Frey & Ruble, 1987; Pajares, 1996a), and 
that boys would report higher levels of self-efficacy than girls, as suggested by previous 
studies (Eccles et al., 1993; Ewers & Wood, 1993; Lloyd et al., 2005). 
Fourthly, Year 4 students were expected to indicate a stronger incremental theory-of-
intelligence than Year 5 students (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Leonardi 
& Gialamas, 2002; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996). As suggested 
by previous research (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Räty et al., 2004; Stipek & Gralinski, 
1991), it was hypothesised that girls would tend towards an entity belief more than 
boys.  
Finally, the mathematics achievement of Year 5 students was expected to exceed that 
of Year 4 (Darr et al., 2007), with no significant gender difference in achievement 
(Young-Loveridge, 2010). Analysis of variance was used to test these hypotheses. 
Having considered how the three variables might differ for the three treatment groups, 
relationships between mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and 
achievement within groups were tested using correlation and regression analysis to 
answer the question: 
How are students’ theory-of-intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, and 
mathematics achievement related?  
It was hypothesised that an entity theory-of-intelligence would be associated with low 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement, and an incremental belief with high self-
efficacy and achievement (Chen & Pajares, 2010; Wood & Bandura, 1989), and that 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement would be correlated (Pajares & Miller, 
1994; Schunk & Gunn, 1986). 
Relationships between the beliefs of teachers and students were also of interest:  
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s theory-of-intelligence and their 
students’ theory-of-intelligence? 
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
and their students’ mathematics self-efficacy? 
Consistent with previous studies (Anderson et al., 1988; Stipek et al., 2001) that 
identified associations between teachers‟ beliefs and those of their students, it was 
hypothesised that teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy would be positively 
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associated with their students‟ theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy (respectively). It 
was also hypothesised that teachers‟ beliefs would concomitantly be associated with 
students‟ achievement, particularly in the second half of the school year. An 
examination of correlations was used to examine these hypotheses. 
The nature of students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, 
which tends to be represented as dichotomous in the research literature (for example, 
Dweck & Bempechat, 1983; Dweck et al., 1995) was also of interest: 
  What is the nature of students’ and teachers’ theory-of-intelligence? 
Students‟ and teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence beliefs were hypothesised to be non-
dichotomous, but whether they might form a continuum or be multi-dimensional was 
unclear. Findings from both quantitative and qualitative data were combined to answer 
this question. 
Guided by the literature (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Leonardi & 
Gialamas, 2002; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996), it was expected 
that younger students would have more strongly incremental beliefs than older 
students, and that this might be associated with differences in definitions of 
intelligence, associated with students‟ age and cognitive development. 
 Do students’ theory-of-intelligence beliefs change as they get older? 
It was hypothesised that Control group students‟ mean score for theory-of-intelligence 
would decrease over the three time points, as they got older.  
A combined analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data sets addressed the 
following question:   
Is there convergence between the quantitative and qualitative findings? 
The main purpose for using mixed methods in this sequential explanatory study was to 
triangulate the data (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966) – to check for 
convergence and contradictions – in order to test the validity of the mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence instruments when used with primary students. 
Furthermore, any inconsistency between the quantitative and qualitative data might 
suggest some inadequacy in the conceptualisation of the constructs of mathematics 
self-efficacy or theory-of-intelligence. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Methods 
Methodological paradigms and mixed-methods research 
A theoretical perspective shapes how a researcher conceptualises their research, 
the methods they choose to employ, and their interpretation of the outcomes. 
Rather than opting for a single methodology or theoretical perspective, a pragmatic 
perspective involves pluralism (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006), combining the 
strengths of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, one providing “deep, rich” 
data and the other producing “hard, generalizable” data (Sieber, 1973, p. 1335). 
Pragmatists can be thought of as “anti-dualists” (Rorty, 1999, p. ixx), avoiding the 
traditional dualism between quantitative and qualitative methodologies that have 
been at the heart of the so-called “paradigm wars” outlined in Sieber‟s (1973) 
paper. The many possibilities for mixed-methods research can be thought of as 
being located along a continuum of quantitative and qualitative methods integration, 
according to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009).  
The following definition of mixed methods, developed by Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, 
and Turner (2007) by synthesising definitions provided by leaders in the field of 
mixed-methods research, was adopted in the present study: 
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or 
team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, 
data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration. (p. 123) 
When quantitative and qualitative data are both used in the same study, decisions 
must be made regarding the weighting of each, the points at which the two are 
mixed, and when in the study each method is used (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
There is much discussion in the mixed-methods literature about the many ways in 
which quantitative and qualitative methods can be integrated in research (Bazeley, 
2009; Yin, 2006), which range from “simply combining different data collection 
methods, analysis strategies, or research designs” to “creating a dialogue between 
different ways of seeing, interpreting, and knowing” (Maxwell, 2010, p. 478).  
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Mixed methods in the present study 
The overall theoretical lens that guided this study was a pragmatic worldview, 
where the researcher “bases the inquiry on the assumption that collecting diverse 
types of data best provides an understanding of a research problem” (Creswell, 
2009, p. 18). This is consistent with the idea of multiple theories throwing light on 
the same situation from different angles, resulting in a more complete picture, 
discussed in Chapter 2. This study aimed to investigate hypotheses about the 
relationships between three variables that were initially measured for 343 students, 
necessitating a perspective consistent with methods that supported the objective 
statistical analysis of data. Quantitative methods are typically associated with a 
post-positivist worldview, and aim to connect causes with outcomes, and frame 
questions as sets of testable hypotheses. 
In addition, I was interested to learn more about students‟ and teachers‟ 
understanding of mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence. Recognising 
that, often through interactions with others, individuals develop their own 
perceptions about their abilities and their own subjective meanings of concepts 
such as intelligence, I sought to reveal this complexity. This was more consistent 
with a social constructivist worldview, usually associated with qualitative methods. 
At different times during the course of the present sequential explanatory study, the 
paradigm shifted (Creswell, 2011; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007) between these 
two perspectives, in order to achieve the aims of the study. As such, the paradigms 
were seen as complementary rather than conflicting.  
In an area that has traditionally been dominated by quantitative research, another 
reason for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data was to check for a 
convergence of findings from the datasets – the “corroboration” referred to earlier in 
Johnson et al.‟s (2007) definition of mixed-methods research. Such triangulation 
(Webb et al., 1966) was especially important to check the primary student 
participants‟ beliefs and understandings in connection with their questionnaire 
responses. In particular, it was thought that such young participants might not yet 
have an understanding of the term intelligence, and that this might affect their 
questionnaire responses.  
The mixed-methods design of the present study was determined by the original 
research questions, as recommended by Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003), and the 
research questions, in turn, were further refined by the decision to conduct a  
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mixed-methods study. Quantitative methods were prioritised, and I integrated these 
with qualitative methods when this helped to address the research questions. For 
instance, data from the first questionnaires were used to determine which students 
were to be interviewed, and were also the subject of enquiry during those 
interviews. Findings from analyses of both the quantitative and qualitative datasets 
were compared to check for convergence and contradictions. 
Blending quantitative and qualitative methods was intended to take advantage of 
the inherent strengths of both methodologies, and at the same time minimise their 
weaknesses, thereby contributing to the validity of the findings. While the 
quantitative data allowed a breadth of coverage, the qualitative data with a small 
cross-section of students and their teachers provided a rich description of 
individuals‟ experiences. Neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone would 
have captured the complexity of students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs. Complementarity, 
therefore, was another reason for employing mixed methods, aimed at developing 
a more complete picture of students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs (Hesse-Biber, 2010), 
thereby strengthening the study‟s conclusions. 
Participants 
The focus of the study was the 152 Year 4 and 5 students (aged 7 years and 7 
months to 9 years and 6 months) from a total sample of 343 Year 3 to Year 6 
students, whose ages ranged from 6 years and 7 months to 10 years and 6 months 
at the start of the research. Many primary classes include students from two year 
levels (in this case, Years 3 and 4, and Years 5 and 6), and the initial inclusion of 
Years 3 and 6 students was for practical reasons. Their 24 teachers, eight of whom 
were male, also participated in this 14-month study. All participants were from 
decile 7-10 schools in the Wellington area, avoiding the student transience more 
prevalent in low decile schools (Gilbert, 2005) that might have compromised this 
short-term longitudinal study. Further details about the sample are reported in 
Chapter 6. 
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Quantitative instruments 
Two student measures were used – one comprised selected items from a 
commercially available series of mathematics assessments, and the other was a 
questionnaire developed for the present study – to identify students‟ mathematics 
self-efficacy and their theory-of-intelligence. A teacher questionnaire measured 
their theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy for teaching mathematics (see 
Appendix A for both questionnaires). 
Student mathematics achievement measure 
Ten age-appropriate items were selected from the Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics (Darr et al., 2007) for each year group (20 items in total). Each 
problem was multi-choice in format. Specific item difficulty information included in 
Darr et al. enabled the selection of items of a range of difficulty levels for each year 
level. Students referred to the same problems when their mathematics self-efficacy 
was measured, allowing for well-aligned comparison of self-efficacy and 
achievement.  
Student theory-of-intelligence and mathematics self-efficacy measure  
Students‟ theory-of-intelligence was measured with six items from Dweck (2000) 
(see Table 3.1). These were a combination of three positively-worded items, such 
as, “Your intelligence is something about you that you can‟t change very much”, 
followed by three negatively-worded items, such as, “You can always greatly 
change how intelligent you are”.  
Students were asked to judge their mathematics self-efficacy in relation to the 10 
Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics problems which they were later asked 
to solve in the achievement test. For example, Year 5 students were asked how 
much they agreed or disagreed that they could solve the problems, “What does the 
7 stand for in 756?” and, “Ants have 6 legs. How many legs in total would there be 
on 43 ants?” (A complete list of Year 5 items is shown in Chapter 6, in Table 6.2c.) 
Problems were presented on large (A3) sheets of paper, and were shown to the 
students for around 4 seconds. This brief exposure was to allow students sufficient 
time to make a self-efficacy judgment, but insufficient time to actually solve each 
problem. They then recorded their level of self-efficacy for solving that particular 
problem, using a 6-point Likert scale that ranged from Strongly disagree [that I 
could solve the problem] at one end to Strongly agree at the other – the same scale 
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that was used for their theory-of-intelligence responses. The mathematics self-
efficacy items for each year level were randomly ordered in terms of difficulty. The 
student questionnaire is included in Appendix A.  
Teacher theory-of-intelligence and self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
measure 
The teacher questionnaire comprised 21 items – eight measuring theory-of-
intelligence (drawn from Dweck, 2000), and 13 measuring their self-efficacy for 
teaching mathematics (adapted from Gibson & Dembo, 1984, and Woolfolk & Hoy, 
1990). Six versions of the questionnaire were developed, each comprising the 
same items in different random orders. Teachers were asked to circle their 
response to each statement using the same 6-point Likert scale included in the 
student questionnaire. The teacher questionnaire is in Appendix A. 
Qualitative data gathering instruments  
A purposive sample of Year 4 and 5 students (n = 46) was interviewed, as were 15 
teachers from the two intervention groups. All interviews were audiotaped, and field 
notes were made during, and at the conclusion of, each interview.  
Student interviews 
The quantitative data were used to identify students with extreme total raw scores 
for self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence. This was to facilitate the selection of 
equal groups of students in each of four categories: low mathematics self-efficacy + 
entity belief; low mathematics self-efficacy + incremental belief; high mathematics 
self-efficacy + entity belief; and high mathematics self-efficacy + incremental belief.  
However, this process proved less than straightforward, as very few students had 
extremely low scores for mathematics self-efficacy or theory-of-intelligence, and still 
fewer indicated a combination of both. Instead, the middle one-third of the student 
data was put aside, and the students chosen for interview were those whose two 
scores were located in combinations of each of the bottom and top one-third of the 
two scales. A cluster analysis of the Year 4 and 5 students‟ Time 1 logit scores 
(explained shortly) on a two-dimensional plane representing mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence identified two clusters of scores; one cluster of 
68 students around a point at co-ordinates (1.31, .55) logits for theory-of-
intelligence and self-efficacy, respectively, and the remaining 84 students clustering 
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around (-1.18, -.59) logits. Students who had been selected for interviewing on the 
basis of their combination of high scores for both self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence were all included in the former cluster, and those selected because of 
their low scores for both were in the latter.  
Student interviews were conducted in whatever spaces the schools provided. I 
collected each student from their classroom, and engaged them in conversation on 
the way to the interview venue. Before the actual interview began, students were 
also encouraged to answer all the questions, and were thanked for their help. To 
put the student at ease and to introduce the focus on mathematics, I began by 
asking them about the things they enjoyed most, and least, about mathematics.  
The first interviews, in Term 2 2010, focused on each student‟s ideas about 
teacher-student feedback, the student‟s mathematics self-efficacy, and their theory-
of-intelligence. Interview questions included: 
 Tell me what you think intelligence is. 
 What makes a person intelligent? How do they get to be 
intelligent?  
 In the questionnaire that you did with me last term, it looked as 
though you  (either) thought that you can solve all the maths 
problems I showed you, (or) thought you could solve most of the 
maths problems I showed you, (or) thought you couldn‟t solve 
most of the maths problems I showed you. Is that right? Tell me 
why you thought this. 
Part-way through the Time 1 interviews, an addition was made to the interview 
schedule, in response to students‟ comments about intelligence. The question, 
“How much can you change your intelligence?” is included in the final schedule in 
Appendix B. 
In the second student interview around 7 months later, some questions were 
repeated, with additional items included to identify the effects of peer modelling on 
students. Where students‟ reported mathematics self-efficacy and/or theory-of-
intelligence seemed to have changed from the Time 1 to Time 2 questionnaires, 
they were asked why this might have happened. Students in the Combined 
interventions group were also asked specifically about the intervention lessons, and 
how they thought these had affected their learning. The Time 2 interview schedule 
is also in Appendix B. 
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Teacher interviews 
Teachers from the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence 
interventions and Mathematics self-efficacy intervention groups were also 
interviewed. I had met each teacher prior to their first interview, during the 
recruitment and consent process. Teachers were released from their classroom to 
be interviewed on both occasions.  
Questions in the first interview focused on their current teacher-student feedback 
practices, ways in which their beliefs about intelligence might affect their 
interactions with students, and their ideas about students‟ mathematics self-efficacy 
and how they might influence it. Interview items included:  
 In your questionnaire responses, you indicated that you believe 
(either) intelligence can be changed, (or) intelligence cannot be 
changed much at all. Is that right? Tell me why you think this. 
 How do you think this belief might affect your teaching? 
 What factors do you think contribute to students‟ self-beliefs 
about their ability in mathematics? 
 Which of those factors can you influence, and how do you go 
about this? 
The later interview included many of the same items, with additional questions to 
identify ways in which teachers had changed their practice, specifically to build 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, and the effects they noticed among their 
students. An additional set of questions were asked of Combined mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group teachers to identify how long 
they spent on the intervention lessons, and how they perceived these lessons had 
affected students. Teachers were also asked how the start of the 2011 school year 
might be different in their class as a result of their participation in the interventions. 
The teacher interview schedules for Term 2 and Term 4 are included in Appendix B.  
Design overview 
The research design used in this study most closely resembled what Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2007) described as a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design, 
and included qualitative components within a strongly quantitative, quasi-
experimental research methodology, as shown in the overview in Figure 5.1. 
Morse‟s (1991) notation system is used, shortening qualitative and quantitative to 
“qual” and “QUAN”, using uppercase to indicate major emphasis. 
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Figure 5.1.   Overview of the research design. 
The sequential, explanatory, quasi-experimental research design with interventions and three 
data collection times over a 14-month timeframe 
With the aim of allowing for more reliable measures of the effects of two separate 
interventions, three distinct groups of teachers and students were involved in 
different treatment conditions: 
 The Control group participated in no intervention; 
 The Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group participated in 
the mathematics self-efficacy intervention;  
 The Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group participated in the mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention, followed by the theory-of-intelligence 
intervention. 
In order to identify any intervention effects (both immediately post-intervention, and 
around 7 months after that), and therefore to answer the research questions, three 
waves of data were collected over a 14-month period.  
Allocation of participants to treatment groups 
When all consent forms had been completed and returned, schools were organised 
into three approximately matched groups, shown in Table 5.1. Each group had an 
approximately similar number of students, number of teachers, and spread of year 
levels of students. Students who had completed the Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics before they completed the student questionnaire were allocated to 
separate groups to manage the bias this might cause.  
The groups were then randomly allocated to treatment groups as follows: 
 Group 1: Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group;  
 Group 2: Control group; 
 Group 3: Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group. 
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Table 5.1: The three treatment groups  
The three groups of schools, with the number of teachers and consenting Year 4 and 5 students 
(n = 152) at each school who provided data at each of Times 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Number of 
teachers 
PAT: 
Mathematics 
completed 
before 
questionnaire 
Total number 
of Year 4 and 
5 students 
who provided 
data at Times 
1, 2, and 3 
Number of 
students in 
each Group 
Group 1 
(8 teachers) 
3 - 17 
61 4 4 classes 37 
1 - 7 
Group 2 
(7 teachers) 
4 - 31 
50 
3 - 19 
Group 3 
(9 teachers) 
3 3 classes 14 
41 
6 - 27 
 
Procedure 
Before the study got underway, a pilot of the questionnaires was conducted. 
Pilot 
Student questionnaire procedures 
A total of 193 Year 3 to 6 students completed questionnaires during September and 
October of 2009. I administered the questionnaire class by class. To be sure that all 
students understood how to use the Likert scale, a modified version of Bandura and 
Schunk‟s (1981) introduction was used. First, the six labels for the Likert scale were 
presented to the class on large cards which were then displayed in a horizontal line 
(in the same order as they appeared on the questionnaire) on a whiteboard, to 
provide a visual reference point. Next, the teacher nominated a student to take the 
role of peer model. This student stood at the front of the class, while the other 
students were asked to consider how much they agreed or disagreed that the 
student could jump to a given marker. This was repeated several times with the 
marker at different distances from the student, with some discussion of students‟ 
judgments at each point. The focus here was to check that students were able to 
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use the “agree”/“disagree” language in the labels that they would be asked to use in 
the questionnaire. The accuracy of their judgments was not of interest, so students 
were told that not until after they had completed the questionnaire could the student 
actually attempt the jumps.  
More time was spent introducing the scale to Year 3-4 students than those in Year 
5-6 classes. As a final check that students understood the questionnaire task, a 
practice example was included at the start of the questionnaire. Students used the 
Likert scale to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement, 
“Chocolate is good for you.” The brief discussion of their responses aimed to 
highlight that a variety of responses were equally valid, and that it was important for 
students to respond honestly. I checked that students had recorded a response for 
this example before starting the actual questionnaire items, and emphasised during 
the introduction that there were no wrong answers for the questionnaire items. 
In one of the first Year 3-4 classes to complete the questionnaire, a Year 3 student 
asked, “What‟s intelligence?” I invited other students to describe intelligence, and 
they responded with statements such as, “It‟s how clever you are”. The purpose of 
the questionnaire was not to test students‟ understanding of “intelligence”, so in 
subsequent classes I asked students to share their definitions of “intelligence” 
before beginning the questionnaire. The 12 theory-of-intelligence items included in 
the original student questionnaire were drawn from Dweck (2000) and Dweck and 
Molden (2005).  
For the mathematics self-efficacy items, students were shown an enlarged (A3) 
copy of each mathematics problem for approximately four seconds, while the 
problem was read aloud to them to control for any reading difficulties. The same 
problems were shown to all students during the pilot, regardless of year group. 
Although students were specifically instructed not to actually calculate the solution, 
but to consider whether they believed that they could, some might have done so, 
especially if they were mathematically able. One Year 4 student attempted to 
record solutions to the mathematics problems on his questionnaire, despite being 
instructed to the contrary on three occasions. Otherwise, all students appeared to 
follow the technical aspect of responding to each item, circling one point on the 
Likert scale. 
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Analysis 
To analyse the data, numeric values of 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) 
were assigned to Likert scale points. Data for negatively-worded items were 
reverse coded. The ordinal data were plotted on histograms, which showed no 
clumping of responses; a range of responses was evident for all items.   
An initial principal components analysis with varimax rotation of Year 3 to 6 
students‟ responses extracted six factors with eigenvalues greater than one, with a 
lot of cross-loading of items. Because this was not readily interpretable in relation to 
theoretical considerations, the analysis was repeated using only the target Year 4 
and 5 (n = 123) students‟ data. Factor 1 explained 24% of the variance, Factor 2: 
10%, Factor 3: 9%, and the remaining three factors each explained a combined 
17%. The scree plot confirmed three main factors, with a leveling off at the fourth 
factor. Loadings on the first three factors are shown in Table C.1 (see Appendix C). 
Mathematics self-efficacy items (items 13-22) loaded on Factor 1, items indicating 
an entity theory-of-intelligence (items 1, 2, and 3) on Factor 2, and those indicating 
an incremental theory-of-intelligence (4, 5, and 6) on Factor 3. Weak factor 
loadings were evident for responses to items 7 to 12 inclusive, so these items were 
dropped from the final questionnaire. This left six items related to theory-of-
intelligence, and ten items focusing on mathematics self-efficacy.  
The item-totals were all strongly correlated; correlations for the six items relating to 
students‟ theory-of-intelligence were all above 0.85, and correlations for the ten 
items relating to their mathematics self-efficacy were above 0.95. Internal reliability 
was checked using Cronbach‟s alpha, with values for the final item sets of α = .87 
for mathematics self-efficacy, α = .65 for entity theory-of-intelligence, and α = .69 
for incremental theory-of-intelligence. Although the theory-of-intelligence alpha 
values were slightly lower than the commonly used benchmark of .70 (Schmitt, 
1996), this was probably related to the likely imprecision of data collected from 
young participants. 
Teacher questionnaire procedures  
The trial teacher questionnaire comprised 24 items (included in Table C.2 in 
Appendix C). Eight of these came from Dweck (2000) and were intended to assess 
teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence, with six of the same items included in the student 
questionnaire.  An additional 16 items, aimed at assessing teachers‟ self-efficacy 
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for teaching mathematics, were from Woolfolk and Hoy (1990) and Hoy and 
Woolfolk (1993), who in turn had included eight items from Gibson and Dembo‟s 
(1984) earlier study. They had also used two items from the Rand study (Armor et 
al., 1976), included in other teacher self-efficacy studies (Midgley et al., 1989; 
Woolfolk & Hoy, 1990).  
The original items were modified for the present study to relate them specifically to 
teaching mathematics. The words that were added to the original Rand items are 
shown here in brackets, and are typical of the modifications made: 
 When it comes right down to it, a teacher really can‟t do much 
because most of a student‟s motivation and performance [in 
mathematics] depends on his or her home environment. 
 If I really try hard in my [mathematics] teaching, I can get through 
to even the most difficult or unmotivated students. 
Beneath each item in the questionnaire, a line was provided for teachers to write a 
short comment about the item, should they wish to.  
Colleagues in the Australasian mathematics education community administered the 
trial teacher questionnaire to groups of teachers, with teachers from Wellington 
schools that were to be invited to participate in the study excluded. Seventy-four 
completed teacher questionnaires were received by the end of November 2009. 
Teacher data were coded the same way as the student data. However, 13 teacher 
respondents drew one circle around two points on the scale, for example, 
encompassing both disagree and mostly disagree, or marked a line halfway 
between two points on the Likert scale; all 32 of these types of responses (one 
respondent was responsible for 12) were coded by systematically alternating 
between coding the lower and the higher of the two, rather than treating them as 
missing data.  
In the space provided for teachers to describe which aspect of an item may have 
been unclear, four respondents recorded a comment about items related to 
teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics. These were as follows: 
 Item 9. When a student does better than usual in maths, many 
times it is because I exert a little extra effort. Comment: 
“Teachers always exert effort!” 
 Item 10. The amount a student can learn in maths is primarily 
related to family background. Comment: “Much of what a student 
can learn depends on teaching”;  
 Item 20. Even a teacher with good maths teaching abilities may 
not reach many students. Comment: “Don‟t know”; 
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 Item 24. Some students need to be placed in slower maths 
groups so they are not subjected to unrealistic expectations. 
Comment: “By slower do you mean lower?” 
One respondent wrote an overall comment at the end of their questionnaire: “This 
is a confusing questionnaire – most questions are loaded and will attract a wide 
variety of outcomes.” 
Analysis 
Histograms of the teachers‟ data showed a range of responses for all items. A 
principal components analysis extracted three main factors that explained a total of 
49% of the variance, with an additional four factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one together explaining a further 22% of the variance. Factor 1 was interpreted as 
an incremental theory-of-intelligence, Factor 2 as a belief that teachers influence 
students‟ learning, and Factor 3 as a belief that influences other than teachers are 
associated with students‟ learning. The loadings for these factors are shown in 
Table C.2 in Appendix C.  
Three items (9, 21, and 25) had cross-loadings on two of the three main factors of 
less than 0.4, and were omitted from the final questionnaire. Correlations between 
items relating to theory-of-intelligence all greater than 0.69, and those relating to 
self-efficacy for teaching mathematics consistently above 0.95. Cronbach‟s alpha 
reliability coefficients for the final item sets were: α = .87 for incremental theory-of-
intelligence items; and α = .90 for the self-efficacy items. 
The questionnaire instructions were modified to clearly state, “Please circle one 
response only.” The final version of the 21-item teacher questionnaire is included in 
Appendix A. 
Pre-intervention: Time 1  
Time 1 data gathering began as soon as the student consent process was 
completed for each class in Term 1 of 2010. I spent between 30 and 40 minutes 
administering the student questionnaire with each class, reading the items aloud to 
students. Before they began the questionnaire, students‟ ideas were used to 
establish a shared definition of intelligence as how smart a person is, or how clever 
they are.  
The student questionnaire was administered around a fortnight prior to most 
students completing the mathematics achievement measure. Principals provided 
123 
 
me with access to their students‟ online Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics data for tests that were administered at three points during the  
14-month study. 
Most teachers completed their questionnaire while the students did theirs. Where a 
teacher was absent, they completed the questionnaire later and posted it to me. 
Teachers also provided class lists that were divided into year levels and gender, 
providing demographic information for students.  
Interviews with students and intervention teachers were held at the beginning of 
Term 2. Student interviews were generally shorter than 10 minutes, and were 
transcribed in full. Teacher interviews lasted up to 45 minutes and were audio-
taped, and field notes were made. I listened to the interviews later, and on the field 
notes highlighted excerpts to be transcribed. Excerpts were selected on the basis 
of relevance to the research questions, or to additional themes emerging from the 
data. As themes seemed to emerge from the teacher interviews, field notes and 
audiotapes were checked for further evidence, in an iterative process. 
The interventions 
Teachers in the two treatment groups met with me on three occasions over a 21 to  
24-week period. Initial meetings were held in the later part of Term 2, followed by a 
second round of meetings in the first half of Term 3, and final meetings early in 
Term 4. Meetings for teachers in the two intervention groups were held separately 
to avoid teachers in the Combined interventions group sharing information about 
theory-of-intelligence with teachers in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group. The duration of workshops varied from 1 to 2 hours, depending partly on 
how much discussion there was and also on the size of the group (the smallest 
group had three teachers and the largest was a whole staff of around 12 at one 
school). For the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence 
interventions group, Workshop 2 was longer to accommodate the additional content 
associated with the theory-of-intelligence intervention. 
Intervention 1: Students’ mathematics self-efficacy 
The mathematics self-efficacy intervention focussed on the role the teacher plays in 
developing students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, and involved teachers in both 
intervention groups. An overview of the foci for each workshop is shown in Table 5.2. 
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The following instructional strategies, drawn from recommendations made by Hattie 
and Timperley (2007), Siegle and McCoach (2007), Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick 
(2006), and Schunk and Pajares (2002), were included in this intervention. Each of 
these strategies relates to informing students about their progress in learning: 
 Making explicit the learning intentions and their supporting 
success criteria – goals should be specific and proximal. Ideally 
the success criteria will be negotiated with the students, and 
should clarify what good performance will be; 
 Giving students feedback that encourages them to identify 
progress in their learning with specific reference to the learning 
intentions and success criteria, and indicates the next steps they 
need to take; 
 Having students record each day/week one thing that they learnt 
or excelled at in mathematics, to facilitate the development of 
self-assessment and reflection. 
Table 5.2: An overview of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention workshops  
Workshop Foci 
Workshop 1 
(June, 2010) 
 
 What is maths self-efficacy? What are its effects on 
students and teachers? 
 Strategies that can help develop a student‟s maths self-
efficacy. 
 Teachers setting goals for including strategies in their 
teaching practice. 
Workshop 2 
(July/August, 
2010) 
 
 Review progress and effects of mathematics self-efficacy 
strategies; 
 Teacher-student feedback, including Tunstall and Gipps‟ 
(1996a) typology. 
Workshop 3 
(November, 
2010) 
 
 Evaluate progress and effects of mathematics self-efficacy 
strategies; 
 Discuss strategy grouping for mathematics and students‟ 
maths self-efficacy; 
 Discuss articles related to feedback in numeracy; 
 Summarise what has been learnt, to build on in 2011. 
In addition to these strategies, teachers were encouraged to use similar student 
peers as models, rather than using teacher modelling. Also discussed at the first 
workshop was ways teachers could help children to develop ways of coping when 
they found learning difficult. Drawing on Schunk et al. (1987), strategies that were 
recommended included: teachers using “think-alouds” to model their own 
responses to difficult learning experiences; using student models to share their 
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thought processes when they have dealt constructively with working through 
difficulties; and emphasising the value of effort and perseverance.  
Teachers reflected on their feedback practices using Tunstall and Gipps‟ (1996a) 
typology (see Figure 4.1), which was discussed in detail with teachers at Workshop 
2. Several key readings (Pajares, 2005; Siegle & McCoach, 2007; Tunstall & Gipps, 
1996a) were presented and discussed at the mathematics self-efficacy meetings.  
Intervention 2: Students’ theory-of-intelligence 
This intervention involved only the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-
of-intelligence interventions group teachers who met in two groups of four. The 
main focus was to support teachers to explicitly teach students about their capacity 
to develop their intelligence. In addition to the workshops outlined in Table 5.2, 
Workshop 2 was extended by around 45 minutes.  
Themes included in this intervention were the brain‟s structure and function, and 
how the brain behaves like a muscle, in that it can be developed with exercise. 
Teachers were taken through two clearly-defined lessons (see Appendix D) which 
they then took back to their classrooms to teach to their students. I suggested to 
teachers that each lesson needed around 45 minutes. Copies of lesson plans and 
posters about the brain were given to each teacher, along with a collection of library 
books. A plastic, pull-apart model of a brain was shared among teachers at the 
three schools in this group, to support the lessons.  
To help maintain consistency with Dweck‟s work in the present study, her (2010) 
article, Mind-sets and equitable education, was presented and discussed. 
Additionally, the main ideas for the intervention were modelled on Blackwell et al.‟s 
(2007) intervention, that were reported to boost the mathematics achievement of 
students in seventh grade. As already explained, Dweck‟s items were used to 
measure theory-of-intelligence. 
Post-intervention: Time 2  
At the end of Term 3, students and teachers completed the same measures. Early 
in Term 4, interviews were held with the same students. The interview schedule 
comprised some of the same questions asked in the first interview, and additional 
items aimed at identifying students‟ perceptions of effects of the interventions for 
those in the affected group. Second interviews with teachers in the intervention 
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groups included similar modifications. Both Time 2 interview schedules are 
included in Appendix B. 
Delayed post-intervention: Time 3 
The student questionnaire and achievement measure were the only data collected 
at Time 3. Each school administered the Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics during the first term of 2011, after students had completed the 
questionnaire for a third time. Because the Progressive Achievement Test: 
Mathematics is an age-appropriate assessment, in 2010 Year 4 and 5 students 
completed tests 1 and 2, and in 2011 they completed tests 2 and 3, respectively. 
Self-efficacy judgments were made with reference to items from these tests. 
Analysis of quantitative data 
Decisions about which data to include in the final analysis were made on the basis 
of principal components analysis and correlations between item-totals for different 
year levels‟ data. Students with missing data were also removed. 
A Rasch (1980) measurement model was applied to the remaining student data, 
taking individual Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics items‟ calibrations for 
difficulty into account both for Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics data 
and mathematics self-efficacy data, which were judgments made with reference to 
the same mathematics problems. Both estimates of students‟ self-efficacy, and of 
their mathematics achievement, were derived using the difficulty parameters of the 
specific Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics items, allowing for meaningful 
comparison between Rasch data for mathematics self-efficacy and achievement. 
Rasch measurement was also applied to students‟ theory-of-intelligence data, with 
difficulty estimates for each item calculated using a maximum log likelihood 
procedure. The theory-of-intelligence scale was not connected to the self-efficacy 
and achievement scales in the same way, so a comparison could not be drawn, for 
instance, between a student‟s ratings on the mathematics self-efficacy scale and 
the theory-of-intelligence scale.  
Applying Rasch measurement enabled students‟ logit scores for mathematics self-
efficacy, achievement of the Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics, and 
theory-of-intelligence to be treated as continuous data and analysed accordingly. 
Students who gained maximum raw scores for self-efficacy, achievement, or 
theory-of-intelligence would theoretically have infinite ability estimates in a Rasch 
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model. Rather than omitting their data from the following analyses, maximum raw 
scores were given the logit score assigned to the maximum score-but-one for their 
year level; for instance, if a Year 5 student correctly answered all 10 maths 
problems, their achievement logit score was equivalent to that of a Year 5 student 
who had a raw score of 9. Likewise, minimum raw scores were assigned the 
minimum score-but-one for their year level. The data represented here, therefore, 
slightly underestimate all three measures. 
A Levene‟s test of homogeneity of error variance was used to check the 
assumption of equal variances before the three groups‟ data were analysed, and 
because variances were unequal, students‟ scores were standardised. A series of 
repeated-measures analyses of variance, and correlational analyses were used to 
address the research questions. 
Analysis of qualitative data  
Transcripts of student interviews were imported into NVivo (version 9) for analysis. 
Each student‟s data were treated as an individual case, which was ascribed 
attributes indicating the student‟s treatment group, year level, and gender. Also 
included as attributes were low/medium/high indications of their Time 1 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence, on which basis students were 
selected for interviewing. Finally, attributes that indicated their mathematics 
achievement at Time 1 and Time 3 were included, again using low/medium/high 
values. This was intended to support the identification of links between the 
qualitative and quantitative findings.  
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data. Overall categories 
were set up for data relating to students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence. Within these broad categories, codes were then developed from the 
data. All tentative codes were re-applied to the qualitative data to confirm and refine 
them in an iterative process. When these initial codes had been decided on, their 
relationships with the quantitative results and therefore the research questions 
were considered, and an approximate alignment between many of the codes and 
the research questions was identified, with further minor adjustments made. Codes 
that did not contribute to answering research questions were retained for their 
potential to identify divergences between the qualitative and quantitative data. In 
order to build a picture of the quantity of responses, as well as a qualitative one, 
some of the themes were transformed to numerical data (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 
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2003) by counting the number of responses related to a particular theme. 
Quantitising of the qualitative data was restricted to frequency counts in order to 
emphasise the students‟ and teachers‟ voices. 
Ethical considerations 
The original research proposal was assessed and approved by the Victoria 
University Faculty of Education Ethics Committee. Informed consent was sought 
from the participating schools‟ principals (as the Boards of Trustees‟ 
representatives), teachers, students‟ parents/guardians, and students. Copies of all 
information sheets, consent forms, and confidentiality agreements are included in 
Appendix E. 
The identities of the schools, teachers and students were kept confidential to my 
supervisors and me. In all writing about this research, pseudonyms have been used 
and any identifying characteristics excluded. Because access to each school‟s 
online Progressive Achievement Test: Mathematics data was needed, I signed a 
letter of confidentiality for each school, undertaking to keep access details 
confidential, not to alter any data, and to use only data related to consenting 
students. A colleague who helped with transcribing interviews signed a 
confidentiality agreement. 
To preserve the integrity of the interventions, teachers were not given the results of 
students‟ questionnaires; giving teachers this information would have been likely to 
influence their interactions with students and therefore their implementation of the 
interventions. For the same reason, I provided teachers in the two intervention 
groups with no information about the other intervention group.  
The findings are to be shared with stakeholders in several ways. To ensure that 
teachers in each of the three groups have access to any benefits from this study, 
they will all be invited to an after-school meeting at which I will present a summary 
of the findings, which will be discussed with participants. Following this meeting, 
principals of all participating schools will be provided with an electronic version of 
the summary to include in a newsletter to parents, informing them of the findings. 
The summary of findings will also be sent to parents who requested this when they 
signed consent forms at the outset of the study. Finally, the full thesis will be made 
available to parents, teachers and principals, on request. 
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Student consent process 
I visited each consenting teacher‟s class to talk to their students about what the 
research would involve for them, if they chose to participate. This gave students an 
opportunity to ask me questions, and they were also encouraged to contact me if 
they had further questions after talking with their parents about their involvement. 
Two information sheets and consent forms were then sent home with every 
student: one for the student and one for their parents or guardians. Only one email 
from a parent was received, forwarded by their child‟s teacher, explaining that her 
son was reluctant to participate because he found writing difficult. A response was 
sent, asking the parent to reassure her son that answers would simply be circled on 
a Likert-type scale. In some cases, only one of the two consent forms sent home 
was returned to school completed. If a parent had given consent, but their child had 
not completed a consent form – something they were unlikely to be familiar with 
doing – then if students were agreeable to participating on the day, this was taken 
to be in the spirit of gaining students‟ consent. Those students who had not 
returned a parental consent form were given another to take home for signing.  
Issues and challenges  
Recruitment and the consent process proved to be the two main challenges for this 
study. During the recruitment phase, several principals declined to participate in the 
study due to a perceived increase in teachers‟ workload because of the introduction 
during 2010 of National Standards; some also said they were concerned about the 
demands on teachers of implementing the revised curriculum. Recruitment of 
schools was made more challenging by not being able to tell principals from the 
outset, in which treatment group their teachers would participate. This meant that 
principals and teachers were being asked to make a commitment without knowing 
exactly what they were committing themselves to do. There was also a potential 
risk that teachers might sign consent forms, hoping to be included in the control 
group with a minimum of involvement, and then be allocated to one of the 
intervention groups and withdraw because they were not willing to take on the 
expected responsibilities.  
In one school, a single teacher was eager to participate in the study. The original 
intention was for groups of at least three teachers in a school to be involved, 
allowing more opportunities for collaboration and support during the interventions. 
However, because it had proved difficult to recruit sufficient teachers, and because 
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this teacher was very supportive of research, she was included. I was mindful of 
including her during the intervention meetings of which she was a part, along with a 
group of teachers from one other school.   
The consent process for students took considerably longer than was anticipated. In 
several classes I provided a second set of information sheets and consent forms for 
students to take home, complete, and return to their teacher. The amount of 
information for parents to read may have been off-putting for those with limited time 
or for whom English was an additional language. One school seemed to have 
particular difficulty gaining parents‟ consent, and the principal intervened to 
reassure parents of the value of their support for their children‟s involvement.  
The reality of undertaking research with teachers and students in school settings is 
complex and messy, and the effects of this are multiplied when a study covers an 
extended time-frame. Between the first and second waves of data gathering, one 
teacher from each group left, and a number of students also left schools. Most 
teacher absences were accommodated (intervention meetings were re-scheduled), 
but if students were absent on the day questionnaires, mathematics achievement 
measures, or student interviews were undertaken, this resulted in missing data.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Findings from the Quantitative Data 
The student data  
Three waves of quantitative data were collected from students in each of the three 
treatment groups: the Control group, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, 
and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions 
group. The first wave was collected in Term 1, 2010 prior to the interventions, and 
the second wave in Term 3 of the same year, post-intervention. The third and final 
wave of data was gathered during Term 1 of the 2011 school year, to identify any 
delayed effects of the interventions.  
Of 600 Year 3 to 6 students who were invited to participate, 370 consented 
(approximately 62%), comprising 215 girls and 155 boys. The consent rate ranged 
from 43% of students at one school, to 84% at another. Of these 370 students, the 
216 Year 4 and 5 students were the target group for this analysis. Furthermore, 
only data for students who had completed the questionnaire and achievement 
measure at each of the three data-collection points were included, because the 
analysis focussed on changes over time in individual students‟ trajectories, as well 
as the differences between these. (Details of missing data are included in 
Appendix F.) The final dataset comprised 152 Year 4 and 5 students: 50 from the 
Control group, 41 from the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and 61 
from the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence 
interventions group. A break-down of the final sample is provided in Table 6.1.  
Eighty-eight (58%) of the final sample were girls. This is not reflective of a bias in 
the schools‟ populations, and 302 girls and 298 boys were invited to participate. 
Although a slightly greater number of boys than girls opted not to participate (69 
and 57, respectively), the number of boys who did not return consent forms was 
double that of girls (78 and 37, respectively). When the first data were collected, 16 
consenting boys – but no girls – happened to be absent. 
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Table 6.1: Student participants 
Description of the student participants by treatment group, year level, and gender (girl/boy). 
Treatment groups are Control group (Control), Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
(Self-efficacy), and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions 
group (Combined) 
Treatment 
group 
Year 4 Year 5 Totals Totals 
G B G B G B 
Control 9 9 23 9 32 18 50 
Self-
efficacy 
5 7 16 13 21 20 41 
Combined 15 13 20 13 35 26 61 
Totals 29 29 59 35 88 64 152 
 
At each of the three data-collection points, Year 4 and 5 students completed written 
assessments of their mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence, and 
mathematics achievement. A principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
was used to investigate the dimensionality of Time 1 mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence data. Because the mathematics self-efficacy items were 
different for each year level, analyses were conducted separately with the data for 
Year 4 (n = 91) and Year 5 (n = 125). The results of these analyses, presented in 
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b, show that the factor structures for the Time 1 data varied by 
year level. The mathematics achievement items were not analysed in this way 
because they have already been extensively tested with a national reference 
sample of around 1500 students at each of Year 4 and 5 levels, and items have 
been selected to ensure that the instrument is uni-dimensional. Further details are 
available in Darr et al. (2007).  
For Year 4, Factor 1 accounted for 30% of the variance, with an additional 15% 
explained by Factor 2, and the scree plot indicating two other eigenvalues slightly 
greater than one, before a levelling-off effect. Factor 1 was largely indicative of a 
uni-dimensional mathematics self-efficacy measure, with loadings of .54 to .83 (see 
Table 6.2a). Interpretation of the three remaining factors was substantively linked to 
theory-of-intelligence. All theory-of-intelligence items loaded on Factor 2, which 
seemed to be representative of an incremental belief. Theory-of-intelligence items 
seemed to be further differentiated by Factors 3 and Factor 4, with the strongly-
incremental items loading on the former, and the strongly-entity items loading on 
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the latter. The first theory-of-intelligence item loaded moderately on all four factors 
factor. Cronbach‟s alpha values were α = .72 for theory-of-intelligence items and 
α = .86 for mathematics self-efficacy items. 
Table 6.2a: Factor loadings on student questionnaire items for Year 4 
Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence items for Year 4 students (n = 91) at Time 
1. Mathematics self-efficacy items were presented to students in a visual format, often with 
pictures to support the questions included here. Students were asked to respond by indicating 
how much they agreed or disagreed that they could solve the mathematics problems, and how 
much they agreed/disagreed with the statements about intelligence. Items are ordered by 
weighting on Factor 1. Note: Factor loadings < .3 are not shown. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Variance 30% 15% 9% 7% 
Mathematics self-efficacy items 
Which set of coins is exactly the right amount to 
buy this ice block? 
.83    
How many $10 notes will it take to buy this doll?  .78    
Riki won 12 marbles before school, 5 marbles at 
lunchtime, and 11 marbles after school. How many 
did he win altogether? 
.74    
How many pencils must Kath give to Kyle so they 
both have the same number of pencils? 
.66    
Which of these has the numbers ordered from 
smallest to largest? 
.64    
June is making a string of beads. She is using a 
repeating pattern. Here is the start of her string of 
beads. What will the 24
th
 bead she uses look like? 
.62    
A sheet of 35 stickers was shared evenly by 7 girls. 
How many stickers did each girl get? 
.60    
Which picture is 
1
/3 shaded? .60    
Paul has put some ice block sticks into groups of 
ten. He has four groups of ten, and five left over. 
How many ice block sticks does he have altogether? 
.59    
Some friends were given 95 chocolates. They ate 
72. How many did they have left? 
.54    
Theory-of-intelligence items 
You can learn new things, but you can‟t really 
change your basic intelligence.  
.48 .59 .31 .67 
Your intelligence is something about you that you 
can‟t change very much.  
 .60  .86 
No matter who you are, you can change your 
intelligence a lot.  
 .65 .79  
No matter how much intelligence you have, you can 
always change it quite a bit.  
 .59 .72  
You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you 
really can‟t do much to change it. 
 .59  .81 
You can always greatly change how intelligent you 
are.  
 .63 .77  
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Table 6.2b: Factor loadings on student questionnaire items for Year 5 
Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence items for Year 5 students (n = 125) at Time 
1. Mathematics self-efficacy items were presented to students in a visual format, often with 
pictures to support the questions included here. Students were asked to respond by indicating 
how much they agreed or disagreed that they could solve the mathematics problems, and how 
much they agreed/disagreed with the statements about intelligence. Items are ordered by 
weighting on Factor 1. Note: Factor loadings < .3 are not shown. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Variance 31% 18% 8% 
Mathematics self-efficacy items 
In a game these counters are used for money. How much 
would this group of counters be worth altogether? 
.70   
How many $10 notes will it take to buy this bike? .81   
Ants have 6 legs. How many legs in total would there be 
on 43 ants? 
.77   
At the pet show there were 38 dogs, 46 cats, and 29 
rabbits. How many animals were there altogether? 
.76   
25 + □ = 55 What number should go in the □ to make the 
sentence true? 
.72   
Ligi has drawn arrows on the number line to help solve 
121 - □ = 57. What number should go in the □ to make the 
sentence true? 
.71   
If 3 x 12 = 36, then 6 x 12 will equal: A. 2 x 36; B. 3 x 36; 
C. 6 + 36; D. 12 + 36 
.70   
What fraction of this group of circles is shaded? .66   
What does the 7 stand for in 756? .59   
This tree has 8 apples on it. If the wind blows ¼ of them 
onto the ground, how many apples are left on the tree? 
.56   
Theory-of-intelligence items 
You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really 
can‟t do much to change it. 
 .83  
Your intelligence is something about you that you can‟t 
change very much.  
 .73 .35 
You can always greatly change how intelligent you are.    .77 
No matter how much intelligence you have, you can 
always change it quite a bit.  
  .78 
You can learn new things, but you can‟t really change your 
basic intelligence.  
 .66 .33 
No matter who you are, you can change your intelligence a 
lot.  
 .40 .67 
Table 6.2b shows the three factors extracted from the Year 5 data. This was the 
year level for which students‟ responses gave the most unambiguous factors, with 
each mathematics self-efficacy item having a primary loading on Factor 1 of .56 or 
greater, and no cross-loading above .30. Factor loadings for theory-of-intelligence 
items suggested Factor 2 represented an entity theory-of-intelligence, and Factor 3 
was consistent with an incremental theory-of-intelligence, with some cross-loading 
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between these two factors indicating that they may be part of the same construct, 
rather than being distinct from one another. Thirty-one per cent of the variance was 
explained by Factor 1, 18% by Factor 2, and a further 8% by Factor 3. Taking this 
information into consideration, Cronbach‟s alpha levels were acceptable for the 
items measuring mathematics self-efficacy; α =.90, and theory-of-intelligence; 
α = .79. 
The principal components analysis confirmed that, by and large, the mathematics 
self-efficacy items with which students at both year levels were presented provided 
a reasonable estimate of their self-efficacy beliefs. The theory-of-intelligence items, 
however, loaded on at least two factors at each year level, suggesting a less well-
defined measure despite the small number of items, and their apparent near 
identity. 
Analysis of variance 
A series of analyses of variance was undertaken to identify whether or not mean 
scores varied significantly for the treatment groups, for girls and boys, and for Year 
4 and 5 students. Prior to conducting any analysis of variance, Levene‟s test of 
homogeneity of error variance was used to check the assumption of equal 
variances in each of the three groups. This assumption was not supported for 
mathematics self-efficacy at Times 1 and 2; F (2, 149) = 2.69, p = .07 and F (2, 
149) = 2.60, p = .08, or for theory-of-intelligence at Time 3; F (2, 149) = 2.88, p = 
.06. For this reason, all logit scores were transformed to standardised z-scores 
prior to further analysis, by dividing them by their respective standard deviations.  
Differences between treatment groups 
Over the three data collection points, do individual student differences in 
mathematics self-efficacy, achievement, and theory-of-intelligence vary as a 
function of treatment group? 
A series of repeated-measures analyses of variance was undertaken to identify 
changes associated with treatment group, in each of the three dependent variables: 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics 
achievement. Each analysis of variance had time (three levels) as the within-
subjects factor, and treatment group (three levels: Control group; Mathematics self-
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efficacy intervention group; Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group) as the between-subjects factor.  
Figure 6.1 shows the mean standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy, 
theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement for each treatment group at 
each of the three data collection points. The first graph in Figure 6.1 shows 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy. Group means varied significantly as a main 
effect of time; F(2, 298) = 44.67, p < .001, and treatment group; F(2, 298) = 3.36, 
p = .04. There was a significant interaction between time and treatment group 
affecting mathematics self-efficacy; F(4, 298) = 3.35, p = .01. The mean score for 
the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group increased noticeably from Time 2 
to Time 3, with a moderate effect size for this group compared to the Control group; 
Cohen‟s d = .43. Mean scores for the Control and Combined mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions groups were very similar on all 
three occasions, and at Time 3, all three groups had very similar mean scores.  
The interaction effect supported the hypothesis that the mean mathematics self-
efficacy of students in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group would 
increase at a greater rate than that of the Control group, although it is interesting 
that this occurred between the post-intervention and delayed post-intervention time 
points. On the other hand, the hypothesis that the mean mathematics self-efficacy 
of the Combined interventions group would increase at a greater rate than that of 
the two other groups was not supported by the data. 
Theory-of-intelligence scores for each treatment group are shown in the top right 
graph in Figure 6.1. A main effect of time on group theory-of-intelligence means 
was evident; F(2, 298) = 18.65, p < .001, but there was no main effect of treatment 
group; F < 1. There was no significant interaction effect of time and treatment on 
students‟ theory-of-intelligence; F(4, 298) = 1.59, p = .18. the second graph in 
Figure 6.1 shows the mean standardised scores for students‟ theory-of-intelligence 
for each treatment group at each of the three data collection points. The 
hypothesised decrease in the Control group‟s theory-of-intelligence was not 
therefore supported by the data. 
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Figure 6.1.   Students’ mean mathematics self-efficacy (top left), theory-of-intelligence (top right), and 
mathematics achievement (bottom), by time (three levels) and treatment group (three levels). 
Treatment groups are: Control group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group; and Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. Error bars denote standard 
errors of the estimates. 
The mean mathematics achievement standardised scores for the three groups at 
each time point are shown in the bottom graph in Figure 6.1. Again, time had a 
significant effect on the mean outcome for each group; F(2, 298) = 62.57, p < .001, 
as did treatment group; F(2, 149) = 3.97, p = .02. There was evidence that 
mathematics achievement was influenced by a significant interaction between time 
and treatment group; F(4, 298) = 4.58, p < .001. Compared to the Control group‟s 
mean change in achievement from Time 1 to Time 3, there was a fairly large effect 
size of .74 for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, supporting the 
hypothesis that the latter would have a greater increase in mathematics self-
efficacy than the former. Compared to the Control group, the Combined 
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interventions group showed a moderate effect size; Cohen‟s d = .44, evidence that 
supported the hypothesis that this group would also show a greater achievement 
gain than the Control group.  
Although all groups showed an increase in mean achievement from Time 1 to 
Time 2, the Control group‟s mean decreased markedly at Time 3, and the 
Combined interventions group showed a slight decrease. The only treatment that 
did not appear to lose any ground, and in fact made a slight gain at Time 3, was the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group. This group‟s mean achievement score 
was significantly below the Control and Combined groups‟ means at Time 1; 
t(89) = 2.48, p = .02, and t(100) = 2.68, p = .01, respectively, and at Time 2; 
t(89) = 2.48, p = .02, t(100) = 3.35, p = .001, respectively. At Time 3, though, this 
difference was no longer evident. Instead, a weak difference between the 
Combined interventions group and the Control group emerged; t(109) = 1.79, 
p = .08. Despite the drop in the Combined interventions group‟s Time 3 
achievement score, this group still showed the highest mean achievement score on 
all three occasions. 
Summary of between-treatment group differences 
Most noticeably, the analysis of differences between treatment groups showed that 
at the end of the study the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group had made 
significant gains in mathematics self-efficacy and achievement, compared to the 
Control group and the Combined interventions group. This supported the 
hypothesised changes for self-efficacy and achievement for the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group and provided evidence of the effectiveness of the 
mathematics self-efficacy intervention. It seems likely that there was an initial 
implicit effect of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention that impacted on 
mathematics achievement in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group at 
Time 2, which in turn resulted in a more explicit effect on students‟ self-efficacy at 
Time 3.  
In contrast, there was no clear evidence of the effect of the theory-of-intelligence 
intervention on outcomes for students in the Combined interventions group. The 
trajectory for theory-of-intelligence for the Combined group was not significantly 
different from those of the other groups, providing no support for the hypothesised 
changes in this variable. Neither was there evidence to support the hypothesised 
difference between mathematics self-efficacy and achievement of the Combined 
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interventions group and the two other groups at the end of the study. In the 
Combined interventions group, the theory-of-intelligence intervention may in fact 
have interfered with the self-efficacy intervention. 
Differences according to gender 
Between-treatment group differences for girls and boys  
Among treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender? 
To identify any effects of being in different treatment groups for girls and boys, data 
were split by gender, and repeated-measures analyses of variance were conducted 
with time (three levels) the within-subjects factor, and treatment (three levels) the 
between-subjects factor. Figure 6.2 shows girls‟ mean scores for mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and achievement, according to time and treatment 
group. Apart from the effect of time, there was no evidence of a main effect of 
treatment group for any of the three measures.  
For girls‟ mathematics self-efficacy (shown in the top left graph in Figure 6.2), there 
was a main effect of time; F(2, 170) = 15.96, p < .001, but no effect of treatment 
was indicated; F(2, 85) = 1.36, p = .26. There was no significant interaction 
between time and treatment group; F(4, 170) = 1.02, p = .40. At Time 2, the mean 
self-efficacy of the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group was very slightly 
lower than it was at Time 1, and was significantly lower than that of the Control and 
Combined interventions groups; t(51) = 2.16, p = .04, and t(54) = 1.79, p = .03, 
respectively. 
Girls‟ theory-of-intelligence showed a main effect of time; F(2, 170) = 6.11, p = .01, 
but there was neither a main effect of treatment; F(2, 85) = 1.41, p = .25, nor an 
interaction effect; F(4, 170) = 1.60, p = .18. Time 1 theory-of-intelligence for girls in 
the Control group was significantly different from means of girls in the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group and the Combined interventions group; t(51) = 1.97, 
p = .05, and t(65) = 2.42, p = .02, respectively. 
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Figure 6.2.   Girls’ (n = 88) mean standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy (top left), theory-
of-intelligence (top right), and mathematics achievement (bottom), by time and treatment group: 
Control group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group; and Combined mathematics self-efficacy 
and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
For girls‟ mathematics achievement, a main effect of time was also indicated; 
F(2, 85) = 33.96, p < .001, but again, there was no main effect of treatment group; 
F(2, 85) = 1.66, p = .20. No significant interaction effect was shown; 
F(4, 170) = 1.87, p = .12. Mean achievement for girls in the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group increased slightly from Time 2 to Time 3, whereas mean 
achievement for the two other groups decreased slightly. 
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Figure 6.3.   Boys’ (n = 64) mean standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy (top left), theory-
of-intelligence (top right), and mathematics achievement (bottom), by time and treatment group: 
Control group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group; and Combined mathematics self-efficacy 
and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
Boys‟ mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and 
achievement are shown in Figure 6.3, by time and treatment group. For boys‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy (shown in the first graph in Figure 6.3), there was a 
significant main effect of time; F(2, 122) = 35.20, p < .001, and a very marginal 
effect of treatment; F(2, 61) = 2.85, p = .07, which approached the .05 significance 
threshold. Also evident was a significant interaction between time and treatment; 
F(4, 122) = 3.11, p = .02. Boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
(n = 20) had significantly lower mean mathematics self-efficacy than boys in the 
Combined interventions groups at Times 1; t(44) = 2.06, p = .05, and Time 2; 
t(44) = 2.93, p = .01, and significantly lower self-efficacy than boys in the Control 
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group at Time 2; t(36) = 2.25, p = .03. An increase in mean self-efficacy of boys in 
the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group at Time 3 resulted in no significant 
differences in mean self-efficacy for boys in the three treatment groups at the final 
time point. The change in mean self-efficacy of boys in the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group from Times 1 to 3 indicated a large effect size compared 
to that of boys in the Control group; Cohen‟s d = .79.The second graph in Figure 
6.3 shows boys‟ theory-of-intelligence by treatment group. A main effect of time 
was evident; F(2, 122) = 14.43, p < .001, but there was no main effect of treatment 
group; F < 1. Neither was there a significant interaction between time and 
treatment; F(4, 122) = 1.21, p = .31. Mean scores for boys‟ theory-of-intelligence 
increased for all groups from Time 1 to Time 3. 
For boys‟ mathematics achievement (the last graph in Figure 6.3), a main effect of 
time was indicated; F(2, 122) = 28.84, p < .001. A main effect of treatment group 
was beyond the significance threshold of .05; F(2, 61) = 2.54, p = .09. A significant 
interaction between time and treatment was evident; F(4, 122) = 3.53, p = .01. For 
boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, mean achievement was 
significantly below that of boys in the two other groups at Times 1 and 2. At Time 3, 
no significant differences between boys in the three groups persisted, partly due to 
an increase in self-efficacy for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and 
partly due to decreases in mean self-efficacy for boys in the two other groups. A 
large effect size (Cohen‟s d = .74) was evident for mean change in achievement 
from Time 1 to Time 3 for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, 
compared to mean achievement change for the Control group. Because there 
seemed to be some similarity in the trajectories for self-efficacy and achievement 
for boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, the changes in boys‟ 
self-efficacy and achievement from Time 1 to Time 3 were compared to see if they 
might be correlated for this treatment group, but no significant correlation was 
evident; r =.09, p = .70. 
Summary of between-treatment group differences for girls and boys  
Time was the only significant effect on girls‟ mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-
intelligence, and achievement, each of which increased for all groups from Time 1 
to Time 3. For boys, mathematics self-efficacy and achievement were both affected 
by significant interactions between time and treatment. Boys in the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group had significantly lower mean mathematics self-
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efficacy and achievement than those of boys in the two other groups at Times 1 
and 2. At Time 3, though, their mean scores no longer differed significantly. 
Within-treatment group differences for boys and girls 
Within treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender? 
Each treatment group‟s mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy for boys and 
girls are shown in Figure 6.4.  
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.4.   Treatment groups’ mathematics self-efficacy by time and gender. Treatment groups are: 
Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom). Error bars denote 
standard errors of estimates. 
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In each treatment group, time had a main effect on students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, and although boys‟ mean scores appeared to be higher than girls‟, no 
gender difference reached the significance threshold of p < .05. For the Control 
group, a main effect of time was indicated; F(2, 96) = 7.30, p < .001, but no main 
effect of gender was evident; F(1, 48) = 1.61, p = .21. Nor was there a significant 
interaction between time and gender: F < 1. A main effect of time on self-efficacy 
was also evident for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group; 
F(2, 78) = 19.76, p < .001, but there was no effect of gender, and no interaction 
effect; F < 1 in both cases. Likewise, there was a main effect of time for the 
Combined interventions group; F(2, 118) = 17.89, p < .001, but no main effect of 
gender; F(1, 59) = 3.07, p = .09. Neither was the interaction between time and 
gender significant; F < 1. 
Figure 6.5 shows mean theory-of-intelligence scores for each treatment group, by 
gender. In the Control group‟s theory-of-intelligence (see the top left graph in Figure 
6.5), there was a main effect of time; F (2, 96) = 2.86, p = .06, but gender alone had 
no significant effect; F < 1. A significant interaction between gender and time was 
evident; F(2, 96) = 3.64, p = .03. Boys in this group (n = 18) had a significantly 
lower mean theory-of-intelligence than girls (n = 32) at Time 1; t(48) = 2.06, p = .05, 
but at Time 2 the effect of gender was no longer significant. In the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group, a significant main effect of time on theory-of-
intelligence was indicated; F(2, 78) = 8.77, p < .001. There was neither a main 
effect of gender; F(1, 39) = 2.31, p = .14, nor an interaction effect; F(2, 78) = 1.54, 
p = .22. At Time 3, however, boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group had a significantly higher mean theory-of-intelligence than girls; t(39) = 2.00, 
p = .05. 
A main effect of time on the Combined interventions group‟s theory-of-intelligence 
was evident; F (2, 118) = 10.95, p < .001, but no main effect of gender, or 
interaction between time and gender, was indicated; F < 1 in both cases. Of the 
three treatment groups, the greatest similarity of girls‟ and boys‟ theory-of-
intelligence scores was in the Combined interventions group.  
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Figure 6.5.   Treatment groups’ mean standardised scores for theory-of-intelligence, by time and 
gender. Treatment groups are: Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
(top right); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group 
(bottom). Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
Figure 6.6 shows mean mathematics achievement scores for each treatment group 
by time and gender. Importantly, no significant effect of gender on students‟ 
achievement was found for any treatment group. The graphs for the Control group 
and the Combined interventions group both show decreases in girls‟ and boys‟ 
mean achievement from Time 2 to Time 3, and in both groups, boys‟ mean 
achievement is very slightly greater than that of girls. In the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group, increases in mean achievement were shown for boys 
and girls alike, with scores for both genders very similar. 
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Figure 6.6.   Treatment groups’ mean standardised scores for mathematics achievement, by time 
and gender. Treatment groups are: Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group (top right); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions 
group (bottom). Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
For the Control group‟s achievement, a main effect of time was evident; F(2, 96) 
= 15.88, p < .001, but there was no main effect of gender; F(1, 48) = 1.19, p = .28. 
The Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group also showed a main effect of time; 
F(2, 78) = 19.93, p < .001; but no main effect of gender; F < 1. For the Combined 
interventions group, there was a main effect of time on achievement; F(2, 118) 
= 38.94, p < .001, but again, there was no main effect of gender; F < 1. Interaction 
effects for each group did not reach the significance threshold; F < 1 in each case. 
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Summary of within-treatment group differences for boys and girls 
Overall, mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and 
achievement increased from Time 1 to Time 3 for all treatment groups, for boys and 
for girls. In the Control group, an initial significant difference between the boys‟ and 
girls‟ mean scores for theory-of-intelligence was no longer evident at Time 2. In 
contrast, boys‟ mean theory-of-intelligence was significantly greater than girls‟ 
theory-of-intelligence at Time 3 only, for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group. For boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, mean 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement at Times 1 and 2 were significantly 
lower than those of boys in the two other groups. At Time 3, these significant 
differences were no longer evident. 
Differences according to year level 
Among treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of year level? 
Between-treatment group differences for Year 4 and 5 students 
To identify any effects of being in different treatment groups for Year 4 and 5 
students, data were split by year level, and repeated-measures analyses of 
variance were conducted with time (three levels) the within-subjects factor, and 
treatment (three levels) the between-subjects factor. Figure 6.7 shows Year 4 
students‟ mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and 
achievement, according to time and treatment group. 
For Year 4 students, a main effect of time on mathematics self-efficacy was evident 
(see the top left graph in Figure 6.7); F(2, 110) = 16.06, p < .001; there was no 
significant effect of treatment group; F < 1. The interaction between time and 
treatment was not significant; F(4, 110) = 1.54, p =.20. 
Year 4 students‟ theory-of-intelligence was subject to a significant main effect of 
time; F(2, 110) = 10.54, p < .001; but no significant effect of treatment; F(2, 55) 
= 1.64, p = .20, and no interaction effect; F(4, 110) = 1.35, p = .26. Mean theory-of-
intelligence for Year 4 students in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
(n = 12) increased quite sharply between Time 2 and Time 3, by which point it was 
significantly different to the mean of the Combined interventions group t(38) = 2.09, 
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p = .04, but not significantly different to the mean of the Control group; t(28) = 1.91, 
p = .07. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.7. Year 4 students’ mean standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-
intelligence, and mathematics achievement, by time and treatment group: Control group (top left); 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom).  Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
Year 4 students‟ mathematics achievement was affected by a significant main 
effect of time; F(2, 182) = 20.77, p < .001, but no main effect of treatment group 
was evident; F < 1. A significant interaction between time and treatment group was 
indicated; F(4, 110) = 2.58, p = .04. The bottom graph in Figure 6.7 shows that the 
mean mathematics achievement of Year 4 students in the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group was noticeably lower than that of the two other groups at 
Times 1 and 2, but the differences did not reach the significance threshold of .05. 
When mean change in achievement from Times 1 to 3 was compared between the 
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Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group and the Control group, an effect size 
was shown; Cohen‟s d = 1.09. This was in part due to a decrease in mean 
achievement for Year 4 students in the Control group from Time 2 to Time 3, which 
resulted in a very small net gain of .16 logits from Time 1 to Time 3. 
Year 5 students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and achievement 
scores are shown in Figure 6.8.  
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.8. Year 5 students’ mean standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-
intelligence, and mathematics achievement, by time and treatment group: Control group (top left); 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom).  Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
Main effects of time; F(2, 182) = 29.54, p < .001; and treatment; F(2, 91) = 6.49, 
p = .01, were indicated for Year 5 students‟ mathematics self-efficacy. An 
interaction between time and treatment was beyond the .05 significance threshold; 
F(4, 182) = 2.11, p = .08. Once again, the lower Times 1 and 2 mathematics self-
efficacy of a sub-sample of the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group – in 
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this instance, Year 5 students – was evident. At Time 2, their self-efficacy was 
significantly lower than that of Year 5 students in the Control and Combined 
interventions groups; t(59) = 2.83, p = .01, and t(60) = 4.22, p < .001, respectively. 
For Year 5 students‟ theory-of-intelligence, the only significant effect was that of 
time; F(2, 182) = 8.53, p < .001. There was no significant effect of treatment group; 
F(4, 182) = 2.01, p = .14, and no interaction effect; F < 1. 
For Year 5 students‟ achievement, main effects of time; F(2, 182) = 41.90, p < .001, 
and treatment; F(2, 91) = 5.47, p = .01, were indicated. A significant interaction 
between time and treatment group was also evident; F(2, 182) = 3.08, p = .02. 
Again, the significantly lower mean achievement of Year 5 students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group at Times 1 and 2 is shown, with no 
significant differences between the groups‟ Time 3 means. Mean change in 
achievement from Time 1 to Time 3 was compared between Year 5 students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy group and the Control group, and a moderate effect size 
was identified; Cohen‟s d = .61. 
Summary of between-treatment group differences for Year 4 and 5 students 
Time had a significant effect on all three mean measures for students in all 
treatment groups. For Year 4 students, a significant interaction between time and 
treatment was evident for mathematics achievement, with those in the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group having lower mean achievement than Year 4 
students in the two other groups until Time 3. For Year 5 students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, this between-group difference in 
mean achievement was more clearly defined, with significant effects of time and 
treatment group, and significant interaction effects, for mathematics self-efficacy 
and achievement. For both measures, any significant between-group differences 
were no longer evident at Time 3. 
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Within-treatment group differences for Year 4 and 5 students 
Within treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics self-
efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of year level? 
Each treatment group‟s mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy are shown by 
year level in Figure 6.9. Perhaps most striking is the lack of similarity between the 
graphs. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.9.   Treatment groups’ mathematics self-efficacy by time and year level. Treatment groups 
are: Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom). Error bars denote 
standard errors of estimates. 
A main effect of time on self-efficacy of the Control group students was indicated; 
F(2, 96) = 6.80, p = .01. No main effect of year level was evident; F < 1, and neither 
was there a significant interaction; F(2, 96) = 1.24, p = .29. At Time 2, the 
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difference between Year 4 and Year 5 students‟ mean self-efficacy was not 
significant; t (48) = 1.51, p = .14. 
For the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, a main effect of time was also 
indicated; F(2, 78) = 15.30, p < .001, but there was neither a significant effect of 
year level nor an interaction effect; F < 1 in both cases. Mean scores for the two 
year levels were in fact very similar in this treatment group, with both increasing 
sharply at Time 3. 
The Combined interventions group showed a main effect of year level; 
F(1, 59) = 18.43, p < .001, as well as a main effect of time; F(2, 118) = 17.29, 
p < .001. There was no significant interaction between time and year level; 
F(2, 118) = 1.20, p = .31. For the Combined interventions group, Year 5 students 
had significantly greater mean self-efficacy scores than Year 4 students at all three 
time points; t(59) = 2.68, p = .01 at Time 1, t(59) = 3.93, p < .001 at Time 2, and 
t(59) = 3.98, p < .001 at Time 3.  
Figure 6.10 shows each treatment group‟s theory-of-intelligence scores by time and 
year level. For the Control group (see the top left graph), the main effect of time 
was beyond the .05 significance threshold; F(2, 96) = 2.82, p = .07. Neither was 
there a significant effect of year level; F(1, 48) = 1.56, p = .22. No significant 
interaction was evident; F < 1. At Time 1, Year 5 students‟ mean theory-of-
intelligence was greater than the mean theory-of-intelligence of Year 4 students in 
the Control group, but this was non-significant; t(48) = 1.52, p = .14. 
In contrast to the Control group, where Year 5 students had higher mean theory-of-
intelligence than Year 4 students, the reverse was evident in the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group. Main effects of time; F(2, 78) = 8.35, p = .01, and year 
level; F(1, 39) = 4.497, p = .04, were indicated for the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group. No interaction between time and year level was evident; F < 1. 
Year 4 students‟ mean theory-of-intelligence was greater than that of Year 5 
students at each time point for this treatment group, but did not reach the 
significance threshold even at Time 3, when the difference appeared greatest; 
t(39) = 1.94, p = .06.  
The only significant effect on the Combined interventions group‟s theory-of-
intelligence was time; F(2, 118) = 11.30, p < .001. There was no significant effect of 
year level; F < 1, and no significant interaction of time and year level;  
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F(2, 118) = 1.24, p = .29. In all treatment groups, Year 4 and 5 students‟ mean 
theory-of-intelligence scores were greater at Time 3 than at Time 1. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.10.   Treatment groups’ theory-of-intelligence by time and year level. Treatment groups are: 
Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom). Error bars denote 
standard errors of estimates. 
Figure 6.11 shows each treatment group‟s mathematics achievement, by time and 
year level. In all three graphs, the mean achievement of Year 5 is greater than that 
of Year 4. For the Control group and the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group, time was the only significant effect: F(2, 96) = 14.30, p < .001, and F(2, 78) 
= 16.56, p < .001, respectively. Year level had no significant effect on achievement 
in the Control group; F(1, 48) = 2.27, p = .14, or in the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group; F(1, 39) = 1.37, p = .25. No interaction effects were indicated; 
F < 1 for both groups. 
154 
 
For the Combined interventions group, main effects of time; F(2, 118) = 40.24, 
p < .001, and year level were evident; F(1, 59) = 9.40, p = .01, along with a 
significant interaction between year level and time; F(2, 118) = 3.79, p = .03. Mean 
achievement of Year 5 students in this group was significantly greater than that of 
Year 4 students at Time 1; t(59) = 2.74, p = .01, and at Time 2; t(59) = 4.24, 
p < .001.  
  
  
 
 
Figure 6.11.   Treatment groups’ mathematics achievement by time and year level. Treatment groups 
are: Control group (top left); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (top right); and Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom). Error bars denote 
standard errors of estimates. 
Summary of within-treatment group differences according to year level 
Most of the significant differences associated with year level were related to 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement. The mean achievement of Year 4 (at 
Time 2) and Year 5 students (at Times 1 and 2) in the Mathematics self-efficacy 
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intervention group was significantly lower than that of their peers in the two other 
groups. In the Combined interventions group, Year 5 students had significantly 
greater mathematics self-efficacy (at Times 1, 2, and 3) and achievement (at Times 
1 and 2) than Year 4 students in this treatment group. Significant differences 
according to year level for theory-of-intelligence were indicated for the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group, in which the mean for Year 4 students exceeded 
that of Year 5 students, and time had a significant effect. Time also had a 
significant effect on the Combined group‟s mean theory-of-intelligence, but year 
level showed no significant effect. Mean theory-of-intelligence scores for Year 4 
and 5 students in all groups were higher at Time 3 than Time 1. 
Correlations between measures, according to treatment group 
How are students’ theory-of-intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, and 
mathematics achievement related?  
Correlations between self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics 
achievement at Times 1, 2, and 3 are shown for the three treatment groups in 
Table 6.3. Consistent across all treatment groups‟ data – including the Control 
group‟s – were significant, moderate-to-strong correlations between mathematics 
self-efficacy and achievement (for statistically significant correlations, r ranged from 
0.31, p < .05, to 0.73, p < .01). Correlations between the three self-efficacy 
measures were all statistically significant, as were correlations between the three 
achievement measures, with the latter including some strong associations (up to 
r = 0.78, p < .01). In the correlations between mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement, the strength of the Time 2 correlation for the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group is almost four times the variance explained at Time 1 (r
2
 
= .46 and r
2
  = .12, p < .01 and p = .03, respectively). 
Measures of students‟ theory-of-intelligence had only two statistically significant 
correlations with achievement measures, giving little support to the hypothesis that 
theory-of-intelligence was associated with mathematics achievement. Significant 
moderate correlations between Time 2 and Time 3 theory-of-intelligence measures 
might be explained by students‟ understanding of intelligence becoming more 
stable as they get older. Reasons for several statistically significant moderate 
correlations between mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence – 
particularly involving Time 3 theory-of-intelligence – could not be identified from 
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close examination of the quantitative data, and were further investigated in the 
qualitative data analysis.  
Table 6.3: Significant correlations between student variables 
Pearson‟s correlations between Year 4 and 5 students‟ standardised scores for theory-of-
intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, and achievement at Times 1, 2, and 3, by treatment 
group: Control group (top); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (middle); Combined 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group (bottom). Note: p < .05 
for all correlations shown; non-significant correlations are omitted. 
 
 
Mathematics 
self-efficacy 
Theory-of-intelligence 
 
Mathematics achievement 
 
Time 2 Time 3 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Mathematics 
self-efficacy 
Time 1 
0.30 
0.45 
0.62 
0.77 
0.32 
0.60 
 
0.32 
 
 
 
0.34 
0.32 
 
0.57 
0.34 
0.59 
 
0.42 
0.47 
0.38 
 
0.37 
Mathematics 
self-efficacy 
Time 2 
 0.52 
0.49 
0.68 
 
 
0.35 
 
 0.37 
0.56 
0.60 
0.31 
0.68 
0.57 
0.41 
0.68 
0.46 
Mathematics 
self-efficacy 
Time 3 
    
0.42 
 
 
0.44 
 
0.60 
0.48 
0.73 
0.33 
0.55 
0.60 
0.49 
0.60 
0.53 
Theory-of- 
intelligence 
Time 1 
    0.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory-of- 
intelligence 
Time 2 
    0.45 
 
0.51 
 0.29 
 
0.39 
 
Theory-of- 
intelligence 
Time 3 
        
Mathematics 
achievement 
Time 1 
      0.39 
0.59 
0.65 
0.64 
0.61 
0.78 
Mathematics 
achievement 
Time 2 
       0.47 
0.64 
0.54 
A closer examination of the relationship between students’ mathematics self-
efficacy and achievement 
At each of the three time points, students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement logit scores were almost always significantly correlated for each group 
(see Table 6.3). Because self-efficacy and achievement are correlated, part of 
students‟ later achievement is associated with shared variance in earlier 
achievement, making it difficult to establish the nature of the relationship between 
the two constructs. In addition to the variance that is shared by both constructs, 
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variance in later achievement is also associated with unique variance in earlier 
achievement, and in earlier and concurrent self-efficacy.  
Pairs of linear regression analyses were used to estimate the extent to which 
earlier achievement, earlier self-efficacy, and concurrent self-efficacy, are 
associated with the variance in later achievement. Figure 6.13 shows the shared 
and unique variance in Time 2 achievement associated with Time 1 achievement, 
and Time 1 and Time 2 self-efficacy for each group. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13.   Time 2 mathematics achievement variance associated with prior achievement, and 
prior and concurrent self-efficacy. The top panel shows variance associated with Time 1 achievement 
and self-efficacy; and the bottom panel shows variance associated with Time 1 achievement and 
Time 2 self-efficacy. Treatment groups are: Control group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group (Maths self-efficacy); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence 
interventions group (Combined).  
The top panel shows that in all three groups, students‟ Time 1 achievement was 
more predictive of Time 2 achievement than their Time 1 self-efficacy, which in fact 
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was associated with only a small proportion of unique variance in Time 2 
achievement (5%) for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group. For the 
Combined interventions group, 40% of the variance in Time 2 achievement was 
uniquely associated with Time 1 achievement, compared with 23% for the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and 16% for the Control group. A 
smaller proportion of variance in Time 2 achievement was associated with shared 
and unique variance in Time 1 self-efficacy for each group; 16% for the Combined 
interventions group, 17% for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and 
6% for the Control group. 
The bottom panel shows that, immediately post-intervention, the variance in Time 2 
achievement associated with Time 2 self-efficacy is more than double that 
associated with Time 1 self-efficacy for each group. The total of variance in Time 2 
achievement associated with shared and unique variance in Time 2 self-efficacy for 
the Combined interventions group was 35%; for the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group, 44%; and for the Control group, 18%. Each group shows an 
increase in variance in Time 2 achievement that is uniquely associated with 
concurrent self-efficacy, compared to the data shown in the top panel. The 
Mathematics self-efficacy group was the only group for which the unique variance 
in Time 2 achievement associated with concurrent self-efficacy (16%) was greater 
than the unique variance associated with earlier achievement (7%).  
Figure 6.14 shows the variance in Time 3 mathematics achievement (delayed post-
intervention) associated with Time 1 achievement and self-efficacy (top panel), 
Time 2 achievement and self-efficacy (middle panel), and Time 2 achievement and 
Time 3 self-efficacy (bottom panel). The top panel shows that for the Combined 
interventions group, 66% of the variance in Time 3 achievement was associated 
with Time 1 achievement, either uniquely or in combination with Time 1 self-
efficacy. This was the greatest proportion of variance in achievement associated 
with a combination of earlier achievement and earlier or concurrent self-efficacy for 
any group, at any time. For the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, 36% 
of the variance in Time 3 achievement was attributable to Time 1 self-efficacy and 
achievement – the smallest proportion for the three groups. For the Control group, 
the 46% of variance in Time 3 achievement associated with Time 1 self-efficacy 
and achievement was the greatest proportion of variance in achievement explained 
for this group at any point. This panel shows the greatest unique variance 
attributable to earlier achievement for all groups, at any time.  
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Figure 6.14.   Time 3 mathematics achievement variance associated with prior achievement, and 
prior and concurrent self-efficacy. The top panel shows variance associated with Time 1 achievement 
and self-efficacy; the middle panel shows variance associated with Time 2 achievement and self-
efficacy; and the bottom panel shows variance associated with Time 2 achievement and Time 3 self-
efficacy. Treatment groups are: Control group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (Maths 
self-efficacy); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group 
(Combined).  
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Similar to the variance in Time 2 achievement associated with Time 1 achievement 
and self-efficacy (see the top panel in Figure 6.13), very little variance in Time 3 
achievement was uniquely associated with Time 1 self-efficacy – only 2% for the 
Control group. On the other hand, the proportion of variance in Time 3 achievement 
associated with Time 1 achievement – both unique variance and shared variance 
with Time 1 self-efficacy – was greater for each group than the proportion of 
variance in Time 2 achievement associated with Time 1 achievement, both 
uniquely and shared with Time 1 self-efficacy. The picture in the middle panel 
changes quite noticeably for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, with 
53% of the total variance in Time 3 achievement for this group associated with 
achievement and self-efficacy, immediately post-intervention – the greatest 
proportion of achievement variance explained for this group in any of the 
combinations presented here. Variance in Time 3 achievement associated with 
Time 2 mathematics self-efficacy was greatest for the Mathematics self-efficacy 
group, where a total 41% of the variance for Time 3 achievement was associated 
with Time 2 self-efficacy, both uniquely and in combination with Time 2 
achievement. For the Combined interventions group, the total variance in Time 3 
achievement associated with Time 2 self-efficacy was 21%, and for the Control 
group, 16%.  
The top and middle panels in Figure 6.14 show that for the Combined interventions 
and Control groups, Time 1 achievement and self-efficacy were associated with 
greater variance in Time 3 achievement than were Time 2 achievement and self-
efficacy. For the Mathematics self-efficacy group, though, the reverse was evident; 
greater variance in Time 3 achievement was associated with Time 2 than Time 1 
self-efficacy and achievement.  
In the bottom panel, results for both intervention groups are comparable, and in 
fact, all three groups show similar total proportions of Time 3 achievement 
associated with Time 2 achievement and Time 3 self-efficacy. The Control group 
shows 11% of variance in Time 3 achievement is uniquely associated with 
concurrent self-efficacy, whereas unique variance in Time 3 achievement 
associated with Time 3 self-efficacy of less than 4% was evident for each of the two 
other groups. Time 2 achievement and Time 3 self-efficacy were together 
associated with 52% of the variance in Time 3 achievement for the Combined 
interventions group, with 50% of the variance in Time 3 achievement for the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and with 47% of the variance in Time 
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3 achievement for the Control group. The total variance in Time 3 achievement 
associated with concurrent self-efficacy was fairly similar for each group: for the 
Combined interventions group, this proportion was 28%; for the Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group, 32%; and for the Control group, 26%.  
Overall, the regression analyses confirmed that students‟ mathematics self-efficacy 
is associated with significant variance in achievement, highlighting the value of 
providing teachers with specific strategies to help strengthen students‟ self-efficacy. 
The regression also illustrates the complexity of the relationship between 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement for the three groups. Most notably, 
(immediately) post-intervention self-efficacy was associated with a greater 
proportion of the variance in achievement at Times 2 and 3 for the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group than for the two other groups. One explanation for 
the different pattern indicated for the Mathematics self-efficacy group is that their 
initial low self-efficacy levels were implicitly increased at Time 2 as a result of the 
self-efficacy intervention, and that this was associated with increased achievement 
for this group at Time 2. This groups‟ increase in mean achievement at Time 2 is 
likely in turn to have contributed to students‟ self-efficacy, which was then 
associated with increases in both achievement and explicit self-efficacy at Time 3 
(see Figure 6. 1), in something of a spiral effect.  
Alignment of mathematics self-efficacy and achievement 
Because mathematics achievement items and mathematics self-efficacy items 
were both calibrated with the difficulty parameters for the achievement items, it was 
reasonable to compare students‟ scores for achievement and self-efficacy to 
identify how closely they aligned. Mean self-efficacy was higher than mean 
achievement for each treatment group at every time point. Therefore, to calculate 
the data represented in Figure 6.12, each student‟s standardised score for 
mathematics achievement was subtracted from their standardised self-efficacy 
score for each time point.  
The data suggest that students‟ self-efficacy beliefs and achievement at the end of 
the school year (Time 2) were more closely aligned than at the beginning of the 
2010 and 2011 years (Times 1 and 3), irrespective of treatment group. The 
trajectory was similar for each group over time, with time having a significant effect; 
F (2, 298) = 26.05, p < 0.001, but there was no main effect of treatment, and no 
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interaction effect; F < 1 in both cases. No significant effects of gender or year level 
were detected; F < 1 for both.  
 
Figure 6.12.   Mean differences between students’ standardised scores for mathematics self-efficacy 
and achievement (achievement subtracted from self-efficacy), by time and treatment group: Control 
group; Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group; and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence interventions group. Error bars denote standard errors of estimates. 
Given that the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group had significantly lower 
mean scores than the two other groups for both self-efficacy and achievement, it is 
interesting to note that the alignment between the two variables is very similar for 
all treatment groups. At the start of both school years encompassed by the study, 
mean mathematics self-efficacy exceeded mean achievement for the same 
problems.  
To check whether the closer match between self-efficacy and achievement at 
Time 2 might be reflective of a ceiling effect caused by using the same items at 
Time 2 that were used at Time 1, the numbers of students with maximum scores for 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement were investigated, with results 
presented in Table 6.4. Given that the Time 2 data showed a greater number of 
students were accurately judging their ability to correctly solve the 10 problems 
presented, a ceiling effect was suggested for this small number of students. It did 
not, however, account for the closer mean alignment shown in Figure 6.12.  
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Table 6.4: Students with maximum scores for mathematics self-efficacy 
Numbers (and approximate percentages) of students from the sample (n = 152) with maximum 
raw scores for mathematics self-efficacy (maximum possible score = 60) and achievement 
(maximum possible score = 10), and those with maximum scores for both these measures, by 
time. 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Mathematics self-efficacy 22 (14%) 28 (18%) 15 (10%) 
Mathematics achievement 10 (6%) 29 (19%) 5 (4%) 
Both 4 (3%) 10 (6%) 1 (1%) 
In the overall sample, mean mathematics achievement increased from Time 1 to 
Time 2 by 0.70 logits and self-efficacy increased by 0.20 logits. This shows that the 
closer alignment at Time 2 was related to an increase in mean achievement, rather 
than a decrease in mean self-efficacy. Almost the reverse occurred between Times 
2 and 3; mean mathematics achievement for the whole sample increased by 0.17 
logits, and self-efficacy increased by 0.51 logits. Time 3, like Time 1, was near the 
beginning of a school year, when students‟ judgments of their capabilities seem to 
be slightly over-optimistic, unlike their end-of-year judgments. 
The teacher data 
Teachers completed questionnaires at Times 1 and 2, to identify their self-efficacy 
for teaching mathematics, and their theory-of-intelligence. Of the original 24 
teachers, 21 completed questionnaires on both occasions. The teachers‟ total raw 
scores for theory-of-intelligence and their self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
have been treated as ordinal data, because the sample was too small to apply a 
Rasch measurement model. The minimum and maximum possible scores for self-
efficacy for teaching mathematics were 13 and 78, respectively, and for theory-of-
intelligence, 8 and 48, respectively, assuming all questions were completed. Using 
teachers‟ total scores, appropriate statistical tests were applied, including 
nonparametric alternatives to compare the results by treatment group. Although 
teachers had not been the target of the two interventions, the possibility that they 
might have altered some of their beliefs as an effect of participating in the 
interventions was examined. 
A principal components analysis with varimax rotation of the Time 1 teacher data 
extracted six factors with eigenvalues greater than one, and the scree plot showed 
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the fifth and subsequent factors bunched together and levelling off. The first four 
factors explained a total of 71% of the variance, and are shown in Table 6.5. With 
the exception of item 7, the theory-of-intelligence items loaded very strongly on 
Factor 1, indicating the factor measured by these items approached uni-
dimensionality. (Item 7 had a loading of .90 on the fifth factor, on which four self-
efficacy items had moderate loadings, making it problematic to interpret this factor 
in terms of theory.) Cronbach‟s alpha for this collection of items was also strong; 
α = .94. 
Table 6.5: Factor loadings on teacher questionnaire items 
  
Factor loadings based on the results of a principal components analysis for teacher items at 
Time 1. Items are ordered by weighting on Factor 1. Note: Factor loadings < .2 are not shown. 
 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Variance 36% 13% 13% 9% 
Theory-of-intelligence items 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you 
can‟t really do much to change it. 
.96   
 
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you 
can‟t change very much.  
.92 .21  
 
6. You can learn new things, but you can‟t really change 
your basic intelligence. 
.92   
 
3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change 
your intelligence level. 
.91   
 
4. To be honest, you can‟t really change how intelligent 
you are. 
.91 .20  
 
5. You can always substantially change how intelligent 
you are. 
.89   
 
8. You can change even your basic intelligence level 
considerably. 
.86  .21 
 
7. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can 
always change it quite a bit. 
   
 
Self-efficacy for teaching mathematics items 
20. If I really try hard in my maths teaching, I can get 
through to even the most difficult or unmotivated 
students.  
.39 .76 .30  
10. I have enough training to deal with almost any 
learning problem in maths. 
.26 .27 .20 .74 
15. Teachers are not a very powerful influence on 
students‟ maths achievement when all factors are 
considered. 
.22 .63   
13. When I really try, I can get through to most difficult 
students in maths. 
.21 .63 .21 .60 
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Items intended to measure teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics loaded 
mainly across Factors 2, 3, and 4. Factor 2 was interpreted as a belief that teachers 
influence students‟ learning, Factor 3 as students‟ learning being influenced by 
family background, and Factor 4 as a teacher‟s belief in their ability to respond to 
students‟ learning difficulties. In addition to loadings on these three factors, a 
number of loadings were evident for the self-efficacy items: a cross-loading on 
Factor 1 for item 20 (.39); loadings on Factor 5 (described above); and items 16 
and 19 loading strongly on Factor 6 (.74 and .80, respectively – the only significant 
loadings on this factor). Despite the self-efficacy items loadings across multiple 
factors, Cronbach‟s alpha values were acceptable for the self-efficacy item 
collection; α = .76.  
These factors were not both the same as the two extracted from the trial self-
efficacy data: the first, a belief that teachers influence students‟ learning, aligned 
with Factor 2 above; but the second, a belief that influences other than teachers are 
associated with students‟ learning, was broader than Factor 3 above. Factor 4 
above was not evident in the trial data. 
 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
17. If a student masters a new maths concept quickly, 
this might be because I knew the necessary steps in 
teaching that concept.  
 .81  -.21 
11. When a student is having difficulty with the maths 
work I have given them, I am usually able to adjust it to 
his/her level.  
 .25  .64 
18. If a student did not remember information I gave in a 
previous maths lesson, I would know how to increase 
his/her retention in the next lesson. 
 .38  -.82 
21. When it comes right down to it, a teacher really can't 
do much because most of a student's motivation and 
performance in maths depends on his or her home 
environment. 
  .88  
16. When the maths marks of my students improve, it is 
usually because I found more effective approaches.  
 .20   
9. The amount a student can learn in maths is primarily 
related to family background.  
  .93  
14. A teacher is very limited in what he/she can achieve 
because a student's home environment has a large 
influence on his/her maths achievement.  
  .89  
19. Even a teacher with good maths teaching abilities 
may not reach many students.  
  .23 .20 
12. When a student gets a better maths grade than 
he/she usually gets, it is usually because I found better 
ways of teaching that student.  
 .66 -.33  
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Figure 6.15.   Teachers’ (n = 21) total raw scores for self-efficacy for teaching mathematics at Times 
1 and 2 by treatment group. Groups are: Control group (Control), Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group (Maths self-efficacy), and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group (Combined). NB. Two teachers with scores (54, 49) were from the 
Maths self-efficacy and Combined groups. 
Teachers‟ total raw scores for self-efficacy for teaching mathematics are shown in 
Figure 6.15. Overall, teachers‟ Time 1 self-efficacy scores were moderately 
correlated with their Time 2 scores; r = .65, p = .002. A Kruskal-Wallis test was 
used to compare teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics in the three 
groups, and indicated that there were no statistically significant differences in the 
distribution of total scores between treatment groups.  
Treatment groups‟ medians for teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence at Times 1 and 2 are 
shown in Table 6.6. A Kruskal-Wallis test compared the medians and distributions 
of teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence total scores, and detected no statistically 
significant differences between treatment groups. At the conclusion of the 
combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence intervention, there 
was no evidence of significant changes in teachers‟ beliefs, or differences between 
treatment groups.  
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Table 6.6: Teachers’ Time 1 and Time 2 theory-of-intelligence median by treatment 
group 
Treatment group 
(n) 
Time 1 theory-of-
intelligence median 
Time 2 theory-of-
intelligence median 
Control group 
(6) 
34.0 31.5 
Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group 
(8) 
36.0 37.0 
Combined interventions group 
(7) 
27.5 33.0 
Correlations between teacher measures by treatment group 
Correlations between teachers‟ total scores for self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence were analysed by treatment group, and the small number of significant 
correlations that were identified are reported here, using Spearman‟s correlation 
coefficient. For teachers in the Combined interventions group, there were 
significant correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 total scores for self-efficacy for 
teaching mathematics (r = .78), and between Time 2 self-efficacy for teaching 
mathematics and Time 2 theory-of-intelligence (r = .87).  
Time 1 and Time 2 total scores for theory-of-intelligence were strongly correlated 
for teachers in each group; the Combined interventions group (r = .86); the Control 
group (r = .83); and the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (r = .97), 
where the correlation was especially strong, indicating these teachers‟ theory-of-
intelligence responses were almost the same on both occasions. 
Associations between teacher and student data 
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s theory-of-intelligence and their 
students’ theory-of-intelligence? 
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
and their students’ mathematics self-efficacy? 
To test hypothesised relationships between teacher and student data, the ordinal 
and continuous data (respectively) were compared, with findings reported using 
Spearman‟s rank correlation coefficients in Table 6.7.  
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Table 6.7: Correlations between student and teacher variables 
Spearman‟s rank correlations between teacher (n = 21) and student (n = 152) measures for 
Year 4 and 5 students by treatment group. Groups are: Control group (top), Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention group (middle), and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group (bottom). Note: p < .05 for all correlations shown; non-significant 
correlations are omitted. 
 
 Teachers‟ self-efficacy Teachers‟ theory-of-
intelligence 
  Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Students‟ 
mathematics self-
efficacy 
Time 1 
.30 
 
-.45 
 
-.32 
 
-.53 
-.40 
 
Time 2 
   
 
-.47 
 
 
-.27 
Time 3 
   
 
-.40 
 
Students‟ theory-of-
intelligence 
 
Time 1 
 
-.36 
-.33 
 
 
-.28 
 
 
 
Time 2 
 -.33 
 
 
 
.35 
 
 
.34 
 
Time 3 
   
 
-.34 
 
Students‟ 
mathematics 
achievement 
 
Time 1 
   
 
-.36 
 
Time 2 
   
 
-.51 
 
 
-.34 
Time 3 
   
.36 
 
 
.35 
 
Teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics had fewer significant correlations 
with student outcomes in all groups than teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence. What 
stood out was that the correlations between teachers‟ and students‟ measures for 
the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions 
group were generally negative, with all of these that involved teachers‟ theory-of-
intelligence negatively associated with the student measures. In particular, 
moderate negative correlations between the Time 1 theory-of-intelligence for 
teachers in this group and students‟ self-efficacy on all three occasions were 
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evident; r = -.53, -.47, and -.40, respectively, all p < .001. In this group, teachers‟ 
Time 1 theory-of-intelligence was a moderate, negative predictor of students‟ 
achievement towards the end of the school year at Time 2; r = -.51, p < .001. This 
indicates that teachers‟ having a strongly incremental theory-of-intelligence was not 
systematically associated with students having a high theory-of-intelligence, 
mathematics self-efficacy, or achievement scores. 
In the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, there were no significant 
correlations involving teachers‟ self-efficacy. For this group, teachers‟ Time 1 
theory-of-intelligence was a moderate positive predictor of students‟ theory-of-
intelligence at Time 2; r = .35, p = .03, and students‟ Time 3 achievement; r = .36, 
p = .02. Teachers‟ Time 2 theory-of-intelligence also correlated with students‟ 
theory-of-intelligence for the same time; r = .34, p = .03, and was a moderate 
predictor of students‟ Time 3 achievement; r = .35, p = .03.  
For the Control group, the picture was different again. The strongest correlations 
were between students‟ Time 1 mathematics self-efficacy measures, and the Time 
2 teacher measures, both of which were negative; r = -.45, p = .01 for teachers‟ 
self-efficacy, and r = -.40, p = .01 for teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence.  
The most significant correlations identified here between teachers‟ theory-of-
intelligence and student outcomes were in the Combined interventions group, and 
were consistently negative. This did not support the hypothesised correlation 
between teachers‟ and students‟ theory-of-intelligence, which had been predicted to 
strengthen at Time 2. The lack of significant correlations between teachers‟ self-
efficacy for teaching mathematics and their students‟ mathematics self-efficacy also 
did not support the hypothesised connection between these constructs.  
The nature of theory-of-intelligence 
 What is the nature of students’ and teachers’ theory-of-intelligence? 
The data in Figure 6.16 illustrate that students‟ standardised scores for theory-of-
intelligence did not form a dichotomy, and that although there appeared to be a 
continuum of scores at each of Times 1 and 2, the students‟ scores at these time 
points were not significantly correlated (see Table 6.3 for details of correlations). 
Even though some students scored the maximum possible, Figure 6.16 illustrates 
that students held a wide range of beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. 
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Fewer students had extremely low scores than had extremely high scores, 
suggesting that strong entity theorists were fewer than strong incremental theorists.  
This was further investigated in student interviews, the findings from which are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 6.16.   All Year 4 and 5 students’ (n = 152) theory-of-intelligence standardised scores at 
Times 1 and 2.  
Teachers‟ total raw scores for theory-of-intelligence are shown in Figure 6.17, and 
indicate that few teachers had substantially changed their beliefs when they were 
re-assessed at Time 2. Much less change from Time 1 to Time 2 scores was 
evident for teachers than was indicated for students. Their pre-intervention total 
scores ranged from 16 to 47 (for a teacher who responded to all items, the 
minimum possible score was 8, and the maximum possible score 48), and their 
post-intervention scores from 14 to 48. As Figure 6.17 illustrates, teachers‟ theory-
of-intelligence scores seemed to be spread along a continuum rather than forming 
distinct clusters at either end of the scale, whereas if a dichotomous construct were 
being measured, the latter would be expected. Raw scores for Times 1 and 2 were 
strongly correlated, as decribed in the section, Correlations between teacher 
measures by treatment group.  
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Figure 6.17.   Teachers’ (n = 21) theory-of-intelligence total raw scores at Time 1 and Time 2. Groups 
are Control group, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, and Combined mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. Total scores for two teachers from the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group are represented at (33, 32).  
Chapter summary 
This analysis of the quantitative data indicated that the study‟s hypotheses relating 
to theory-of-intelligence were generally not supported. No significant effects of an 
intervention that focussed on developing students‟ incremental theory-of-
intelligence were evident for students in the Combined interventions group, whose 
mean theory-of-intelligence was not significantly higher than those of the two other 
groups. The hypothesis that Year 4 students would indicate a stronger incremental 
theory-of-intelligence than Year 5 students was not convincingly supported, with a 
tendency towards this shown only in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group. Across the three treatment groups, there was no consistent evidence to 
support the hypothesised gender difference in theory-of-intelligence. Neither was 
there evidence that students‟ theory-of-intelligence scores represented a 
dichotomy. The continuum of Time 1 scores was not significantly correlated with 
the continuum of Time 2 scores, suggesting the instrument might not have been a 
valid and reliable measure of students‟ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. 
Teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence beliefs, on the other hand, appeared to form a 
continuum, and strong correlations between their Time 1 and Time 2 scores were 
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evident. Almost no students had extremely low theory-of-intelligence scores that 
would be indicative of a strong entity belief; this was further investigated in the 
student interviews, reported in the following chapter. There were few significant 
correlations between students‟ mean theory-of-intelligence and mathematics self-
efficacy or achievement. 
In contrast to the theory-of-intelligence data, the mathematics self-efficacy data 
supported most of the related hypotheses involving mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement. The most distinct increases in mean mathematics self-efficacy and 
achievement were shown in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, 
suggesting a positive effect for these students of the mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention. Within treatment groups, no significant effects of gender were 
indicated for self-efficacy. The hypothesis that Year 4 students would show 
stronger mathematics self-efficacy than Year 5 students was not supported by the 
data. On the contrary, in the Combined interventions group, Year 5 students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy was significantly higher than that of Year 4 students, on 
all three occasions.  
There was evidence to support the hypothesised correlation between mathematics 
self-efficacy and achievement. A regression anaylsis confirmed that students‟ self-
efficacy is associated with significant variance in mathematics achievement. As 
anticipated, Year 5 students had greater mean achievement scores than Year 4 
students. 
The hypothesised positive associations between teachers‟ beliefs and student 
measures were not supported by the data. In the Combined interventions group, 
significant moderate negative correlations were identified between teachers‟ theory-
of-intelligence and students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and achievement. A 
significant moderate correlation was evident between teachers‟ self-efficacy for 
teaching mathematics at Times 1 and 2. Their theory-of-intelligence scores at on 
both occasions were strongly correlated, consistent with previous findings (Ball, 
1996; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Lortie, 1975) that teachers‟ beliefs are difficult to 
change.   
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CHAPTER 7 
Students and Teachers Talk about  
Mathematics Self-Efficacy and Intelligence 
The interviewees 
Students and teachers were interviewed on two occasions to gain an 
understanding of their ideas about mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence, and to determine the degree to which this information supported the 
questionnaire data. The sample of students who were interviewed was designed to 
provide opportunities for contrasting those with low and high levels of mathematics 
self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence, as is shown by the breakdown in Table 7.1. 
Unlike the between-treatment comparisons made with the quantitative data, the 
comparisons drawn in this chapter are more often between, for example, the 
groups of students with low self-efficacy and high self-efficacy scores in their Time 
1 questionnaires, irrespective of their treatment groups. 
Table 7.1: Student interviewees at Times 1 and 2 by mathematics self-efficacy and 
theory-of-intelligence levels 
Student interviewees were identified from students‟ Time 1 questionnaire results. To be 
categorised as “low mathematics self-efficacy” (or theory-of-intelligence), a student had a logit 
score in the lowest one-third of scores for their year level, and to be categorised as “high 
mathematics self-efficacy” (or theory-of-intelligence), a student‟s score was in the highest one-
third.  
 Low theory-of-intelligence High theory-of-intelligence 
Low maths self-efficacy 11 11 
High maths self-efficacy 12 12 
Although the original intention had been to select students for the first interview on 
the basis of having extreme scores in their Time 1 questionnaire data, their total 
raw scores for mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence were not spread 
as widely as had been anticipated. It was straightforward to identify students with 
high scores in both, but combinations involving very low scores were not so 
numerous. A cluster analysis identified two clusters located in the top and bottom 
thirds of the data, one with mean logits scores of .51 for mathematics self-efficacy 
and 1.48 for theory-of-intelligence, and the other with mean scores of -.51 and  
-1.13, respectively. The selection criteria were modified, therefore, to include a 
balance of students whose total scores were amongst the lowest – and highest – 
one-third of all scores for mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence. 
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The sample was also designed to have similar representation from Years 4 and 5, 
and from each treatment group, as is shown in Table 7.2. Boys and girls were 
equally represented in the Year 4 students. There were few Year 5 boys with 
extremely low or high scores in the Combined interventions group, and when two 
boys were absent for their first interviews, substitutes – who had similar scores and 
were also available for interviews – could not be identified. The result was that Year 
5 boys had the smallest total number of interviewees at both interviews. 
Table 7.2: Student interviewees by year level, gender, and treatment group 
Student interviewees at Times 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) by year level, gender, and 
treatment group. Note: “Combined interventions group” is the Combined mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. 
Treatment group 
Year 4 Year 5 Totals 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Control group 3 (3) 4 (4) 3 (3) 4 (3) 6 (6) 8 (7) 
Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group 
4 (2) 4 (4) 4 (3) 4 (4) 8 (5) 8 (8) 
Combined interventions 
group 
5 (5) 4 (4) 2 (1) 5 (5) 7 (6) 9 (9) 
Totals 12 (10) 12 (12) 9 (7) 13 (12) 21 (17) 25 (24) 
Fifteen teachers from the two intervention groups were interviewed at Time 1 and 
again at Time 2. Eight teachers were from the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group (identified later as teachers A to H), and seven from the 
Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group 
(teachers J to P). 
Describing students’ mathematics self-efficacy beliefs 
Researcher: And why did you think that you could answer most of the 
questions I showed you? 
Student: Well, that‟s because most of them were easy, and I‟m very 
smart for my age. (Year 5 girl, high self-efficacy score) 
Students like this one, who were selected for interview because they showed high 
mathematics self-efficacy (n = 24), were generally able to explain why they made 
these judgments in relation to the mathematics problems they were shown, as were 
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students who were interviewed due to their reported low self-efficacy (n = 22). The 
reasons students gave for their self-efficacy at both interviews are summarised in 
Table 7.3.  
Table 7.3: Students’ reasons for their mathematics self-efficacy judgments 
Summary of students‟ Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) interview responses when 
asked why their mathematics self-efficacy seemed to be low or high, according to their 
questionnaire responses, by self-efficacy levels in Time 1 questionnaire. A number of students‟ 
responses fell into more than one category. At Time 2, 20 students with low and 21 with high 
self-efficacy were re-interviewed. 
Reasons given by students 
for their self-efficacy  level 
Low mathematics  
self-efficacy 
n = 22 
High mathematics  
self-efficacy 
n = 24 
Difficulty of tasks 9 (3) 2 (1) 
Easiness of tasks 1 (5) 10 (12) 
Mathematics knowledge, 
ability 
6 (8) 6 (12) 
Confidence to attempt 
problems 
4 (1) 3 (1) 
Familiarity of problems 0 (1) 4 (0) 
Other 2 (0) 1 (0) 
Don't know 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Students were asked to confirm my interpretation of their questionnaire responses as 
indicating that they had thought they could solve either very few, most, or all of the 
problems they were shown. They consistently agreed that their mathematics self-
efficacy level had been accurately interpreted. At Time 1, students‟ explanations that 
expressed their perceptions of the easiness or difficulty of the mathematics problems 
were largely aligned with their high or low mathematics self-efficacy, respectively. 
The most frequent explanation from students with low mathematics self-efficacy 
(n = 9) was that the problems were difficult for them. For example, one girl explained 
that “Some of them were very hard, quite big numbers and quite complicated”  
(Year 5 girl, low self-efficacy score). In contrast, 10 students whose questionnaire 
responses indicated high mathematics self-efficacy (n = 10) described the problems 
as easy. A typical explanation was “Coz I knew most of them and they were so easy 
that I could figure them out quickly in my mind, with no hands” (Year 4 girl, high self-
efficacy score). Students‟ perceptions of task difficulty were generally – and not 
surprisingly – associated with their mathematics self-efficacy levels. 
176 
 
The 12 students‟ Time 1 comments that were classified as relating to their 
mathematics knowledge or ability included expressions of negative perceptions by 
four students with low self-efficacy, including: “Because I‟m not good at maths” 
(Year 5 girl, low self-efficacy score). Seven other students expressed a belief that 
they had the mathematics knowledge needed to solve the problems, such as the 
student who explained: “Coz I know how to work out the questions” (Year 4 boy, 
high self-efficacy score). One of these students claimed that he found it helpful to 
know about his stage on the Number Framework, information which was shared by 
his teacher with each student. He said that “I know what stage on the ladder I am 
and that sort of helps. On the ladder there‟s a stage … and since I‟m up to six I‟m 
up to the times table and division stuff” (Year 5 boy, high self-efficacy score). In 
contrast, the remaining student who made a comment that was included in this 
category was unsure of his ability in mathematics: “I‟m not sure if I‟m really good at 
maths or a bit good at maths” (Year 4 boy, low self-efficacy score).  
Two students‟ responses in the same category also suggested a link between a 
student‟s mathematics self-efficacy and their perception of their ranking within the 
class for mathematics. One girl explained that her self-efficacy score had been low 
“Because I was in the low group then, I wasn‟t really good at maths, I‟m not quite so 
good at it” (Year 4 girl, low self-efficacy score). On the other hand, another said that 
the reason her self-efficacy score had been high was “Coz I‟m higher, and a lot 
good at maths, I‟m better than other kids my age” (Year 5 girl, high self-efficacy 
score). These two students seemed to have a clear picture in their own minds of 
their mathematics skills in relation to those of their classmates, which may have 
been associated with their mathematics self-efficacy levels. 
Confidence and a willingness to attempt mathematics problems were reasons given 
by seven students for their self-efficacy levels. Three students mentioned 
confidence in their explanations, and four described a positive attitude towards 
trying to solve what might not appear to be easy questions. One girl, for example, 
explained that “If I just try them, I might realise I can actually do them, even though 
I don‟t know the answer” (Year 5 girl, high self-efficacy score). Like this student‟s 
comment, some of these responses included suggestions of doubt that the 
students would successfully solve the problems, which was perhaps symptomatic  
of the students‟ mathematics self-efficacy levels being slightly in advance of their 
ability to actually solve some of the problems with which they were presented. 
Alternatively, students might have responded this way because they had not yet 
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attempted to solve the problems, so were unwilling to express certainty that they 
could.  
None of the four students listed in Table 7.3 as indicating they were familiar with 
the problems they were shown, was from a class that had done the achievement 
test prior to the first questionnaire, although students had completed the test by the 
time they were interviewed. Their comments that they thought the problems they 
were shown were easy because they had already seen them, might have referred 
to having previously encountered the same problem types rather than those 
specific problems. 
Three students expressed other reasons for their reported mathematics self-
efficacy. Two of these related to students needing more time than they were given 
to think about their ability to solve the problems presented, as described here: 
Student: It‟s just that I take a lot of time thinking, coz it‟s easy to get 
things wrong if I don‟t really think about it. 
Researcher: So are you telling me then, that because I only showed 
them to you for a few seconds, you didn‟t have enough time to tell if you 
could solve them? 
Student: Yeah. I didn‟t actually see if I could answer them … to actually 
think of the strategies. (Year 4 girl, low self-efficacy score) 
The third student explained that “There were no wrong answers, it was our 
opinion”, to account for his self-efficacy responses (Year 5 boy, high self-efficacy 
score). 
Table 7.3 also includes students‟ reasons for their mathematics self-efficacy 
responses in the Time 2 questionnaire, explained in their second interviews. 
Compared to students‟ Time 1 responses, fewer students with low mathematics 
self-efficacy talked about the mathematics problems being difficult (3 at Time 2 
compared to 9 at Time 1), and more students commented that the problems were 
easy (17 compared to 11). This increase in students‟ perceptions that problems 
were easy probably reflects the increase in mean achievement at Time 2 that was 
evident for students in all groups (see Figure 6.1), coupled with the correlation 
identified between achievement and mathematics self-efficacy (see Table 6.6).  
Twenty students‟ explanations of their mathematics self-efficacy included a 
reference to their perceptions of their mathematics knowledge or ability, and 17 
of these were positively expressed, compared to seven in the first interviews. 
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For instance, students‟ Time 2 explanations for their self-efficacy responses in their 
second questionnaire reflected their awareness of increases in their mathematics 
knowledge since Time 1: “Coz probably I know lots more addition and subtraction, 
and if it was division and multiplication, I already know my tables, so that would 
make it easier” (Year 5 boy, high self-efficacy score). Another responded that “just 
the other day we learnt how to do a method about making the littlest one a tidy 
number, and then I didn‟t really know it, so I think that might have been trickier” 
(Year 4 girl, low self-efficacy score). At Time 1, six students in each of the low and 
high mathematics self-efficacy score groups expressed reasons that fell into the 
mathematics knowledge or ability category. At Time 2, the number of students who 
made this type of response increased more for those with high mathematics self-
efficacy scores at Time 1 (n = 12), than for those with low scores (n = 8). 
At the Time 2 interviews, a question about changes in students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy levels was included. When nine students who had reported low 
mathematics self-efficacy at Time 1 were asked about an increase in mathematics 
self-efficacy indicated by their Time 2 questionnaire data, six students explained 
that their increases were associated with having learnt more mathematics since 
Time 1. This student explained that she thought her mathematics self-efficacy had 
changed from very low to very high because “In between term two the teacher got a 
bit harder at maths, so I thought I‟d learnt more, so I could get them much easier” 
(Year 4 girl, low self-efficacy score). 
Four student interviewees had reported high Time 1 self-efficacy followed by a 
decrease in self-efficacy at Time 2, and three either responded that they did not 
know why they reported being less sure of their ability to solve the problems, or 
gave what were very uncertain answers, judging by their intonation. The fourth 
student, whose Time 2 mathematics self-efficacy score was lower than Time 1, 
explained this was “Maybe coz I‟m struggling in my basic facts lately, coz I‟m not 
getting higher than at least thirty [out of fifty questions in a regular basic facts test], 
so I need to improve” (Year 5 boy, high mathematics self-efficacy score). The 
quantitative data for these students showed that for the three Year 5 students, their 
mathematics self-efficacy scores were all higher than their achievement at Time 1, 
and at Time 2, their self-efficacy and achievement scores were almost aligned,  
similar to the overall trend shown in Figure 6.9. In contrast, for the Year 4 student, 
the gap between his two scores had increased at Time 2, with mathematics self-
efficacy 2.72 logits lower than achievement due to a big drop in self-efficacy since 
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Time 1. This otherwise-confident student – the only Year 4 student in this group – 
somewhat hesitantly offered this explanation for his drop in self-efficacy: “Coz I 
didn‟t really know the answer back then?” (Year 4 boy, low self-efficacy score). The 
reasons underlying the decreases in reported mathematics self-efficacy may vary 
for these students, but it seems possible that the Year 4 boy did not understand 
what was being asked of him in the questionnaire. The Year 5 students, on the 
other hand, may have begun the year with levels of self-efficacy that exceeded their 
actual achievement, and during the year their beliefs in their mathematics ability 
may have become more closely aligned with their achievement as a consequence 
of a growing awareness of assessment information. 
To summarise the students‟ perspective, their explanations of their mathematics 
self-efficacy were consistent with their questionnaire responses. In the Time 2 
interviews, towards the end of the school year, a number of students‟ comments 
reflected an awareness of the progress they had made in their mathematics 
learning since the Time 1 data were collected, making them more sure of their 
ability to solve the problems they were shown for the second time, with more 
students than at Time 1 reporting that they found the problems easy. This agreed 
with the correlation between mathematics self-efficacy and achievement, and the 
increase in the latter, evident in the quantitative data. Some students‟ apparent 
awareness of the progress they had made in their mathematics learning over the 7 
months between interviews may also have contributed to the closer alignment of 
their mathematics self-efficacy and achievement indicated in the quantitative 
analysis (see Figure 6.9). 
Before the intervention meetings got underway, teachers were asked about the 
factors they thought contributed to students‟ self-beliefs about their mathematics 
abilities, and which of these factors they could influence. The factor mentioned 
most frequently by teachers (n = 12) was the influence of parents or family, which 
teachers said they tried to influence through various forms of parent education or 
home-school partnership programmes. The influence of peers, identified as a factor 
by nine teachers, was a consideration when they established ground-rules with 
students for their classroom culture. Students‟ past achievement was mentioned by 
nine teachers as a factor that could contribute to students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy, and several talked about the importance of ensuring students were 
successful in mathematics. Another factor that teachers thought influenced 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy was students knowing which mathematics 
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group they are in (n = 3). What was perhaps most surprising though, was that just 
five teachers suggested that a student‟s school or teacher were factors in shaping 
their mathematics self-efficacy. Perhaps this was because the remaining teachers 
thought this was self-evident. No teacher explicitly mentioned a student‟s emotions 
as a factor that might influence their mathematics self-efficacy, although these were 
perhaps alluded to when they talked about the effect of grouping, and 
developmental considerations were not raised. 
Participants’ experiences of the mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention 
I was always confident that I could solve things, and I just had to work it 
out, coz if I didn‟t believe that I could do it, then it would‟ve been a lot 
harder, coz it‟s all about attitude. (Year 5 boy, high self-efficacy score) 
It‟s like anything – if you think you can do it, you can do it. It‟s not just 
maths, it‟s everything. (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
teacher A) 
The mathematics self-efficacy intervention aimed to give teachers strategies for 
developing their students‟ mathematics self-efficacy – to build a “can do” attitude to 
mathematics, like those expressed by the student and teacher above. 
Using similar peers as models 
As one strategy to help build students‟ belief in their mathematics abilities, 
intervention group teachers were encouraged to use similar peers as models. 
During the intervention meetings teachers discussed situations in which they 
already did this, and what might be potential difficulties for increasing peer 
modelling, particularly involving less able students. Teachers‟ comments described 
here tended to focus on the involvement of students as models, while students 
talked about the effects of observing their peers modelling or explaining their 
mathematical thinking.  
Six teachers set themselves goals related to including or increasing peer modelling 
during mathematics lessons, and the comments they later made about this tended 
to include increased participation and engagement, particularly from students 
working at lower levels. One teacher reflected that she had initially had to spend 
time teaching appropriate language to students of lower ability, who had until then 
had fewer opportunities to share their thinking with the class than the more able 
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mathematicians. Her observation of the effect of the similar peer modelling strategy 
was that “This particular group of children who do find maths a challenge have just 
loved being the „teacher‟ and sharing their strategies. It‟s definitely boosted their 
confidence” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher B). Another 
teacher said that “Students who are usually passive are more engaged – it‟s also 
easier for me to be sure they have picked up a particular strategy” (Combined 
interventions group teacher ). Including the students working at lower levels in peer 
modelling had had a very positive effect in another class, according to a teacher 
who reported that “People like [a Year 4 girl] has made huge improvements just 
because she has better self-efficacy now” and that “it‟s the Year 4 girls … they 
know now and they ask, can they stand up at the end of maths and share 
something they‟ve learnt, or can they teach the class something about fractions?” 
(Combined interventions group teacher K). These teachers‟ comments reflected the 
positive effects on students of taking the role of peer model. However, not all 
students liked being included in peer modelling. One boy described the strategy he 
used to avoid being asked to explain his mathematics thinking to the class: 
Student: I don‟t want to say it. I don‟t put my hand up, and I always look 
like I‟m paying attention so he doesn‟t pick me, and I don‟t want to 
answer the questions. 
Researcher: So you don‟t like talking in front of the whole class? 
Student: No. I like doing it with twos, we ask each other. (Year 5 boy, 
Control group) 
When students were asked about their experiences of peer modelling from the 
audience‟s point of view, several said that hearing an explanation from a student 
who was more advanced in mathematics than they were was beneficial to their 
learning. One student said that she preferred to listen to an explanation from 
“Probably someone higher, coz then they can tell me things that I don‟t really know” 
(Year 5 girl, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group). When the same student 
was then asked about the effect of peer modelling from a student who was at a 
similar mathematics level to her, she responded: “Well, if I did a bit bad at it, I 
usually get it, if they explain it well” (Year 5 girl, Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group). 
Others commented on the positive effect of having another student at the same 
mathematics level explain how they solved a problem. One student said that this 
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would make him feel “Really confident, because if someone at my level of maths 
helps me to figure out the question, it‟ll be easier” (Year 4 boy, Combined 
interventions group). Another student who saw benefits in similar peers modelling 
how they solved a problem commented that “It‟s good, coz then I get to see their 
opinion and how they worked it out” (Year 5 girl, Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group). 
Students who were less able in mathematics were also chosen to explain their 
thinking, according to one student, “Because some might not be that bright, but he 
chooses them too because they‟ve done the right things” (Year 4 girl, low 
mathematics self-efficacy). Students did not specifically talk about the effects on 
their own learning of less able students being peer models, but seemed to value 
everyone being included, “Because we‟re all in different groups and we learn 
different things” (Year 5 girl, high mathematics self-efficacy score). 
One student, though, was sensitive to students who were similar to her in 
mathematics level but younger than her, being invited by the teacher to explain 
strategies that she had been unable to apply. She said: “It feels OK, but if they get 
it right and then I didn‟t know, it makes me feel a bit weird coz some of them are 
younger than me” (Year 4 girl, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group). So 
although students might be similar in one regard, a student‟s perception of 
dissimilarities can also influence their experience of a “similar peer” modelling 
strategy.  
Students gave a mixture of reasons they thought their teachers might use peer 
modelling, ranging from behaviour management to being inclusive to monitoring 
students‟ learning. A summary of their ideas at Time 2 is shown in Table 7.4. The 
highest frequency of comments for each group was for those coded as being 
related to inclusive learning, with students in the Combined interventions group 
mentioning this the most often (n = 12). Students seemed to be aware that their 
classes comprised a range of ability levels, and many appeared to appreciate that 
there might be social as well as academic reasons for including all students in 
sharing their mathematics thinking with the rest of the group or the class. One girl 
explained that her teacher used peer modelling “So she can give the people who 
aren‟t so good at it a chance to say what they think the answer is” (Year 5 girl, 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group). Similarly, a boy thought that 
“Otherwise it‟d be unfair, and the ones that aren‟t smartest won‟t learn much, just 
being told what it is … it just helps, so that not only the people who are good at 
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maths get better at maths” (Year 4 boy, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group). Students seemed to value their teachers including students of various 
abilities in sharing their solutions and ideas during mathematics lessons. 
Table 7.4: Students’ reasons for teachers’ use of peer modelling 
Summary of students‟ reasons for teachers‟ use of peer modelling during whole-class 
components of mathematics lessons, at Time 2 interviews, by treatment group. Several 
students‟ responses fell into more than one category. Note: “Combined interventions group” is 
the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. 
Reasons suggested by 
students 
Control group 
n = 13 
Maths self-
efficacy group 
n = 13 
Combined 
interventions 
group 
n = 15 
Inclusive learning 7 10 12 
Monitoring students‟ learning 3 2 4 
Behaviour management 3 1 0 
Other 3 0 1 
Don‟t know 1 1 0 
Students also suggested there were circumstances in which teachers needed to 
deliberately call on the more able mathematicians in the class. One such 
circumstance was “When she asks someone that can‟t figure it out, she asks 
someone who‟s smarter” (Year 4 boy, Combined interventions group). Another was 
“when they‟re the questions from that person‟s group and only the ultra-smart 
people put up their hands” (Year 5 boy, Combined interventions group). 
Sometimes teachers asked students for their ideas as a behaviour management 
strategy, according to four students. One girl explained that “Sometimes she picks 
on them coz they‟ve either been talking on the mat, or just to see if they really know 
what they‟re doing” (Year 5 girl, Control group). Another student may have been 
speaking from experience when, after a considerable pause, he said his teacher 
sometimes directs a question to a particular student “To, um, to wake them up” 
(Year 5 boy, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group). 
Peer modelling was generally appreciated by students as supporting their learning, 
as well as their sense of fairness and inclusion. Students appeared to find it more 
helpful to have a similar peer, or one who was more advanced than them, to model 
their solutions to a mathematics problem, rather than a student who was at a lower 
mathematics level than they were. They seemed to value having a classroom 
184 
 
culture, though, in which all students were expected to share their thinking. 
Teachers‟ comments indicated that some students who had been struggling with 
mathematics had become more engaged due to the increased use of peer 
modelling. 
Increasing the use of descriptive teacher-student feedback 
Another focus for teachers in the mathematics self-efficacy intervention was to use 
more descriptive teacher-student feedback and less evaluative feedback, using 
Tunstall and Gipps‟ (1996a) typology (see Figure 4.1) as a guide. Five teachers‟ 
answers to interview questions about how their practice had changed as a result of 
this intervention highlighted using teacher-student feedback for teaching rather than 
for praising alone, and using descriptive feedback more often, making responses 
such as: “My feedback is more specific, that‟s probably been the thing I‟ve worked 
on the most … it‟s teaching more than just praising, even though they need both. 
Praise then teach” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher C). 
Another explained that she would “Try and make sure that the feedback I give them 
is in relation to the work that we‟re doing, and try and draw their attention to the 
skills that they are developing” (Combined interventions group teacher M). Finally, 
one teacher described the change he had made in terms of Tunstall and Gipps‟ 
(1996a) categories of feedback, saying that “It‟s definitely gone more towards the 
descriptive feedback than the evaluative ... the approving and disapproving part of 
evaluative are very easy to do, and that‟s really surface level sort of stuff” 
(Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher E). Although he was aware of 
the purposeful nature of the feedback he was aiming to give students, one of the 
practical challenges was to do this with every student. As he said, “my small groups 
tend to be eight or nine, but to touch base with each kid and try and give descriptive 
feedback is rough” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher E). Issues 
like this were discussed at a later intervention group meeting, with suggestions 
made by other teachers for ways to manage giving descriptive feedback about their 
mathematics learning, for instance, to initially plan to give descriptive feedback to 
each student once over the course of a week until this becomes part of a teacher‟s 
everyday practice.  
At Time 2, interview responses from teachers in the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group suggested they had made greater changes to their feedback 
practices than teachers in the Combined interventions group, although the reason 
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for this is unclear. For several teachers in the former group, applying this to 
mathematics lessons was something they were still developing. One teacher, for 
example, reported that “I tend to use success criteria more in my topic work, I 
always use learning intentions throughout, but I‟ve started using a lot more success 
criteria in maths” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher C). As a 
colleague explained, “This is just something that we‟ve started doing, so we‟re at the 
beginning of a process” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher D). 
The focus on feedback prompted several teachers to raise their expectations of 
students‟ learning. This teacher described the effect of changes she had made to 
her interactions with students:  
I think it‟s galvanised a few things for me, in that one of the particular 
strategies I applied I did quite rigorously, and quite, I guess you could 
say, ruthlessly. If you were in the room, and there were the tears, we just 
kept working through the problem until the smiles came because they‟d 
done it, and that was highly successful in building capacity to think, I can 
do, rather than seeing the tears and thinking, back up the bus, and we‟ll 
stop there. So, working through that, “I can‟t” and … structuring the 
questions but keeping the pressure on till you get to a place where, “I 
can, I can”. … It really was effective, and I think it was effective for those 
watching as well as those doing. … They don‟t melt so much, and the 
kids are prepared to keep at it a bit more. (Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group teacher B) 
Rather than pulling back when her students signalled that something was difficult, this 
teacher had made a conscious decision to press on, and found that helping students to 
work through their difficulty had been empowering for them. As she said, “Being kind, 
but putting the pressure on as well” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
teacher B) was beneficial to her students‟ learning. Another teacher commented that 
he also felt he was “a bit more challenging now” and that his recent expectation that 
students need to demonstrate they understood what they have been working on 
before leaving him to work independently, was “quite uncomfortable for them, and 
maybe that‟s part of being honest, that you are going to feel uncomfortable” 
(Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher D). Some teachers had begun to 
make changes to the ways in which they gave students feedback about their learning 
in mathematics, and for some this also included changing their ways of interacting with 
students, and increasing their expectations for students‟ learning and engagement 
during mathematics. While this involved changes for teachers, there were also 
adjustments to be made by their students.Students were also asked about teacher-
student feedback during mathematics, including the feedback that they found the most 
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helpful for their learning. Knowing their next learning step was highlighted by three 
students as supporting their learning, as this student explained: “The most helpful is 
when he says this is your next step because it‟s like expanding your learning” (Year 5 
boy, Combined interventions group). In addition to next learning steps, four students 
highlighted the value they perceived in their teachers explaining exactly why their 
strategies did not solve the problem. This student commented that this helped her 
learning “because you know what you can actually improve on and you know that you 
can improve on something and you know what you need to learn next” (Year 5 girl, 
Combined interventions group). 
When asked directly if their teachers regularly told them about their next learning 
steps, most students confirmed that their teachers did this either regularly or 
sometimes. This student‟s teacher shared learning intentions and success criteria with 
students: 
Student: Yeah, yeah, she does that in every subject. 
Researcher: And does she tell you how you‟re going to get there, what 
you need to do to get there? 
Student: I think sometimes she goes, like, this is how you‟ll know when 
you got there, and all that. (Year 4 girl, Combined interventions group) 
One student explained that his teacher had told him that his next learning step was 
to learn the six and nine times tables so that he would have instant recall of them, 
“Coz I use different strategies to work out the answers, instead of just telling him 
the answers” (Year 5 boy, Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group).  
When describing the feedback their teachers gave them, though, few students said 
that their teachers gave them descriptive feedback about exactly what it was they 
had done well, or not so well. This response was fairly representative of the 
students‟ perspectives: 
Student: He would probably say that we would have to try a bit harder 
sometimes, but when we get it nailed he says you‟re doing a great job, 
you could probably go and work off the maths wall or go and work on the 
maths box games. 
Researcher: And when you‟ve done it well, does he tell you exactly what 
you‟ve done well? 
Student: No, he just says we‟ve done it well. (Year 4 girl, Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group) 
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Although teachers in the intervention groups tended to report that they were using 
more descriptive teacher-student feedback during mathematics, this was not so 
evident in students‟ interview responses. This might be related to the challenge one 
teacher mentioned of giving detailed feedback to individual students in terms of the 
learning intentions and next learning steps. Several students said that having their 
next learning steps described to them by their teachers, along with how students 
would know they have achieved these steps, was helpful for their learning. 
Providing students with coping strategies 
Another strategy that was presented in the intervention meetings was to model 
coping strategies for students so that they knew appropriate ways to respond when 
learning was difficult for them. One teacher described the effect this had had on her 
students, saying that “if you‟ve got a group on the floor and they‟re using their 
scrapbooks, they‟ll just chuckle now, and say, oh, I know that‟s wrong, I should‟ve 
done such-and-such, they‟re very relaxed about making mistakes and that‟s about 
me role-playing” (Combined interventions group teacher K). Mathematics 
intervention group teacher B, who was quoted earlier describing how she had 
insisted that a student work through their difficulties until they achieved success, 
also helped this student cope by maintaining a focus on the mathematics problem 
and largely ignoring the student‟s emotional reaction. Several teachers described 
students becoming more accepting that learning is often challenging, and that 
mistakes are a valuable part of the learning process. An awareness that teachers 
needed to carefully judge the degree of challenge for individual students was 
voiced by one teacher who said that her students “understand that I wouldn‟t ask 
them to do something they couldn‟t do, by applying themselves” (Combined 
interventions teacher P). As another teacher in the same intervention group said, 
when talking about the start of the next school year, “I will most definitely be 
establishing the concept of you can do it, and learning is a process, learning is hard 
the first time, but don‟t be discouraged by that, keep working on it, and you‟ll get 
there” (Combined interventions group teacher M). 
Effects of ability-grouping on students’ mathematics self-efficacy 
During the interviews, the effects of ability grouping for mathematics (or its proxy in 
the Numeracy Development Projects, strategy grouping) arose as a possible 
influence on students‟ self-efficacy beliefs. For example, a teacher talked about her 
belief that grouping students for instruction according to the stage on the Number 
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Framework at which they were working, recommended in the Numeracy 
Development Projects, influenced self-efficacy. She said: “I think it has a huge 
effect, I really do, in the way that the two top groups, I‟m sure they make better 
progress and achieve more because they think they can do it”. In contrast, she 
commented that “The ones in the bottom group, even though they‟re happy 
because they‟re doing stuff they can manage … I‟m sure their self-efficacy is 
harmed” (Combined interventions group teacher N). When the question of how 
strategy-grouping might affect students‟ mathematics self-efficacy was 
subsequently discussed at intervention group meetings, most teachers seemed to 
think that students in the lowest strategy group would be negatively influenced by 
this practice because “Labelling often scars students, they believe they are dumb if 
they are in the lowest group” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher 
F). Another teacher in this group suggested that for a student to be aware that “I‟m 
always a Triangle” (assuming the Triangles is the lowest group A) would negatively 
affect their self-efficacy. On the other hand, students in the “highest group were 
happy to be there and feeling most confident” (Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group teacher E). Although ability-based grouping might have an effect 
on students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, what is being described in most of these 
comments is more consistent with students‟ broader self-concept than their self-
efficacy.    
Students‟ comments confirmed that they felt very positive about being in what they 
thought was the highest group. A girl who said she likes her group “coz I think it‟s 
the highest group” (Year 5 girl, high mathematics self-efficacy score) was fairly 
typical. The student‟s comment that by being in the highest group “I feel way more 
encouraged, because I feel like I‟m doing really well, and that‟s going to encourage 
me to do more” (Year 5 boy, high mathematics self-efficacy score) supports the 
teacher‟s suggestion above that the learning of those students who knew they were 
achieving well, would probably continue to thrive. The single student who said she 
was in the group in her class that was given the easiest mathematics work gave no 
answer when asked about how she felt about this. That grouping and mathematics 
self-efficacy levels are likely to be associated for some students was also 
supported by the students who were reported earlier as commenting about the 
group they were in when explaining their self-efficacy levels. 
A small number of teachers were exploring alternative strategies to structure 
teaching mathematics in ways designed to avoid particular students‟ self-efficacy 
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being negatively affected by an ability-grouping strategy. Students in one class 
described being taught in fluid groups that targeted students‟ learning needs in 
particular number domains, such as addition and subtraction, multiplication and 
division, and place value. One of these students said that being included in the 
place value group made her feel “More confident, because that way I know that the 
teacher‟s spotted my difficulties and, so she will be able to help me” (Year 5 girl, 
high mathematics self-efficacy score). It was unclear, though, whether some 
students might be included in all of these groups, which might still negatively 
influence their self-efficacy. In another class, peer teaching was included in the 
mathematics programme: “Well, right now, we‟re not going in groups, but we‟re 
going for people who aren‟t sure with people who are sure how to do it” (Year 4 girl, 
low mathematics self-efficacy score).  
Teachers‟ second interviews were conducted after they had participated in two 
intervention group meetings that focussed on mathematics self-efficacy, where a 
student‟s self-efficacy was described as being influenced by: prior achievement; 
observations of others‟ experiences; persuasion from others; and physiological and 
emotional responses. When teachers were asked to name the factors that they 
believed contributed to students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, four teachers included 
a student‟s prior achievement in mathematics. None mentioned the effect of 
observing similar peers as models. One teacher included strategies for coping with 
difficulty, and another talked about a particular student‟s negative emotional 
response to basic facts testing – both of which related to physiological and 
emotional responses. Much more frequently, teachers highlighted the contributing 
effects of: parents‟ comments to students (n = 7); peer support and encouragement 
(n = 6); and teacher-student feedback (n = 5), all of which could be categorised as 
persuasion from others. Other factors mentioned by teachers included: a student‟s 
self-confidence or self-belief (n = 6); the provision of tasks with an appropriate 
degree of challenge (n = 3); a student‟s intelligence or ability (n = 3); and the 
school‟s culture or ethos (n = 2). Compared with their earlier interviews, where five 
teachers explicitly acknowledged the potential influence of school and teacher on 
mathematics self-efficacy, 11 teachers talked about this, post-intervention. 
As part of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention, teachers implemented several 
key strategies with their students, and reported a number of positive effects. Post-
intervention, teachers showed a heightened awareness of how students‟ 
interactions with their peers, parents, and teachers can influence students‟ beliefs 
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about their abilities in mathematics. In the following section, students‟ and teachers‟ 
thoughts about the nature of intelligence are presented before discussing the 
effects of the second intervention, which aimed to increase students‟ incremental 
beliefs about intelligence. 
What is intelligence?  
Researcher: Tell me what you think intelligence is. 
Student: Well, I think it‟s just a way that you inherit from your parents. 
Researcher: And what is it, exactly? 
Student: It‟s just a thing that you get better at, which means that some 
people aren‟t, well, they‟ve got less to start with so they‟ve got less when 
they‟ve tried as hard as they could, when people who‟ve got a lot just 
had to go up a teeny bit. The people with a little had to go up a whole lot 
to be with the higher people, and they just had to go up a little bit. (Year 
4 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score) 
A small number of students, like the one above, described intelligence as a 
combination of capacity and rate. Another student appeared to have given some 
thought to what intelligence is, and had developed his own tentative theory about 
intelligence having two distinct aspects: 
Student: I reckon there‟s kind of two types of intelligence. Basic 
intelligence, which is like being able to speak and communicate. And 
then, learned intelligence which you gain by learning things and doing 
things and exploring things.  
Researcher: OK. And where did you get that idea of there being two 
intelligences from? 
Student: Well, I kind of thought of it for myself. I can‟t remember it 
coming from anywhere else.  
Researcher: Uh-huh. Well, in the questionnaire that you did with me last 
term, it kind of looked as though you thought you can‟t really change 
your intelligence, although it seemed a little unclear, so I thought I‟d ask 
you in the interview. Do you think that you can actually change your 
intelligence?   
Student: You can‟t really change your basic intelligence, but can change 
your learned intelligence. Coz you can‟t, well, you can kind of change 
your basic intelligence, like learning a different language, coz that‟s being 
able to communicate, but that‟s really adding to it actually, so sort of. 
(Year 5 boy, low theory-of-intelligence score) 
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The thoughtful responses made by these two students were exceptional among the 
student interviewees, and showed an emerging awareness of the complexity of 
intelligence and the factors that might define it. Both definitions were suggestive of 
intelligence as comprising the two dimensions described in Chapter 3: a more or 
less fixed capacity for learning, and the (softer) rate at which knowledge can be 
acquired. Both students had low theory-of-intelligence scores. Whether their low 
scores were representative of their beliefs about the malleability of both dimensions 
of intelligence, or whether they believed the rate of knowledge acquisition could be 
increased but the level of complexity could not, or vice versa, cannot be discerned 
from their questionnaire responses and was not asked during the interviews.  
The first description in particular seemed to correspond with some of the comments 
teachers made about intelligence being an innate ability that can be developed to a 
limited extent, discussed shortly. Both students had low scores for theory-of-
intelligence, and both scored among the highest 10% in the sample of 152 students 
for Time 3 mathematics achievement. Definitions of intelligence from other students 
with equally high achievement tended to be much more plainly stated, such as, 
“How smart you are” (Year 4 boy, low theory-of-intelligence score, high 
achievement). Being “smart” was included in definitions of students with a wide 
range of achievement levels. So students‟ ideas about intelligence did not appear 
to be systematically associated with their achievement in mathematics. 
Seven other students gave descriptions of intelligence that seemed to show 
emerging two-dimensional definitions of intelligence.  These responses ranged 
from “Being smart and knowing a lot of things, a big variety of things, and learning 
fast” (Year 5 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score), to “Being good at maths and 
being good at other learning stuff as well” (Year 4 boy, high theory-of-intelligence 
score). The nine students with more complex definitions of intelligence than simply 
being “smart” had a range of theory-of-intelligence scores. Of the students with 
these more nuanced definitions for whom Time 3 data were available, four of the 
seven had achievement scores in the highest 10% of the sample of 152 students.  
Students and teachers were all asked to describe what they thought intelligence 
was. Table 7.5 shows a summary of students‟ responses, in which they tended to 
relate their ideas about what intelligence is directly to their personal experiences. 
Students often responded with a short statement, such as “Being clever” (Year 4 
girl, low theory-of-intelligence score). Most frequently at Time 1, students described 
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intelligence as being smart or clever, or being good at something (n = 24). Equal 
numbers of students with low and high theory-of-intelligence scores made this type 
of response. This explanation seemed to be representative of intelligence as an 
inherent capacity, and was more often given by Year 4 (n = 15) than Year 5 
students (n = 9). An awareness of the influence of a student‟s home environment 
was indicated when students commented that “Sometimes at night me and Mum 
tell each other simple maths problems” (Year 4 girl, low theory-of-intelligence 
score), or “You read a lot of books and do a lot of learning stuff at home” (Year 5 
boy, high theory-of-intelligence score), when talking about what intelligence is.  
Table 7.5: Students’ definitions of intelligence 
Summary of students‟ responses to “Tell me what intelligence is” at Time 1 (and Time 2, shown 
in parentheses) interviews, by theory-of-intelligence scores in their Time 1 questionnaire. 
Several students‟ responses fell into more than one category.  
Students‟ definitions of 
intelligence 
Low theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 22 
High theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 23 
How smart you are, being 
good at something 
12 (9) 12 (14) 
Influenced by home 
environment 
4 (2) 4 (3) 
Knowing, getting right 
answers 
4 (2) 11 (6) 
Effort 2 (1) 2 (0) 
Other 2 (2) 3 (2) 
Don‟t know 9 (7) 2 (3) 
Of the 14 responses that suggested knowing or getting right answers were 
characteristics of intelligence, a greater number of these were made by students 
with high theory-of-intelligence score (n = 11), and more came from the older year 
level (n = 10). For instance, one Year 5 student defined intelligence as “When you 
know lots of stuff and you know all the answers” (Year 5 boy, high theory-of-
intelligence score). Some students with high theory-of-intelligence scores seemed 
to believe knowledge was a component of, or synonymous with, intelligence, and 
because they believed they could increase their knowledge, they believed they 
could change their intelligence. It seems obvious that if a student believes 
intelligence equates with knowledge, then they will probably believe they can 
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change their intelligence. However, this does not explain why a small number of 
students with low theory-of-intelligence scores also described intelligence as 
related to knowing. 
A small number of students mentioned effort when they described intelligence at 
Time 1; two were Year 4 students and two, Year 5. In her response to the question 
about intelligence, one student responded: “To have a go and to have a try and see 
if you get it right” (Year 5 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score).  
Not all students were able to suggest what intelligence might be (n = 11); nine of 
these were students with low scores for theory-of-intelligence, and seven of the 
“Don‟t know” responses came from Year 4 students. It is important to consider that, 
particularly at the first interview, this might well have been the first time that 
students had been asked to explain what intelligence is, so a “Don‟t know” 
response may have been given by some students who felt unable to articulate their 
(simple or complex) understanding of intelligence. Some aspects of students‟ 
definitions of intelligence varied according to their theory-of-intelligence scores, 
some according year level, and some by a combination of both attributes. 
Table 7.6 shows the number of students whose definitions of intelligence were 
consistent with a definition of intelligence as malleable knowledge or as a stable 
capacity, or a combination of the two components. Year 5 students were more 
likely than Year 4 students to give a uni-dimensional definition of intelligence, either 
as malleable knowledge or as a stable capacity. Year 5 students with high theory-
of-intelligence scores most frequently defined intelligence as knowledge-related. 
Students in both year levels, and with both low and high theory-of-intelligence 
scores, gave definitions that were consistent with intelligence as a fairly stable 
capacity. Younger students and those with low theory-of-intelligence scores gave 
definitions of intelligence that included both components – a malleable knowledge 
component and a stable capacity – more often than older students. However the 
small number of responses in this category should be interpreted cautiously.  
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Table 7.6: Students’ definitions of intelligence as capacity and/or knowledge 
Summary of students‟ definitions of intelligence at Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) 
interviews, consistent with intelligence as a stable capacity, a malleable knowledge component, 
or both. Frequencies are presented by theory-of-intelligence scores in their Time 1 
questionnaire, and by year level. Responses from 34 students at Times 1 and 26 of the same 
students at 2 are represented here. These definitions were classified as either “How smart you 
are, being good at something” or “Knowing, getting right answers” in Figure 7.5. 
Students‟ 
definitions of 
intelligence 
Low theory-of-
intelligence score  
n = 14 
High theory-of-
intelligence score  
n = 20 
Year 4 
n =16 
Year 5 
n = 18 
Malleable 
knowledge only 
0 (2) 9 (2) 1 (2) 8 (2) 
Stable capacity 
only 
10 (9) 9 (9) 10 (11) 9 (7) 
Malleable 
knowledge and 
stable capacity 
together 
4 (0) 2 (4) 5 (1) 1 (3) 
In Table 7.7, characteristics of intelligence that teachers explicitly talked about in 
their interviews are summarised. Most frequently mentioned by teachers in both 
groups (n = 13) was the idea of intelligence as an innate ability or capacity. Seven 
teachers referred to intelligence as a combination of the effects of an innate ability 
and the influences of a person‟s environment, with one teacher saying that “I think 
it‟s affected by your genes … It is affected by nurture as well as nature, it‟s just how 
much. I mean, there‟s scientific debate – how much can you change intelligence?” 
(Combined interventions group teacher J). Another teacher used a sandstone 
analogy to convey his thoughts: 
I think that intelligence, at least from a psychological standpoint, is pretty 
much set not completely in stone, maybe in some sandstone, so I think it 
can be etched a little bit this way and that way, but I think that, pretty 
much that‟s where it stands. … I don‟t think it can be changed to a large 
degree. (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher E) 
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Table 7.7: Teachers’ definitions of intelligence 
Summary of teachers‟ responses to “Tell me what intelligence is” at Time 1 (and Time 2, shown 
in parentheses) interviews, by treatment group. Some teachers‟ responses fell into more than 
one category. Note: “Combined interventions group” is the Combined mathematics self-efficacy 
and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. 
Teachers‟ definitions of intelligence Mathematics self-
efficacy intervention 
group 
n = 8 
Combined 
interventions group 
n = 7 
Innate capacity/ability to think, 
problem solve, communicate, learn 
7 (6) 6 (6) 
Influenced by environment, 
experiences 
5 (6) 3 (3) 
Knowledge, how much you learn 2 (0) 1 (1) 
Influenced by effort 1 (2) 0 (0) 
Other 1 (1) 2 (1) 
Unsure 0 (0) 1 (0) 
The implication appeared to be that the genetic influence on intelligence 
determined the maximum potential limit of a person‟s intelligence, regardless of the 
opportunities provided in their environment, including school. The teachers seemed 
to perceive their role as helping students to maximise students‟ learning within their 
capacity to learn.  
During the Time 1 interviews, two teachers described their beliefs that intelligence 
is an innate ability, but at their later interviews, were less definite about this. A 
teacher in the Combined interventions group explained her thoughts about what 
intelligence is at her first interview: 
Teacher: I think you‟re either born with intelligence or not. I‟m never ever 
going to be able to be a doctor, I am not intellectual enough. If I had said, 
when I was an 8-year-old that I‟m going to choose to be a doctor and I 
hated school, then no matter how intelligent I might‟ve been, I would 
never have been able to get there. 
Researcher: And how do you think this belief affects your own learning? 
Teacher: Oh, it has stifled me. Believing that, I‟ve often thought that 
maybe I can‟t do something. Like maths – didn‟t think I‟d be able to teach 
maths, hopeless, didn‟t think that I‟d be able to explain, take the kids 
through to the next step. 
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In the teacher‟s second interview, she was less sure that intelligence is completely 
innate: 
I still think it‟s something that you are born with, and probably if you have 
the spine or the interest, it can perhaps be improved. I‟m still not sure 
about this one – are you born with intelligence, or can your 
circumstances make it change? I don‟t know, I still don‟t know. 
She was particularly insistent, though, that her own beliefs about intelligence did 
not influence her interactions with her students, particularly students who might 
struggle with mathematics: 
No, no, no! Not for my class. Oh, absolutely not! They can all do 
everything really well, and if they can‟t, I‟m going to try to help them to 
get it, to understand it well. We‟re starting multiplication and division this 
week and I know there‟s a couple of little girls, that they‟re just going to 
sit there and I‟m going to see myself in them, and I‟m going to put all my 
effort into moving them along. (Combined interventions group teacher N) 
Comments made by one of this teacher‟s students suggested there was a 
particularly inclusive ethos in her class: “Because it‟s not no-one‟s really good at 
maths, it‟s everybody‟s really good at maths, it‟s just their learning, how much 
they‟ve learnt about it. Coz our groups, there‟s no high group, we‟ve just got a 
different learning step” (Year 4 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score). So from this 
student‟s perspective at least, this teacher might have been quite successful in 
masking her own beliefs about intelligence, in her interactions with students. 
When students‟ and teachers‟ thoughts about what intelligence is were compared, 
some parallels and dissimilarities were evident. As might be expected, teachers‟ 
ideas about intelligence tended to be more clearly defined than those of students, 
and were described as more general principles, sometimes supported by examples 
from teachers‟ personal experiences. In some cases, students‟ descriptions of 
intelligence seemed to be naïve expressions of the characteristics of intelligence 
that teachers described, applied in the narrower context of the students‟ own 
experience. Some correspondence between the first three categories in Table 7.5 
and the first three categories in Table 7.6, respectively, was suggested by the data. 
For example, the student‟s response that intelligence is “when a person is very 
good at maths and he or she is maybe a bit higher than they are supposed to be at 
maths at their level” (Year 5 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score) seemed akin to 
teachers defining intelligence as an innate ability. Teachers talked about 
intelligence being influenced by heredity and environmental factors, with some 
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referring to debates about the relative influences of nature and nurture. From 
students‟ perspectives, the environmental factor that was significant was 
specifically their home environment. Another parallel was that themes of knowledge 
and knowing were evident both in students‟ and teachers‟ definitions of intelligence.  
Although effort appears in categories in both tables, it was used differently in each. 
One student expressed a belief in an inverse relationship between intelligence and 
finding learning difficult, saying that intelligence was “When you know all sorts of 
things and it‟s really easy for you” (Year 5 boy, high theory-of-intelligence score). 
Another student, though, perceived effort as a necessary component of 
intelligence: “I think intelligence is how good you are when you concentrate”  
(Year 4 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score). The latter response seemed more 
aligned with this teacher‟s inclusion of effort in her statement that “Hard work is 
related to intelligence” (Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group teacher A), 
suggestive of hard work enabling intelligence to deploy to its full effect. Overall 
though, there appeared to be a degree of connection between some of the 
students‟ and teachers‟ thoughts about what intelligence is, with the two students‟ 
explanations of intelligence that were quoted at the start of this section most closely 
resembling some of teachers‟ ideas. 
(How much) Can intelligence be changed? 
Most striking in students‟ interview data was their general endorsement of an 
incremental theory-of-intelligence, even by those whose questionnaire responses 
tended towards an entity belief.  Table 7.8 shows a summary of students‟ theory-of-
intelligence, as indicated in their interviews.  
Students with the lowest questionnaire scores for theory-of-intelligence items were 
included in the interview sample because it was expected that their interviews 
would illuminate why they tended to believe that intelligence could not be altered. 
However, during interviews, almost all students expressed their thoughts about 
intelligence in terms of varying degrees of incrementality, rather than in absolute 
terms of “Yes, you can change your intelligence” or “No, you cannot change your 
intelligence”. This did not support the interpretation of low questionnaire scores as 
representing an entity belief. To illustrate this point, this student had a low score for 
theory-of-intelligence, but expressed a belief that she could change her intelligence, 
to a degree:  
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Researcher: In the questions that you answered last term, it looks as 
though you thought that you can‟t really change your intelligence. Is that 
right?  
Student: I‟d say I could, just a little bit. 
Researcher: And why do you think that? 
Student: Coz I know most of the maths stuff [my teacher] gives us … 
I don‟t get much stuff wrong, but it‟s tricky when I have to go back and do 
it again, that‟s when I have to try and get a little bit better. (Year 4 girl, 
low theory-of-intelligence score) 
Table 7.8: Students’ theory-of-intelligence indicated in their interviews 
Summary of students‟ Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) interview responses when 
asked whether they thought they could change their intelligence, by theory-of-intelligence 
scores in Time 1 questionnaire. At Time 2, all students with low incremental scores at Time 1 
were re-interviewed, as were the 19 students with high scores who were available. 
Theory-of-intelligence 
indicated during interview 
Low theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 22
6
 
High theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 23 
Incremental 17 (20) 22 (18) 
Entity 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Inconsistent response 3 (2) 0 (1) 
Don‟t know, not sure 2 (0) 1 (0) 
Of the other students who were selected because they tended towards an entity 
theory-of-intelligence in their questionnaire results, only one student gave a 
response in her first interview that did not seem to reflect an incremental theory, 
although neither did it appear to clearly endorse an entity belief. She explained that 
she thought she could not change her intelligence, “coz I think some of the work‟s 
hard that I do” (Year 4 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score). It seems likely that this 
student might not have understood what she was being asked and was classified 
as “Don‟t know”. 
When asked in his Time 2 interview if he thought he could change his intelligence, 
another student made a differentiation between changing and expanding 
intelligence, saying, “No, you can‟t change it, you can add to it” (Year 5 boy, high 
                                               
6 One student‟s Time 1 interview was interrupted twice, and the questions relating to their theory 
of intelligence were accidentally omitted. For this reason, the responses of 22 students with low 
theory of intelligence scores, rather than 23, are included in this section. 
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theory-of-intelligence score). This response was categorised as being in the spirit of 
an incremental theory, and supported his high score for theory-of-intelligence. A 
similar additive belief about intelligence seemed to be expressed by this boy, who 
had one of the lowest theory-of-intelligence scores: 
Student: I believe that you can change your intelligence a bit. 
Researcher: Tell me why you think this? 
Student: Well, you can put new intelligence in, but you can‟t push old 
intelligence out. 
Researcher: How do you know that? 
Student: Coz I know everything I‟ve known since I was a baby. I didn‟t 
know anything when I was born, but when I first started to know things, 
I‟ve been knowing them for 8 years … you can learn another thing, but 
you can‟t learn about something you already know about. (Year 4 boy, 
low theory-of-intelligence score) 
This idea of intelligence as an acquirable knowledge component was also 
expressed by a student who explained he could increase his intelligence, “Coz if 
you learn more you can change it coz you‟re storing more stuff in your brain” (Year 
4 boy, low theory-of-intelligence score). Students with a wide range of theory-of-
intelligence scores appeared to conceptualise intelligence as an accumulation of 
knowledge. The mathematics achievement scores of these students tended to be in 
the lowest quarter of the range. 
Three students initially agreed that they believed they could not change their 
intelligence, but when comments they made prompted me to repeat the question, 
they answered in the affirmative. At Time 2, similarly inconsistent responses were 
given by three students, only one of whom had done so at Time 1. Because the 
majority of students indicated in their first interviews that they believed they could 
change their intelligence to some degree, and because the quantitative data had 
shown what appeared to be a very gradual positive change in mean theory-of-
intelligence over time for each treatment group (see Figure 6.2), there was almost 
no scope to detect noticeable shifts towards a more incremental theory-of-
intelligence in students‟ Time 2 interview data. One implication was that in the case 
of the Combined interventions group, using the interviews to detect changes in 
students‟ theory-of-intelligence that might be attributable to the theory-of-
intelligence intervention was problematic.  
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To eliminate the possibility of there being differences according to treatment group 
or year level, students‟ theory-of-intelligence indications from their interviews were 
summarised accordingly (see Table 7.9). This confirmed that 14 of the 15 students 
in the Combined interventions group appeared to have an incremental theory-of-
intelligence in their interviews. The only student in this group who was unsure about 
the malleability of intelligence in her first interview, scored in the top one-third of 
students for Time 1 theory-of-intelligence and expressed incremental beliefs at her 
second interview. When asked to confirm that the student thought she could 
change her intelligence quite a lot, she replied, “Yeah, coz you can always do more 
when you practise and you study” (Year 5 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score). 
Table 7.9: Students’ theory-of-intelligence indicated in their interviews, by year level 
and treatment group 
Summary of students‟ theory-of-intelligence, as described in their Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in 
parentheses) interviews, by year level and treatment group. At Time 1, 45 students were 
interviewed about their theory-of-intelligence, and at Time 2, 41. Note: “Combined interventions 
group” is the Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. 
Theory-of-
intelligence 
indicated 
during 
interview 
Year 4 
n = 23 
Year 5 
n = 22 
Control 
group 
n = 14 
Mathematics 
self-efficacy 
intervention 
group 
n = 16 
Combined 
interventions 
group 
n = 15 
Incremental 20 (20) 19 (18) 11 (11) 14 (12) 14 (15) 
Entity 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Inconsistent 
response 
1 (2) 2 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0) 
Don't know, 
not sure 
2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
To investigate the extent to which a variability in definition of the term intelligence 
might have affected the apparent differences between the questionnaire and 
interview responses of the students identified as having low theory-of-intelligence 
scores, all students‟ responses to “Tell me what intelligence is” were examined (see 
Table 7.5). At Time 1, the most frequent response (n = 9) from students with low 
theory-of-intelligence scores was that they did not know what intelligence is. In the 
second interviews, this persisted for seven of these students. Thirteen other 
students with low scores, however, expressed ideas that seemed related to 
intelligence, so a lack of understanding of the term did not account for their 
questionnaire responses being at odds with their interview answers. A much 
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smaller number of students with high theory-of-intelligence scores (n = 2) was 
unable to describe intelligence.  
The theory-of-intelligence items in the questionnaire were stated in absolute terms 
(either you can or you can‟t change your intelligence), but from students‟ comments 
during the interviews, it seemed that a number of them had a more nuanced 
interpretation of the malleability of intelligence. It was not until students were asked 
for their ideas about how intelligence could be changed that their thoughts about 
the rate at which they could acquire knowledge emerged. Among the students 
there seemed to be a range of beliefs about how much, and how quickly, 
intelligence might change. When some students‟ positive responses to the question 
“Do you think you can change your intelligence?” were probed, their comments 
related to how much a person could change their intelligence to different time 
periods. These ranged from weeks: “Because, say you‟re not really that smart at 
doing maths, then over a few weeks you get really smart” (Year 5 girl, low theory-
of-intelligence score); to a school term: “Maybe a little bit each term” (Year 4 girl, 
low theory-of-intelligence score); to a year: “Per day it would be not very much, but 
for a year, definitely a lot. Because last year I didn‟t know square roots and now I 
do” (Year 4 boy, high theory-of-intelligence score). This suggested that rather than 
asking simply if a student believes they can change their intelligence, it might be 
more revealing to ask them to explain how much they thought it could be changed, 
or how much time it might take.  
Part-way through the data-gathering, therefore, a question was added to the 
interview, asking students who had indicated a belief in the malleability of 
intelligence, “How much do you think you can change your intelligence?” Thirty-five 
students responded to this question at Time 1, and 34 of the same students at 
Time 2. Their responses fell into two groups. First, those who were sure that 
intelligence could be substantially increased. One Year 4 student thought: 
Because when I was little I used to draw a lot and then I wasn‟t very 
good, and then I drew a lot – like tons every day – and now I‟m a pretty 
good artist. So I think if you try you can get better at anything you want. 
(Year 4 boy, high theory-of-intelligence score) 
Another said, “If you practise and practise you can change it, and then you can 
change your confidence as well as your intelligence” (Year 4 girl, high theory-of-
intelligence score). These students appeared to have a relatively strong 
incremental theory-of-intelligence.  
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A second group included those who, although they seemed to think that they could 
increase their intelligence, were also aware of factors that limited this potential. A 
student who thought she could change her intelligence “just a bit”, explained that 
applying effort could make a difference: “Maybe if you usually don‟t really listen that 
well, you can try and do your best, try harder” (Year 5 girl, low theory-of-intelligence 
score). Another said intelligence could be changed “A little bit, but not very much 
coz you can still be the same self as you are” (Year 4 girl, high theory-of-
intelligence score). One student‟s response suggested that changes in what she 
thought was intelligence needed to keep in step with a student‟s age, and that 
knowing more than a student should at a given age could have negative 
consequences: 
Just enough as your age goes. Coz if you get too hard when you‟re a 
senior, like a Year 6, then you‟ll know too much and you‟ll have to move 
on, and you won‟t be old enough, and well, then you‟ll get mixed up. 
(Year 4 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score) 
Table 7.10 shows how many students‟ responses about the malleability of their 
intelligence indicated an incremental theory-of-intelligence with an awareness of 
possible limitations, and how many seemed to believe intelligence could be 
increased substantially.  
Table 7.10: Theory-of-intelligence of a sub-sample of students 
A sub-sample of 35 students‟ theory-of-intelligence as indicated in their Time 1 (and Time 2, 
shown in parentheses) responses to “How much do you think you can change your 
intelligence?”, by theory-of-intelligence scores in their Time 1 questionnaires. Thirty-four 
students‟ Time 2 responses are included. Each student had already indicated a belief that 
intelligence could be changed. 
Theory-of-intelligence 
indicated during interview 
Low theory-of-intelligence 
score 
High theory-of-intelligence 
score 
Strongly incremental 2 (4) 19 (11) 
Incremental, with limitations 12 (10) 2 (9) 
The Time 1 interview responses suggested that students who had low scores for 
the first questionnaire tended to be those whose interview comments were 
indicative of an incremental theory-of-intelligence with limiting factors, rather than a 
distinct entity theory. At Time 2, though, the balance of responses from students 
with high theory-of-intelligence scores shifted, so that a similar number suggested 
limiting factors as the number who indicated they believed their intelligence was 
very malleable. From these data, it seems that the low/high theory-of-intelligence 
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distinction was at least partly characterised by a difference in students‟ definitions 
of intelligence, which related to how much students believed intelligence could 
change – not whether or not it could. So not only did students have various 
definitions of intelligence, they also varied in opinion as to how much intelligence – 
as they defined it – can change. 
Differences according to year level were also evident, with eight Year 4 students 
indicating a strongly incremental belief at Time 1, compared to 13 Year 5 students. 
More Year 4 students (n = 11) than Year 5 (n = 3) indicated an incremental belief, 
with limitations.  
Students were asked to describe how they thought they could change their 
intelligence. Their ideas are summarised in Table 7.11. Although separate 
categories were included for effort-related responses, learning, and self-belief, 
there was some overlap between these. For instance, this student‟s response was 
coded as both “effort” and “learning”: “Learning a lot and trying hard to learn and 
practising” (Year 5 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score). 
Table 7.11: Students’ beliefs about how intelligence can be changed 
Summary of students‟ responses to “How can you change your intelligence?”, as indicated in 
their Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) interviews, by theory-of-intelligence scores in 
their Time 1 questionnaires. Several students‟ responses fell into more than one category.  
Ways to change 
intelligence 
Low theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 22 
High theory-of-intelligence 
score 
n = 23 
Effort 13 (9) 17 (11) 
Learning 5 (14) 9 (6) 
Self-belief 2 (0) 1 (2) 
Other 3 (7) 2 (7) 
Don't know 4 (0) 0 (0) 
At Time 1, effort-related suggestions were the category of response made most 
frequently by both groups of students. Students‟ Time 2 responses were less likely 
than those made at Time 1 to include the belief that they could alter their 
intelligence by applying effort, or practising. Instead, a greater number of students 
who had low theory-of-intelligence scores at Time 1 responded that they could 
increase their intelligence by learning. One said, “Yes, I think I can, by learning new 
stuff about multiplication and division and next year I‟ll learn more and get smarter” 
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(Year 5 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score), while another responded, “Coz you 
can learn more things and then that makes you a bit smarter, more intelligent” 
(Year 4 boy, low theory-of-intelligence score). Another student who thought he 
could increase his intelligence by learning, commented, “Because I‟ll learn a bit at a 
time, and I‟ll keep on getting smarter and smarter at the end” (Year 5 boy, low 
theory-of-intelligence score). All of these students seemed to use intelligence 
synonymously with learning and gaining knowledge. For students with high theory-
of-intelligence scores, both effort and learning were mentioned less frequently in 
their second interviews than in their first.  
Classified as “Other”‟ at Time 1 were a variety of comments that appeared 
unrelated to the categories above, and to one another. For instance, one Year 4 
boy responded that he could change his intelligence by “Watching documentaries 
and watching „I Shouldn‟t Be Alive‟ to learn how to avoid things” (Year 4 boy, low 
theory-of-intelligence score). Additional responses classed as “Other” were, “By 
getting lots of help really, coz you can‟t do it by yourself all the time” (Year 5 girl, 
high theory-of-intelligence score), and “By having different feelings inside you” 
(Year 4 girl, high theory-of-intelligence score). 
At Time 2, five of the 14 “Other” responses made a link between teachers 
presenting students with challenging work and changing their intelligence, in what 
may have been an emerging category which was not evident in the earlier 
interviews. “Because [my teacher] keeps on doing harder questions, and it makes 
me really think about it, and makes me smarter” (Year 5 girl, low theory-of-
intelligence score) was one response in this category. Another student suggested 
his intelligence would be increased by his teacher “giving me hard maths like 
twelve times thirteen, or twelve times twelve” (Year 4 boy, high theory-of-
intelligence score). Comments in this category suggested students had some 
awareness of the value of being presented with challenges. Students‟ ideas about 
how they could increase their intelligence were also examined for each year level, 
but there were no noticeable differences between Year 4 and Year 5 students‟ 
responses in any category. 
In students‟ interview data, there was further evidence to confirm that theory-of-
intelligence beliefs are not dichotomous. No students stated that they definitely 
believed intelligence could not be altered, although a small number of students 
seemed unsure. This largely matched the quantitative data in which very few 
extremely low theory-of-intelligence scores were evident. Rather than expressing 
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either entity or incremental beliefs, students‟ beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence were influenced by their definitions of intelligence. Furthermore, students 
expressed a range of beliefs about the degree of malleability of intelligence, as they 
defined it. Students‟ high theory-of-intelligence scores tended to be associated with a 
view of intelligence as either knowledge/skill or a capacity for learning, and low theory-
of-intelligence tended to be associated with either a capacity for learning or a 
combination of both knowledge and capacity components. 
Table 7.12 shows students‟ responses to the question, “Do you think your teacher 
believes that children can change how intelligent they are?” The majority of students 
answered affirmatively at Time 1 (38), with this number decreasing slightly at Time 2 
(33 students). To some students, it seemed obvious that teachers would think this way. 
Several students believed that their teachers thought students could change their 
intelligence, “Because she is a teacher and she wouldn‟t really be doing it if she 
doesn‟t think people can ... it would be a waste of time, basically” (Year 5 girl, high 
theory-of-intelligence score). One boy‟s response was, “Yeah, coz otherwise they 
wouldn‟t have maths sessions, coz they wouldn‟t think you could manage to get any 
further” (Year 4 boy, high theory-of-intelligence score). A Year 5 student‟s comment 
summed this up: “I think all teachers do” (Year 5 girl, low theory-of-intelligence score). 
Table 7.12: Students’ ideas about teachers’ theory-of-intelligence 
Summary of students‟ Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) responses to “Do you think 
your teacher believes that children can change how intelligent they are?” by theory-of-
intelligence scores in their Time 1 questionnaires. At Time 1, 44 students were asked this 
question, and at Time 2, all 41 students who were interviewed were asked.  
Students‟ responses Low theory-of-intelligence 
score 
High theory-of-intelligence 
score 
No 0 (1) 1 (1) 
Don‟t know, unsure 2 (1) 2 (2) 
Probably 1 (2) 0 (1) 
Yes 18 (18) 20 (15) 
A summary of teachers‟ beliefs about intelligence is shown in Table 7.13. At both 
interviews, the majority of teachers described beliefs that intelligence can be 
changed, some teachers tempering this with the limitations they perceived, and a 
smaller number talking even more positively about changing students‟ intelligence, 
with no mention made of any restrictions. For instance, a teacher indicated a 
strongly incremental theory-of-intelligence when she said: 
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I think the biggest thing is that you don‟t set a ceiling on where they can 
get to, that every bit of learning leads to more learning, and it doesn‟t 
matter which student it is, they‟ve all got room for growth. (Combined 
interventions group teacher L)  
Table 7.13: Teachers’ theory-of-intelligence indicated in their interviews 
Intervention teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence at Time 1 (and Time 2, shown in parentheses) as 
expressed in their interviews, by treatment group. Note: “Combined interventions group” is the 
Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. 
Theory-of-intelligence 
indicated during interview 
Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group 
n = 8 
Combined interventions 
group 
n = 7 
Strongly incremental 0 (1) 2 (2) 
Incremental, with limitations 8 (7) 2 (3) 
Entity 0 (0) 3 (1) 
Unsure 0 (0) 0 (1) 
In another case, a teacher‟s strong incremental belief was related to a family 
member‟s experience: 
When my Dad had a stroke … and he could hardly talk and he couldn‟t 
read, and he taught himself to read from the little red books right through 
to library books, and he taught himself to talk … that always tells me you 
can get these kids‟ brains developing. (Combined interventions group 
teacher K) 
Another teacher in the Combined interventions group also described an entity 
theory-of-intelligence at her first interview, defining intelligence as “people‟s natural 
ability to pick up new concepts and the speed at which they can do it, and the rate 
at which they can retain it and then apply it over different areas”. At her second 
interview, the way she explained intelligence suggested a belief that intelligence 
had some potential to be increased, with limitations: 
I think even if you‟re really, really smart and really intelligent, and can 
pick up concepts quite quickly, I don‟t necessarily think you‟re going to 
increase the quickness of that picking-up a whole bunch, coz if you‟re 
already up there – you know. I think it‟s probably not going to be a shift 
from zero to nine, you‟ll maybe process things a little bit faster as you go 
along, but I don‟t think it‟s going to be in giant leaps and bounds … if you 
think about intelligence as knowledge – I don‟t completely think that – but 
then the knowledge can increase. (Combined interventions group 
teacher P) 
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This teacher also said that her expectations of students were changing, and that, 
as a result, she was providing them with a less restrictive mathematics programme. 
Rather than thinking “You‟re just a stage 5 so you‟re just doing this, I‟ve made sure 
that I‟ve had opportunities for all of the kids to try something quite a bit harder, and 
a lot of them have actually succeeded in that” (Combined interventions group 
teacher P). 
A teacher in the same intervention group perhaps came closest to expressing an 
entity theory-of-intelligence, although the influence of environmental factors was 
also acknowledged. In her first interview, she explained that: 
You‟re born with a capacity for understanding certain things, and your 
environment that you first grow up in is so important to how you think and 
how you develop that I feel once they get to school, you can‟t change too 
much, you can help encourage and be positive, and help understand, but 
that basic intelligence is set up very early on, and it takes a lot of effort to 
go beyond that and to help someone who maybe didn‟t have the same 
early start. (Combined interventions group teacher M)  
Her thinking seemed unchanged at Time 2: 
What I still find difficult with the intelligence thing is those children that 
just never seem to get it … and that to me makes me think that there 
may be – this sounds really bad – but may be less potential at the start, 
whereas I feel that some of these kids, like their basic intelligence is 
there and while that doesn‟t mean they‟re going to pick up everything 
instantly, if you just give them a variety of ways, it will spark them off … 
that‟s been my big thing with why I think intelligence is fixed. (Combined 
interventions group teacher M) 
Most teachers in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group described similar 
beliefs about intelligence at both interviews. Of the three teachers in the Combined 
interventions group who indicated an entity theory-of-intelligence in their first 
interviews, two seemed to have changed their thinking slightly at their second 
interviews; one expressed doubts about intelligence being purely innate, and the 
other indicated that, within limits, intelligence might increase. Compared to the 
students‟ beliefs, teachers expressed more clearly-defined ideas about the 
malleability of intelligence. A belief that intelligence cannot be altered was clearly 
asserted by more teachers than students, which might be related to teachers 
having more clearly defined ideas about what intelligence is. Like the students, 
though, teachers‟ beliefs varied according to how much they seemed to believe 
intelligence could be increased. 
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Participants’ experiences of the theory-of-intelligence intervention  
Researcher: And how do you actually know that the brain lessons helped 
your learning in maths? How can you be sure? 
Student: I can be sure because ever since then I‟ve got more of my 
maths working right which is probably because I‟ve been exercising my 
brain and diving deeper. (Year 4 girl, Combined interventions group) 
The effects of a short series of lessons about the brain (see Appendix D) are 
described here by the students and teachers in the Combined mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence interventions group. In the Time 2 interviews, 14 
students were asked about the lessons focusing on brain function and how the 
brain could be strengthened, which their teachers had undertaken to teach. To 
begin this part of the interview, they were asked what they recalled about the 
lessons. Several students, like this one, described the resources teachers used to 
support their learning, including “A brain, a pull-apart one, so she told us all the 
parts of the brain and she brought some posters, and one of the posters told us 
how to get smarter, just practise” (Year 5 girl).  
Other students remembered different aspects of the lessons their teachers had 
taught, with one boy clearly interested in the language associated with the brain 
from the way he reported that he had learnt about “The different parts of the brain 
like the thalamus, the cerebellum, cerebrum, and how fast the messages from your 
brain travel through your system, 300 ks per second, or something like that” (Year 5 
boy). A younger boy described the practical implications of particular information 
that was memorable for him: 
We learned about the parts of the brain and learned about a few things 
like cells, and what the pieces of the brain do. One of them makes you 
be able to balance, and one of them going down to your neck gives you 
the power to actually move, and if that snaps – well, paralysed, dead! 
Gone! (Year 4 boy) 
When students were asked how the lessons had affected their learning, eight 
responded positively, and six of these students associated the brain lessons with 
perceived improvements in their mathematics performance. One girl justified her 
positive response by saying “Coz I get lots more things right” (Year 5 girl). 
Another student explained that she was “finding things easier to do, and I‟m 
actually concentrating harder”, and that as a result, she found “I get more work 
done by the end of the maths session” (Year 5 girl). 
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Although all the students remembered this series of lessons with their teacher, four 
students either could not recall learning anything about how they could make 
themselves smarter, with one boy suggesting the lessons had a different focus: “It 
was more how the brain works than how to change your brain, sort of” (Year 5 boy). 
The seven teachers in this treatment group were also asked for their thoughts 
about the effectiveness of the brain lessons they had been asked to teach. Five 
teachers said they had spent around 2 hours on the lessons, with one teacher 
spending just 30 minutes and another, 1 hour. Perhaps not surprising was the fact 
that the teacher who devoted the least time to this intervention had indicated an 
entity theory-of-intelligence in her first questionnaire and interview.  
The idea of students thinking they had some control of their brains as a result of the 
intervention lessons was mentioned by three teachers. One described how she 
believed that as a result of the brain lessons, students “saw that they had some 
control over what they were doing and how they could learn” (Combined 
interventions group teacher L). Another teacher echoed this, saying that her 
students “were just enthralled, they were just so excited about the whole brain 
concept, and that they actually had control of it. They loved it … I think they feel 
they‟re more in control of their learning” (Combined interventions group teacher M).  
Related to students feeling they had some control of their brains was the concept of 
building connections within the brain. This was mentioned by several teachers, 
along with the empowering impact it had had on some students. For one teacher, 
making connections seemed to have become part of the learning-related language 
that was used in her class:  “Now when they‟re learning something, they talk about 
making a new connection. I think that was the biggest thing for them, that they see 
that they actually can make a difference” (Combined interventions group teacher L). 
Teachers devised their own ways of making the idea of connections in the brain 
meaningful for students, with two using pathways analogies. One talked about 
sheep tracks that became well established with regular use, to highlight the 
strengthening effect of practice on synapses in the brain. A second teacher 
included herself in a GPS analogy, explaining to students that she provided 
guidance when students first travelled an unfamiliar route, but that after they had 
travelled that route a number of times, the GPS would become redundant because 
they knew their way independently. 
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Another teacher was excited to see one of her students writing about connections, 
and emailed me to let me know that “Yesterday we were doing some challenging 
work on identifying factors. At the end the children wrote a reflection on how they 
felt after this activity. One child wrote “It feels like a connection is connecting” 
(email from a Combined interventions group teacher M). The idea of building 
connections in the brain was also described by students during their Time 2 
interviews, and is illustrated by this girl‟s explanation of her understanding of the 
effect of learning on the brain: 
We learnt how when we learn new stuff, it creates a new pathway in our 
brain, connecting two cells, but if we don‟t keep going over it, then the 
connection doesn‟t really stay, so we‟ve got to keep practising to make 
the connection stronger. (Year 5 girl) 
Several teachers commented that they intended to include a focus on building 
connections in the brain at the beginning of the following school year, because they 
believed it had had positive effects on their students‟ learning in all areas, including 
mathematics. One teacher said “I think some of that brain work I‟ll do from the start 
of the year, and actually get them to see that they can make a difference … what 
they do contributes to what they achieve” (Combined interventions group 
teacher L). Likewise, another was going to highlight “The same sort of learning 
pathways, and creating new learning in our brains, and that we‟re getting more 
intelligent the more we learn and make connections” (Combined interventions 
group teacher P), as part of establishing her classroom culture at the beginning of 
the year. Other teachers‟ plans for the start of the next year included giving 
consideration to how students could be grouped in ways that might support their 
mathematics self-efficacy, and teaching students about how the brain works, using 
some of the resources provided during the intervention. 
Teacher change was not explicitly investigated during the interviews. A teacher with 
around 20 years‟ experience talked briefly about change being difficult. When she 
responded to a question about the challenges in implementing the interventions, 
she said the biggest challenge had been “Changing my behaviour. When you‟ve 
been teaching a long time, it is difficult sometimes to undertake new learning” 
(Combined interventions group teacher O). Her questionnaire scores for theory-of-
intelligence items were almost identical on both occasions (32 of a possible 48 total 
points at Time 1, and 33 at Time 2). Interestingly though, when she was asked to 
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comment on how the start of the next school year in her classroom might be 
different to the start of the current year, this teacher said that: 
I think I‟ll have more belief in their ability to change their intelligence 
through the year. I won‟t perhaps see them in quite such tight little 
groups – these are the slow group, this is the medium group … so I‟d like 
to see more movement between each group ... I think my expectations 
for them to make a difference to their intelligence through the year will be 
greater. (Combined interventions group teacher O) 
It was not possible to know whether this teacher‟s beliefs about intelligence had 
changed in a way that would endure, or whether this would have any effects on her 
interactions with students. 
Looking at the overall effects of this intervention, a small number of students 
reported improvements in their mathematics learning that they suggested was 
related to the theory-of-intelligence intervention. Although this may have been the 
case for some individual students, the overall quantitative analysis revealed no 
effect of treatment group on students‟ mean theory-of-intelligence, although it did 
show that students in the Combined interventions group had the highest mean 
mathematics achievement at each data collection point (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3, 
respectively).  
Teachers also seemed to think that the intervention lessons had made a difference 
for some students‟ learning, particularly in giving some students a greater sense of 
control of their learning, and an understanding that practice is necessary to 
establish lasting connections in the brain. The teachers whose comments indicated 
they believed the brain lessons had merit talked about their intention to incorporate 
them into their start-of-year planning to help establish their expectations for 
students‟ learning over the year. The intervention and its associated professional 
development, however, appeared to have had little effect on teachers‟ beliefs. 
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Chapter summary 
The qualitative findings helped to explain the nuances of students‟ and teachers‟ 
beliefs, and the effects on these of the interventions. Students‟ responses to 
interview questions about their mathematics self-efficacy indicated that their 
perceptions of task difficulty levels were associated with their self-efficacy beliefs. 
Teachers described the positive effects on students of implementing particular 
strategies intended to build their mathematics self-efficacy, particularly increasing 
their use of descriptive teacher-student feedback and using similar peers as models 
during mathematics. Students confirmed that observing similar, or more advanced, 
peers as models contributed to their mathematics learning, and seemed to be 
pleased that teachers included students of all abilities in peer modelling. 
Grouping students for mathematics instruction according to their strategy stages – 
a form of ability grouping – was perceived to have negative consequences for 
students who were less able mathematicians. Several teachers responded to this 
by experimenting with alternative groupings. However, it seems likely that the less 
able students who one teacher referred to as “always a Triangle” in fixed, ability-
based groups might simply become the students who are in the “people who aren‟t 
sure” category in alternative, fluid groupings. Whether alternative instructional 
management structures might have a more positive effect on all students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy than ability grouping in the long term, warrants further 
investigation. 
Signs of entity beliefs were more readily identifiable in comments about intelligence 
made by a small number of teachers than in responses from students, who typically 
described a variety of incremental beliefs. Two types of incremental beliefs seemed 
to emerge from the students‟ and teachers‟ interviews. First, beliefs were described 
that included some limiting factor, such as genetic inheritance or in the case of 
students‟ perspectives, time. Teachers most often described this kind of belief. 
Among the younger students, a belief that how much intelligence can be increased 
is limited appeared to be more prevalent than with older students. Secondly, a 
more optimistic belief that intelligence could be changed substantially with no 
particular restrictions, was more common among the older students interviewed, 
and a very small number of teachers. The extent to which the boundaries were 
blurred between these two types of incremental belief was not observable in the 
data. It is unclear whether an entity belief that a person inherits their intelligence 
and cannot change it can be clearly differentiated from an incremental theory with 
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limitations – a person inherits their intelligence but can change it, within limits. What 
was clear, though, was that talking about people as being either entity or 
incremental theorists is overly simplistic, masking a diversity of definitions of 
intelligence and beliefs about the degree to which it can be changed.  
Students‟ responses to questions about intelligence illuminated the complexity of 
their beliefs, and revealed two variables: how students defined intelligence, and 
how malleable they believed intelligence (as they defined it) actually is. The pattern 
that was consistent across the whole sample, regardless of theory-of-intelligence 
score or year level, was that students most frequently defined intelligence as a 
capacity to learn. How the findings from the qualitative data summarised here 
compared with those from the quantitative data, is discussed in the following 
chapter. 
  
214 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Evidence of intervention effects 
The main aim of the study was to determine what effects two interventions had on 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics 
achievement, over time. More specifically, the study sought to answer the question: 
Over the three data collection points, do individual student differences in 
mathematics self-efficacy, achievement, and theory-of-intelligence vary as a 
function of treatment group? 
An important finding was that the evidence supported the hypothesis that the 
mathematics self-efficacy intervention would have a significant positive effect over 
time on the mean self-efficacy and achievement of students in the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group. This was consistent with the findings of Siegle and 
McCoach (2007). Significant interactions of time and treatment group indicated that 
the significantly lower mathematics self-efficacy and achievement of the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group that was evident at Time 1 was no 
longer evident at Time 3. The three strategies that most teachers in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group reported implementing with their 
students were: increasing their use of similar peers as models; increasing their use 
of descriptive teacher-student feedback; and providing students with strategies for 
coping when learning becomes difficult. Teachers raising their expectations of 
students‟ learning and becoming more willing to press students to work through 
difficult problems, rather than allowing them to abandon them, were also themes. 
Despite the significant effect of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention on the 
mean mathematics self-efficacy of the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, 
there was no evidence of such an effect for the Combined interventions group. This 
might be associated with the significantly lower mean self-efficacy, pre-intervention, 
for the former group compared with the latter, arguably providing the self-efficacy 
intervention group greater potential than the combined group for increasing their 
self-efficacy beliefs. However, a more likely explanation might be related to the 
difference in pre-intervention mathematics achievement of the two groups. In their 
meta-analysis, Multon et al. (1991) observed that students with low achievement 
seemed to benefit most from self-efficacy interventions. Given that the mean 
215 
 
mathematics achievement for the Mathematics self-efficacy group was significantly 
lower than achievement in the two other groups when the present study began, this 
might partly explain the difference in the self-efficacy trajectories for the two groups. 
Another factor that might have strengthened the impact of the intervention for the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, is that one medium-size school‟s 
entire teaching staff participated in all the intervention group meetings as their 
school-wide professional development focus for the year. This potentially provided 
those teachers with the collegial support and commitment to a shared purpose that 
Timperley et al. (2007) highlighted as necessary ingredients for changing teachers‟ 
practice. The Combined interventions group, in contrast, comprised a single 
teacher at one school and groups of three and four teachers at two other schools, 
all of which were larger schools with at least 400 students each. These teachers 
may not have had the same opportunities for collegial support, and were also 
participating in additional school-wide professional learning and development.  
An alternative explanation for the different effect for the Combined interventions 
group is that the theory-of-intelligence intervention might have interfered with the 
mathematics self-efficacy intervention in some way. Whatever the underlying 
reason for the disparate findings, the change in self-efficacy for the Mathematics 
self-efficacy intervention group shows that the self-efficacy intervention was 
effective for these students. 
There was no substantial evidence for the efficacy of the theory-of-intelligence 
intervention, aimed at developing more of an incremental belief about the 
malleability of intelligence. The lessons about the functioning of the brain were 
memorable for some students, particularly the idea that learning resulted in new 
connections being formed in the brain. In their interviews, several teachers and 
students commented about observed improvements in mathematics achievement. 
However, the quantitative data for the 152 students did not identify systematic 
positive effects for students in this group; the intervention may have had an impact 
on particular students, but no widespread change in theory-of-intelligence was 
detected by the theory-of-intelligence instrument.  
Students in the Combined interventions group did not show increased theory-of-
intelligence scores, mathematics self-efficacy, and achievement, more than 
students in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group or the Control group, 
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as had been hypothesised. The findings from the present study, therefore, were not 
consistent with those of Blackwell et al. (2007). 
Effects of gender and year level 
Among teatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics 
self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender or year level? 
Overall, mean scores for mathematics self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and 
achievement increased from Time 1 to Time 3 for girls and boys, and for Year 4 
and Year 5 students, in all treatment groups. What stood out in regard to the 
hypothesised between-group differences according to gender and year level were 
initial significant differences in self-efficacy and achievement for students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, that had diminished by the final data 
collection point.  
For girls, there was no evidence to support hypothesised between-group 
differences. For boys, there was a significant effect of treatment group. At Times 1 
and 2, boys in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group had significantly 
lower mean mathematics self-efficacy and achievement than did boys in the 
remaining groups. The delayed post-intervention measures showed that between-
group differences for boys did not persist, suggesting the effectiveness for these 
boys of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention.  
For Year 4 students‟ mathematics achievement, a significant interaction between 
time and treatment was evident. The mean achievement of Year 4 students in the 
Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group was lower than that of their peers in 
the two other groups until Time 3. This between-group difference in achievement 
was even more clearly defined for Year 5 students in the Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group. In addition to significant effects of time and treatment group, 
and significant interaction effects for mathematics achievement, similar significant 
effects were evident for their mathematics self-efficacy. These significant between-
group differences were no longer evident at Time 3. These findings also suggest 
the mathematics self-efficacy intervention had a positive effect on the achievement 
and self-efficacy of students in the mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, as 
had been hypothesised. 
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Within treatment groups, do individual student differences in mathematics 
self-efficacy, theory-of-intelligence, and mathematics achievement vary as a 
function of gender or year level? 
Within individual treatment groups, no consistent effects of gender were indicated. 
Only in one group was there support for the hypothesis that boys‟ self-efficacy 
would be higher than girls‟ self-efficacy. In the Combined interventions group, boys‟ 
mean mathematics self-efficacy was significantly higher than that of girls, 
consistent with the findings of Lloyd et al. (2005), whose participants included 
students of a similar age. There was no significant difference in boys‟ and girls‟ 
mean alignment of mathematics self-efficacy and achievement, indicating no 
consistency between the findings of the present study and those of Ewers and 
Wood‟s (1993) study, in which 10 and 11-year-old boys tended to over-estimate 
their abilities more than girls.  
The hypothesised gender difference in theory-of-intelligence, identified in studies by 
Dweck and Leggett (1988), Rӓty et al. (2004), and Stipek and Gralinski (1991), was 
not evident in the three groups of students. In the Control group, an initial 
significant difference between the boys‟ and girls‟ mean scores for theory-of-
intelligence was no longer evident at Time 2. In contrast, boys‟ mean theory-of-
intelligence was significantly greater than girls‟ theory-of-intelligence at Time 3 only, 
for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group. These one-off significant 
differences might be associated with the theory-of-intelligence instrument‟s capacity 
for accurately measuring students‟ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. 
Importantly, the hypothesis that there would be no significant differences in girls‟ 
and boys‟ mathematics achievement was supported by the quantitative data, 
consistent with Young-Loveridge‟s (2010) findings. 
The mean achievement of Year 5 students was higher than that of Year 4 students, 
in line with expectations based on Darr et al. (2007). Although most of the 
significant within-group differences associated with year level involved mathematics 
achievement and self-efficacy, the quantitative data did not support the hypothesis 
that Year 4 students would show stronger mathematics self-efficacy than Year 5 
students. On the contrary, Year 5 students in the Combined interventions group 
had significantly greater mathematics self-efficacy than Year 4 students on all three 
occasions.  
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The quantitative data did not convincingly support the hypothesis that Year 4 
students would tend to have a stronger incremental theory-of-intelligence than Year 
5 students. Although year level showed no significant effect in the Control and 
Combined interventions groups, significant differences according to year level for 
theory-of-intelligence were indicated for the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention 
group, in which the mean for Year 4 students exceeded that of Year 5 students. 
This difference provided only limited support for the hypothesis, consistent with 
previous studies‟ findings (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Leonardi & 
Gialamas, 2002; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996).  
Relationships among the student variables 
How are students’ theory-of-intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, and 
mathematics achievement related?  
Across the three groups, moderate-to-strong positive correlations between students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement were fairly consistent, as hypothesised. 
Regression analyses showed that for students in the Mathematics self-efficacy group, 
post-intervention self-efficacy was associated with greater proportions of the variance 
in mathematics achievement at Times 2 and 3 than it was for the two other groups. 
There appeared to be something of a spiral effect for this group, with increased 
achievement building self-efficacy, which in turn strengthened subsequent 
achievement for students in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group. This is 
consistent with previous findings that self-efficacy predicts achievement (for example, 
Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 1999; Schunk, 1981), and also that achievement 
predicts subsequent self-efficacy (Feltz, 1982; Usher & Pajares, 2009).   
A few moderate correlations between self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence were 
identified, but the systematic association between them that had been hypothesised 
was not evident. This finding was inconsistent with those of Chen and Pajares (2010), 
and Wood and Bandura (1989). The Time 3 correlations, in particular, might be 
associated with older students, more than younger students, defining intelligence as 
(malleable) knowledge. Although it seems possible that as students got older, the 
relationship between their self-efficacy and (so-called) theory-of-intelligence might 
have strengthened, problems with the theory-of-intelligence measure discussed shortly 
make reliable interpretation of the resultant data doubtful. 
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Mathematics self-efficacy change over time 
The mean mathematics self-efficacy of students in the three groups increased over 
time, consistent with a trend identified in Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons‟ (1990) 
cross-sectional study, whose participants were at least 10 years old – slightly older 
than the 7 to 9-year-olds in the present study. Each treatment group‟s mean 
mathematics self-efficacy exceeded their mean achievement at each of the three 
data-collection points. Alignment of self-efficacy and achievement was closer 
towards the end of the school year than at the beginning of either of the two school 
years encompassing the study. The closer alignment is attributable to the increase 
in achievement for all groups from Time 1 to Time 2 being greater than their 
increase in self-efficacy.  
In contrast, from the end of one school year to the start of the next, the increase in 
students‟ self-efficacy exceeded their increase in achievement, perhaps reflecting 
students‟ optimism at the start of a school year. Students were presented with the 
same mathematics problems at the end of the year as they had been shown seven 
months previously, so the problems may have seemed familiar to them on the 
second occasion. Although this might be expected to boost their self-efficacy, 
students were probably aware on this second occasion that they would 
subsequently be expected to solve the problems, and may have made more 
cautious self-efficacy judgments as a result. On the third occasion that they 
completed the self-efficacy measure, however, no such caution was evident. It 
seems likely that, at the end of the school year, when the gap between self-efficacy 
and achievement levels was smallest, students had probably developed a more 
accurate idea of their capabilities as a result of an accumulation of assessment 
information and teacher-student feedback about their progress over the course of 
the year.  
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Relationships between the student and teacher variables 
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s theory-of-intelligence and their 
students’ theory-of-intelligence? 
Is there a correlation between a teacher’s self-efficacy for teaching 
mathematics and their students’ mathematics self-efficacy? 
It was hypothesised that teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence and that of their students 
would be positively correlated, particularly in the second half of the school year. 
Likewise, a teacher‟s self-efficacy for teaching mathematics was hypothesised to 
be correlated with their students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, especially later in the 
year. There was no evidence, however, to support either of these hypotheses. On 
the contrary, moderate negative correlations were found between the pre-
intervention theory-of-intelligence of teachers in the Combined interventions group 
and their students‟ mathematics self-efficacy and achievement at each time point, 
suggesting that for this group, students‟ self-efficacy and achievement tended to be 
higher where their teacher‟s theory-of-intelligence was low, and student measures 
tended to be low when the teacher‟s theory-of-intelligence was high. For the two 
remaining groups, no patterns of significant correlations between teacher and 
student measures were identified. The associations between teachers‟ beliefs and 
those of their students identified in studies by Anderson et al. (1988) and Stipek et 
al (2001) were not evident in the present study. 
The lack of correlation between teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics 
and students‟ mathematics self-efficacy might be associated with the different 
specificity of the two self-efficacy measures used. Students‟ self-efficacy was 
operationalised as being related to specific problems, whereas teachers‟ self-
efficacy was operationalised as domain-related. Furthermore, teachers were 
probably aware that their self-efficacy judgments would not be compared to their 
actual practice during the study, and this might have influenced how some teachers 
responded. As will be discussed shortly, the theory-of-intelligence questionnaire did 
not appear to provide meaningful information about students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs 
about the malleability of intelligence, because how they defined intelligence 
affected their malleability beliefs.  
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Theory-of-intelligence: Complexities and nuances 
What is the nature of students’ and teachers’ theory-of-intelligence?  
Together, the quantitative and qualitative data provided evidence that students‟ and 
teachers‟ theory-of-intelligence beliefs were not defined in absolute entity or 
incremental terms. Teachers‟ beliefs formed a continuum; students‟ beliefs about 
intelligence appeared to be influenced by the various ways in which they defined 
intelligence, and as such, were multi-dimensional. Definitions of intelligence 
expressed by students varied from simple to complex. More students gave a simple 
definition of intelligence as either knowledge, or as a relatively stable capacity, than 
gave a definition that included both (incremental) knowledge and a (stable) capacity 
component. In addition, students‟ beliefs varied in respect of the extent to which 
these components of intelligence can change.   
Similarities between students‟ and teachers‟ definitions of intelligence were evident, 
although students tended to relate their descriptions of intelligence to their personal 
experience more than teachers, who were more likely to talk in terms of general 
principles. Students‟ ideas about what intelligence is and their beliefs about how 
much it can be changed were diverse, even among those who had similar theory-
of-intelligence scores.  
Students‟ definitions of intelligence fell into three broad categories: those who 
defined intelligence as a combination of a fairly stable capacity and a malleable 
knowledge component; those who defined it only as a stable capacity; and those 
who defined it only as a malleable knowledge component. How students defined 
intelligence appeared to be associated with how much they believed it can be 
changed. Students who described a combination of two components of intelligence 
tended to think they could increase their intelligence, but within limits due to the 
stable capacity component. Some of these students appeared to believe that they 
had a good amount of this capacity, and were keen to add to it by learning as much 
as possible. Students who believed intelligence is simply “How smart you are” – a 
stable capacity – were likely to perceive that they could change their intelligence 
only slightly. Still others seemed to think of intelligence as only the expandable 
knowledge component, and so were quite optimistic about being able to increase 
their intelligence.  
Only tentative conclusions can be drawn by comparing ways in which students in 
the present study defined intelligence to those of similar age students in other 
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studies, due to variations in the coding and presentation of qualitative data. In the 
descriptions of the classifications Yussen and Kane (1985) used to analyse their 
data, their “Academic skills” category is very similar to the present study‟s “How 
smart you are, being good at something”. Similarly, their “Knowledge” category is 
approximately parallel to the present study‟s “Knowing, getting right answers”. 
Yussen and Kane identified a shift in definitions of intelligence of first to sixth-grade 
students, from younger students‟ more frequent inclusion of social skills to older 
students‟ greater emphasis on academic skills. Overall, findings from the present 
study appeared to contradict those of Yussen and Kane‟s study. Defining 
intelligence with reference to academic skills was more frequent among Year 4 
than Year 5 students in the present study – the opposite of Yussen and Kane‟s 
finding.  Yussen and Kane reported that knowledge was central at all grades, but in 
the present study, Year 5 students included knowledge-related comments more 
often than the Year 4 students did. There was very little mention of social skills 
across all students‟ definitions of intelligence. Like Yussen and Kane (1985), Kurtz-
Costes et al. (2005) found that younger children were more likely to include non-
cognitive factors in their definitions of intelligence. In their study, Kurtz-Costes et al. 
did not differentiate knowledge from ability, instead including them both as 
“knowledge/achievement”. This makes it very difficult to draw any meaningful 
comparisons between their findings and those of the present study.  
Cain and Dweck (1989) hypothesised that students believe intelligence is a 
combination of a fixed capacity and a knowledge component, and that entity 
theorists give greater weighting to the fixed capacity and incremental theorists, the 
knowledge aspect, in a dialectical relationship. The present study identified some 
students with a belief that intelligence comprises both a stable capacity and an 
expandable knowledge component, and some students who identified only one of 
these aspects, suggesting that Cain and Dweck‟s hypothesis was simplistic. 
Students with high theory-of-intelligence scores were more likely than those with 
low scores to include knowledge or skill in their definition of intelligence. The former 
students did not emphasise intelligence as a fixed capacity any more than did the 
latter. Only a small proportion of the students indicated that they conceptualised 
intelligence as two-dimensional, probably because of their age. 
It was not surprising that Year 5 students with high theory-of-intelligence scores 
tended to define intelligence as malleable knowledge, which may reflect these 
students‟ perceptions about what is valued in the senior primary school years.  
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That the older students, more than the younger students, tended to believe their 
intelligence is expandable, might seem to be something of a contradiction. One 
might expect that as students get older, they develop more sophisticated 
conceptions of intelligence, and temper their optimism about increasing their 
intelligence. However, it is also likely that as students get older and start to 
understand possible limitations of their intelligence, they might also develop a 
clearer understanding of effective learning strategies they can use to maximise 
other aspects of their intelligence, which might account for this apparent optimism. 
Theory-of-intelligence change over time 
Do students’ theory-of-intelligence beliefs change as they get older?  
The hypothesis that the Control group‟s mean score for theory-of-intelligence would 
decrease over the three time points, consistent with a shift towards an entity theory-
of-intelligence as students got older (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Kӓrkkӓinen et al., 2008; 
Leonardi & Gialamas, 2002), was not supported by the data. In fact, the mean 
theory-of-intelligence score for all three groups increased on each occasion it was 
measured, suggesting a general trend in the opposite direction, towards an 
incremental theory, supporting the findings of Burke and Williams (2009) and 
Gonida et al. (2006), whose studies also involved primary students. From the 
quantitative data, it was not possible to determine whether this shift reflected an 
actual change in clearly-held beliefs or if this might have been related to the 
development of students‟ ability to understand intelligence, and a better 
understanding of what they were being asked in the questionnaire. At Time 3 in 
particular, there were several correlations between students‟ theory-of-intelligence 
and mathematics self-efficacy (see Table 6.3), which were not evident previously, 
and which might have been associated with a developing conceptualisation of 
intelligence as including both stable capacity and malleable knowledge 
components.  
An important finding was that no students and few teachers were identified as 
having a strong entity theory-of-intelligence. Having an absolute entity theory 
implies a complete absence of belief that intelligence can change, but in previous 
research – particularly studies such as those conducted by Dweck et al. (1995) and 
Pepi et al. (2004), in which theory-of-intelligence scores were dichotomised – many 
of those who were labelled entity theorists might have been people with a weak 
incremental belief, rather than those who actually believe that intelligence is fixed. 
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Similarly, those who have been represented as incremental theorists are likely to 
have had a variety of views about the malleability of intelligence. Almost all student 
interviewees described varying degrees of incremental beliefs in their Time 1 
interviews, so it was very difficult to identify change in students‟ beliefs at Time 2 
from the qualitative data. It is possible that other researchers have encountered the 
same issue (without realising it), and that students with strong entity beliefs may 
have been equally scarce in previous studies. For example, using a 6-point Likert 
scale, the mean theory of intelligence score of 4.45 in Blackwell et al.‟s (2007) 
study suggests that few of the 91 12 and 13-year-olds in their study showed a 
strong entity theory-of-intelligence. Where theory-of-intelligence scores seem to be 
concentrated in the upper half of the range, the spread of scores might represent 
more nuanced beliefs about how much intelligence can be increased than have 
been previously described. 
Consideration was given to whether the lack of entity theorists might be a cultural 
difference in the beliefs of New Zealand students, compared to those of similar-age 
students in other countries where theory-of-intelligence has been measured. 
Results of two studies whose participants were similar ages and that used at least 
three of Dweck‟s (2000) items were compared to those of the present study. 
Gonida et al. (2006) conducted their study in Greece, and reported mean total 
scores, from a 6-point Likert scale, with 6 being a strong belief in the malleability of 
intelligence. For two groups of students, means were 4.53 (standard deviation 1.34) 
and 4.48 (standard deviation 1.22). Shih‟s (2007) study was conducted in Taiwan, 
and although no means or medians were reported, 69 of their 298 participants 
(around 23%) were identified as having an entity theory-of-intelligence. However, to 
be considered an entity theorist in Shih‟s study, participants had to score above the 
mean score for the three entity items and below the mean score for the incremental 
items. Although a similar approach was used in the present study to identify 
students to interview who had a range of beliefs about the malleability of 
intelligence, their interview responses demonstrated that none of them actually had 
a strong entity belief. Children‟s scores on theory-of-intelligence items do not seem 
to mean what researchers interpret them to mean. Whether there are indeed 
cultural differences in children‟s beliefs about the malleability of intelligence needs 
to be investigated using methods other than Dweck‟s theory-of-intelligence 
questionnaire. 
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Does an incremental theory foster all students’ learning? 
In the literature, an incremental theory is often espoused as an advantageous belief 
for everyone to have, because of its association – for students in some samples – 
with higher achievement, than was an entity belief. In the present study though, 
there was no evidence to support an association between a strongly incremental 
theory-of-intelligence and high achievement, or between a clear entity belief and 
low achievement. In fact, no students indicated a strong belief that intelligence 
cannot be changed, although a good number indicated a strongly incremental 
belief.  
A belief that sat somewhere between extreme entity and incremental beliefs was 
suggested by some students‟ responses: one student in particular described 
thinking about different types of intelligence – a type that is essentially fixed, and 
one to which you can add. He was one of two quite articulate students who 
achieved high scores in mathematics, and who seemed to believe that intelligence 
is fairly stable but can be increased within limits. From their comments, both 
seemed to believe they were quite intelligent and that this was not going to 
increase substantially, and both had confident “can do” attitudes. For a slightly 
larger group of students who had a mixture of low and high theory-of-intelligence 
scores, the beginnings of this type of thinking were perhaps evident. Taking the 
mathematics achievement of some of the students in this group as an indicator of 
their intelligence, it seemed some of them were also very able.  
There were no students in the present study who expressed a strong belief that 
they could not increase their intelligence. Consequently, there was no evidence 
relating to whether an entity theory-of-intelligence might have a negative effect, 
leading students to believe they are powerless to overcome their deficits, as Ziegler 
and Stoeger‟s (2010) research indicated. It seems probable that a student would 
feel more empowered to overcome their weaknesses, by a belief that they can 
increase their intelligence.   
Dichotomising theory-of-intelligence, as either entity or incremental, belies the 
complexity of students‟ thinking about what intelligence is, and how much it can be 
changed. What previous studies of theory-of-intelligence have failed to identify is 
the varying degrees to which students believe different aspects of intelligence can 
be changed. None of the students in this study believed they could not increase 
their intelligence. Instead, students held a range of views that appeared to fall into 
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one of two broad categories: either that they had a limited potential to increase their 
intelligence, or that they could substantially increase their intelligence.  
Perhaps, if any one of these beliefs about intelligence leads to learning for 
particular students, then they should be encouraged. However, perhaps even more 
helpful would be for teachers to ensure their students know that they expect all 
students to learn, and in fact, will press them to do so with appropriate support, on 
tasks with an inherent degree of challenge that is also appropriate. Teachers can 
help students to cope constructively with the difficult learning experiences they will 
then encounter by explicitly teaching them ways of coping in such situations. 
Whether students interpret teachers‟ expectations that they will learn as meaning 
they can change their intelligence, or as meaning that they can increase a 
component of their intelligence, may not actually be particularly important.  
Mixing the quantitative and qualitative findings 
Is there convergence between the quantitative and qualitative findings?  
Quantitative and qualitative findings were compared to identify convergence and 
contradictions emerging from the data. Students‟ responses to interview questions 
about their mathematics self-efficacy largely confirmed the picture generated by 
their questionnaire responses, and shed some light on the factors on which they 
based these judgments. Students most typically judged their belief in their ability to 
solve a given problem according to whether they perceived the task as easy or 
difficult, and whether they believed they had the requisite mathematics knowledge 
or ability. Requiring students to make judgments about their ability to solve specific 
mathematics problems, as advocated by Bandura (1986, 2006), resulted in the 
instrument measuring what it was intended to, with evident precision. In the case of 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy, the qualitative and quantitative findings 
converged.  
In contrast, findings for theory-of-intelligence from the two datasets did not align in 
any meaningful way. The interviews provided insight into how poorly the 
questionnaire data for theory-of-intelligence for these students and teachers 
actually represented their beliefs about intelligence. Responding to theory-of-
intelligence items seemed to involve an individual amalgamating their judgments of 
how much they believed the often-multiple components of what they defined as 
intelligence could change. Whatever the definition of intelligence students gave, 
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though, seemed to have little systematic association with their questionnaire 
scores. A student with a low score on the questionnaire, for instance, might have 
had a uni-dimensional perception of intelligence and believed it could be increased 
only slightly. Alternatively, they might have had a two-dimensional 
conceptualisation of intelligence and believed that although the knowledge 
component could be increased significantly, the capacity component was fairly 
stable. In light of this, the interpretation of students‟ questionnaire scores became 
quite problematic. For students of this age (from 7 years 7 months to 9 years 6 
months old when the study began), the measure of theory-of-intelligence did not 
expose the complexity of their beliefs about intelligence, and in fact, yielded no 
meaningful information.  
Students with more nuanced definitions of intelligence – perhaps closer to those 
expressed by teachers than by some of their peers – tended to have low scores for 
theory-of-intelligence, and some were very able mathematicians. This suggests that 
students with a more sophisticated understanding of intelligence and the factors 
that might influence it, might be more cautious about believing in its malleability. 
Perhaps rather than maintaining their naïve optimism that they can be successful at 
anything by expanding their accumulation of knowledge, students start to perceive 
limitations to their possibilities. The main limitation appears to be the realisation that 
intelligence is, at least partially, determined by genetic inheritance – a factor over 
which students have no control. 
In Chapter 6, a number of statistically significant moderate correlations between 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence – particularly involving Time 3 
theory-of-intelligence – were unexplained. With evidence from the student 
interviews showing that the theory-of-intelligence instrument was an almost 
meaningless measure for students of this age, it is unclear what in fact was being 
measured by these items. The somewhat muddled factor loadings for these items 
are also suggestive of problems with the integrity of the instrument. It can therefore 
only be surmised that these correlations might be associated with older students 
tending to define intelligence as (malleable) knowledge, making it reasonable to 
think that as students got older, the relationship between their self-efficacy and (so-
called) theory-of-intelligence might have strengthened. 
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Contribution to the research 
The findings from this study contribute to the research into primary students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence, and how these are associated 
with students‟ achievement.  
First, the teacher-implemented strategies were shown to increase the mean 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement of a group of students for whom these 
two measures were initially lower than those of students in a control group. 
Strategies used by teachers to help build their students‟ mathematics self-efficacy 
demonstrated that classroom-based interventions, delivered to students by their 
teachers, can be effective in changing students‟ beliefs and achievement, although 
little impact on teachers‟ beliefs was evident. The majority of intervention studies 
that have targeted students‟ self-efficacy and beliefs about intelligence have been 
experimental in nature and conducted entirely beyond the classroom by 
researchers (for example, Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Kinlaw & Kurtz-Costes, 2007; 
Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008; Schunk, 1982, 1983a). In 
the present study, students were withdrawn from their classrooms for interview 
purposes only. I administered the mathematics self-efficacy, achievement, and 
theory-of-intelligence measures in-class, with teachers present. The actual 
interventions were the responsibility of teachers, meaning that teachers played a 
significant role in the study. While this meant I relinquished control over exactly 
what form the interventions took for students in different classes, it also meant that 
the interventions were tested by teachers in a variety of authentic teaching 
contexts.  
Second, calibrating the mathematics self-efficacy and achievement instruments in 
this study to the same difficulty parameters gave a more rigorous measure of 
students‟ mathematics self-efficacy over time than has recently been used (see for 
example, Chen, 2006; Klassen, 2004; Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008). Students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy was measured with items that were referenced to specific 
mathematics problems that students were subsequently required to solve. These 
age-specific items were calibrated to the same difficulty scale, allowing more 
precise estimates of self-efficacy than in studies where the difficulty levels of 
problems were estimated by researchers (for example, Bandura & Schunk, 1981; 
Chen, 2006; Ramdass & Zimmerman, 2008; Relich et al., 1986). Furthermore, the 
same students‟ mathematics self-efficacy was measured on three occasions, over 
a 14-month period, extending the methods used in a 6-month study by Pajares and 
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Graham (1999) in which students‟ task-specific mathematics self-efficacy was 
assessed twice. Students‟ self-efficacy judgments were made in relation to two 
different teacher-designed exams, which were not calibrated to a difficulty scale.  
Third, the findings of this study challenge some of the previous conceptualisations 
of beliefs about intelligence, and suggest that researchers might usefully ask some 
different questions about intelligence to help identify the apparent nuances in 
students‟ and teachers‟ beliefs. These questions might include: “What do you think 
intelligence is?” and “How much do you think [the components of intelligence that 
students describe] can be changed?” No students were identified as pure entity 
theorists, casting doubt on whether many students of similar ages in previous 
studies have actually held this belief. A small number of teachers, on the other 
hand, described clear entity beliefs about the malleability of intelligence, particularly 
pre-intervention. Students in the present study described intelligence as being 
either uni-dimensional or two-dimensional, but this was not systematically 
associated with students‟ questionnaire scores. Findings suggested that some 
students with high ability have more complex ideas about the nature of intelligence. 
Meaningful interpretation of students‟ scores on the theory-of-intelligence 
questionnaire was not possible. For students in the present study, their theory-of-
intelligence scores were not generally helpful in predicting their mathematics self-
efficacy or achievement. A theory-of-intelligence intervention had no significant 
effect on students‟ theory-of-intelligence, mathematics self-efficacy, or 
achievement. The findings raise questions about whether simply advocating an 
incremental theory-of-intelligence for all students – regardless of a their ability or 
beliefs about intelligence – will have the most positive effect on their achievement.  
Limitations of the study 
Practical considerations helped determine the scale of the study. The number of 
participating students and teachers was limited by there being a single researcher 
responsible for gathering and analysing data, and presenting professional 
development workshops. The length of time spent gathering data for this semi-
longitudinal study was also dictated by feasibility. Within these limits, I aimed to 
maximise the quantity of data collected.  
The ability to generalise findings to other contexts is limited by the sample size and 
also by the particular characteristics of the sample (for example, the schools were 
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all decile 7 to 10). Beliefs about intelligence and mathematics self-efficacy beliefs 
may differ according to students‟ ethnicity, social class, parents‟ education levels, 
and other factors. It was not the aim of this study to investigate these factors, and 
so the sample was not designed to support these explorations. Because the 
participants in this quasi-experimental research were in pre-determined class 
groups rather than being randomly assigned to treatment groups, the three groups 
of students and teachers were not exactly equivalent. Neither were the number of 
teachers participating in each school the same, with participation ranging from a 
single teacher at one school, to six at another school. These factors must therefore 
be considered when interpreting the study‟s findings.  
I was aware that students with low mathematics self-efficacy might prefer to avoid 
participating in this study. For this reason, I visited each of the 24 classrooms to 
talk to students about their involvement, reassuring them that the focus was on 
their opinions and beliefs, and that to answer the questionnaire, they had simply to 
circle their answer. Students had an opportunity to ask questions, and as well as 
information and consent forms for their parents, students were given consent forms 
to show that their voices were valued. Nonetheless, it is likely that students with an 
aversion to mathematics-related school activities were more likely to decide not to 
participate than students who enjoyed mathematics. 
Classroom observations of teachers in the intervention groups were not feasible, in 
addition to the considerable quantity of data already gathered for this study. The 
lack of in-class support and monitoring is likely to have contributed to the 
comparatively weak outcomes of the study. The explicit focus was on changing the 
beliefs of students, not those of teachers, although the latter may have influenced 
the former.   
In order to investigate students‟ beliefs about learning in general, and beliefs about 
learning mathematics in particular, I chose to focus on students‟ mathematics self-
efficacy and theory-of-intelligence. By deciding what to include, many other 
possible foci, such as the broader constructs of goal orientation and learning 
strategies, were excluded. There are many additional aspects of students‟ beliefs 
about learning that are also likely to play a role in how a student feels about 
learning mathematics, including the classroom culture, students‟ relationships with 
their teachers, and the influence of perceived expectations of parents, peers, and 
teachers. 
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Future directions 
In future research, young students‟ ideas about the knowledge/skill and 
capacity/rate aspects of intelligence need to be made explicit, and then their beliefs 
about the malleability of each one, measured separately. There is much to be learnt 
about the nuances of students‟ beliefs about intelligence by seeking answers to 
questions such as, “What do you think intelligence is?” and “How much do you 
think [the components of intelligence that students describe] can be increased?”, 
rather than seeking to determine “Do you (or do you not) think intelligence can be 
changed?”  
Still more important, though, will be research that investigates the effects of 
teachers being clear with students about their expectation that students will 
succeed with learning that challenges them, and pressing them to do so, 
irrespective of teachers‟ and students‟ beliefs about intelligence. Alton-Lee (2003) 
emphasised the need for teachers to have high expectations for students‟ learning, 
supported by quality teaching in order to make a positive difference to students‟ 
achievement. More recently, it was stated in the New Zealand Curriculum that: 
“Students will be encouraged to value excellence, by aiming high and by 
persevering in the face of difficulties” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 10). Students 
need to be provided with opportunities to persevere with genuinely challenging 
learning. At times, this will inevitably involve them failing at a task, and this in itself 
is a valuable learning opportunity – one from which primary teachers tend to protect 
young students, unintentionally denying them the opportunity to learn appropriate 
ways to respond. Some of the coping strategies that teachers implemented in the 
present study as part of the mathematics self-efficacy intervention involved 
explicitly teaching students as young as 6 years old, appropriate ways to react 
when they encounter difficulty in their learning, such as applying greater effort, and 
persevering. The question of how New Zealand primary schools equip students to 
cope with difficulty and failure is an area for further investigation. 
During their interviews, teachers and students suggested that strategy grouping for 
mathematics has a negative influence on the mathematics self-efficacy of students 
who were less able in mathematics. Whether this is in fact the case, and whether 
alternative organisational structures, such as co-operative groups or fluid groupings 
that focus on different content areas might have a more positive effect on the 
mathematics self-efficacy of less able students need further investigation. As 
Nicholls (1978) suggested, non-competitive arrangements seem to have the 
232 
 
potential to foster low achievers‟ engagement in learning, as well as engaging 
those who excel. 
Whether there is a relationship between absences from school and students‟ 
beliefs in their abilities is another area for research. It seems reasonable that 
disruptions to learning caused by absences are likely to have negative effects on 
students‟ mathematics achievement and self-efficacy beliefs. In the present study, 
only four of the eight students in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
who were selected for interviews because they had low mathematics self-efficacy 
at Time 1 had complete datasets. More detailed information about students‟ 
absences could help to identify whether there is an inverse relationship between 
absences and mathematics self-efficacy, and would add to our knowledge of ways 
in which student absences can influence achievement.  
Finally, measuring teachers‟ self-efficacy for teaching mathematics at the same 
level of specificity as students‟ mathematics self-efficacy would operationalise the 
construct in a manner that is more consistent with Bandura‟s (1986) definition of 
self-efficacy, and with recommendations for measuring self-efficacy (Bandura, 
2006; Pajares, 1996b). This would require teachers making judgments about their 
ability to undertake specific teaching activities for particular students, which they 
would subsequently undertake.  A teacher‟s self-efficacy could be compared with 
the achievement of the particular students, to give an indication of the difficulty of 
their specific teaching task. Measuring teachers‟ self-efficacy with a greater degree 
of precision might further illuminate the relationship between teachers‟ beliefs and 
students‟ achievement. 
Concluding thoughts 
Returning to my students with mathematics difficulties who were cited at the 
beginning of this thesis as motivating the research, some implications of the 
present work are apparent. Some of the strategies included by teachers in the 
mathematics self-efficacy intervention might have been helpful in encouraging 
these students to become more engaged in learning mathematics, which might in 
turn have supported an increase in their achievement. Although at the time I 
expressed to the students my confidence in their ability to master the concepts on 
which they worked, I was perhaps not insistent enough that they did actually master 
them. Had I pressed them more to work through the difficulties they encountered 
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until they succeeded, rather than pulling back when I could see them growing 
anxious or confused, it seems likely they would have developed stronger 
mathematics self-efficacy and higher achievement in this key learning area. I was 
reluctant to push these young students beyond work with which they were 
comfortable, and at the time, believed that encouraging them to enjoy mathematics 
work was also important. However, listening to the students and teachers in this 
study led me to think that perhaps an enjoyment of mathematics might be more 
surely developed for all students by teachers being insistent that students 
persevere until they succeed in achieving challenging goals. Supporting students 
with a suitable level of scaffolding for learning experiences that have an appropriate 
degree of challenge, and involving them in conversations about how they can 
improve their achievement (Alton-Lee, 2003; Hattie, 1999; Hattie & Timperley, 
2007; Tunstall & Gipps, 1996a) are particular strategies that teachers can use to 
facilitate this, as teachers in the Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group 
demonstrated.  
Clearly, addressing students‟ learning needs while at the same time building their 
mathematics self-efficacy poses a challenge for teachers, particularly in relation to 
students who find mathematics difficult. By encouraging students “to value 
excellence, by aiming high and by persevering in the face of difficulties” (Ministry of 
Education, 2007, p. 10), teachers can help build students‟ mathematics self-efficacy 
and achievement. The success of our endeavours in this area will be marked by 
students having “a „can-do‟ attitude, and with students seeing themselves as 
capable learners” (p. 12), as did this student:  
I was always confident that I could solve things, and I just had to work it 
out, coz if I didn‟t believe that I could do it, then it would‟ve been a lot 
harder, coz it‟s all about attitude. (Year 5 boy, high mathematics self-
efficacy score) 
To get to this point, teachers and students will together need to press on through 
challenging mathematics learning that may at times be uncomfortable, and indeed, 
may initially meet with failure. Teachers – as well as students – need to learn to 
persevere when their students encounter difficulty, and to make sure their students 
are equipped with strategies for responding constructively, rather than avoiding 
these potentially uncomfortable situations. That this can be effectively implemented 
during a mathematics lesson was demonstrated by one teacher who had earlier 
described her participation in the study as “galvanising” her resolve to deal more 
234 
 
pro-actively with challenging situations. The perseverance of teacher and students 
was apparent when the teacher described what unfolded as she and her students 
met with one such situation towards the end of the mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention:   
I was determined that they were going to do it before we‟d finished, so 
that the whole kaupapa of default mode tears actually became, “I can 
think through that, and I have got strategies”, and it was really effective. 
(Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group, teacher B) 
It is this type of perseverance and determination that teachers need to cultivate, 
first in themselves, and then in their students, in order to raise students‟ 
mathematics self-efficacy and achievement.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Questionnaires 
Student questionnaire 
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Teacher questionnaire 
Beliefs about intelligence and teaching  
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. The questionnaire has been designed 
to find out your ideas about intelligence, and some of your perceptions about 
teaching and learning in the area of mathematics. There are no right or wrong 
answers; I am interested only in your frank opinions. Please give your initial 
response to the questions, rather than deliberating over them; the entire 
questionnaire should take you a maximum of 15 minutes to complete.  
 
Instructions: Using the scale below each statement, please indicate the extent to 
which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements by circling the 
appropriate response. Please circle one response only. 
 
 
1. When it comes right down to it, a teacher really can't do much because most of a 
student's motivation and performance in maths depends on his or her home 
environment. 
     
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. I have enough training to deal with almost any learning problem in maths.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
3. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
4. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit. 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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5. When a student is having difficulty with the maths work I have given them, I am 
usually able to adjust it his/her level.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
   
6. If a student did not remember information I gave in a previous maths lesson, I would 
know how to increase his/her retention in the next lesson.   
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
7. When the maths marks of my students improve, it is usually because I found more 
effective approaches.      
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
8. To be honest, you can‟t really change how intelligent you are.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
      
9. When a student gets a better maths grade than he/she usually gets, it is usually 
because I found better ways of teaching that student.    
   
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
10. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
11. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can‟t really do much to change 
it.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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12. If I really try hard in my maths teaching, I can get through to even the most difficult 
or unmotivated students.     
      
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
      
13. Even a teacher with good maths teaching abilities may not reach many students. 
      
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
14. Your intelligence is something about you that you can‟t change very much.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
15. The amount a student can learn in maths is primarily related to family background. 
      
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
   
16. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
17. When I really try, I can get through to most difficult students in maths.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
18. If a student masters a new maths concept quickly, this might be because I knew the 
necessary steps in teaching that concept.   
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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19. Teachers are not a very powerful influence on students‟ maths achievement when 
all factors are considered. 
      
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
      
20. You can learn new things, but you can‟t really change your basic intelligence. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
21. A teacher is very limited in what he/she can achieve because a student's home 
environment has a large influence on his/her maths achievement.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Mostly 
disagree 
Mostly agree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
Finally, a few details about yourself. 
 
For how many complete years had you been teaching on January 1
st
 2010?   
 
________ years. 
 
Please list your tertiary qualifications: 
 
 
 
Do you have a degree with a mathematics major?  Yes / No  (please circle one) 
 
Name ……………………………………………………    Date: …………………….. 
                (Please print clearly) 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
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Appendix B:  Interview schedules 
Student interview schedule, Time 1 
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Student interview schedule, Time 2 
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Teacher interview schedule, Time 1 
270 
 
 
  
271 
 
Teacher interview schedule, Time 2 
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Appendix C: Factor loadings on questionnaires 
Factor loadings for student and teacher pilot questionnaires 
Table C.1: Loadings on the first three factors, based on a principal components analysis of 
theory-of-intelligence items (1 to 12) and mathematics self-efficacy items (13 to 22) in the pilot 
of the student questionnaire for Year 4 and 5. Items are ordered by weighting on Factor 1. Note: 
Factor loadings < .2 are not shown. 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Item Variance 24% 10% 9% 
 Theory-of-intelligence items 
11 
When something I am studying is difficult, I try 
harder. 
0.20 0.24 0.34 
5 
You can always greatly change how intelligent 
you are.  
0.20  0.70 
3 
You can learn new things, but you can‟t really 
change your basic intelligence.  
 0.64 -0.22 
10 
To tell the truth, when I work hard at my 
schoolwork, it makes me feel like I‟m not very 
smart.  
  0.36 
2 
Your intelligence is something about you that you 
can‟t change very much.  
 0.77  
9 
The harder you work at something, the better 
you‟ll be at it. 
   
1 
You have a certain amount of intelligence, and 
you really can‟t do much to change it. 
 0.77  
6 
No matter how much intelligence you have, you 
can always change it quite a bit. 
 -0.30 0.61 
4 
No matter who you are, you can change your 
intelligence a lot.  
 -0.23 0.80 
12 
When I fail to understand something, I become 
discouraged to the point of wanting to give up.  
   
8 
It is much more important for me to learn things at 
school than it is to get the best marks.  
 0.27  
7 Even geniuses work hard for their discoveries.    0.30 
 Mathematics self-efficacy items 
20 
If 3 x 12 = 36, then 6 x 12 will equal: A. 2 x 36; B. 
3 x 36; C. 6 + 36; D. 12 + 36 
0.76   
16 
At the pet show there were 38 dogs, 46 cats, and 
29 rabbits. How many animals were there 
altogether? 
0.75   
22 
Ligi has drawn arrows on the number line to help 
solve 121 - □ = 57. What number should go in the 
□ to make the sentence true? 
0.74   
18 
Ants have 6 legs. How many legs in total would 
there be on 43 ants? 
0.73   
21 
25 + □ = 55. What number should go in the □ to 
make the sentence true? 
0.66   
14 
In a game these counters are used for money. 
How much would this group of counters be worth 
altogether? 
0.66  0.29 
19 What fraction of this group of circles is shaded? 0.66   
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  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Item Variance 24% 10% 9% 
13 What does the 7 stand for in 756? 0.60  -0.22 
15 How many $10 notes will it take to buy this bike? 0.57  0.21 
17 
This tree has 8 apples on it. If the wind blows ¼ of 
them onto the ground, how many apples are left 
on the tree? 
0.57   
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Table C.2: Loadings on the first three factors, based on a principal components analysis of all 
original items in the pilot of the teacher questionnaire. Items are ordered by weighting on Factor 
1. Note: Factor loadings < .2 are not shown. 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Item Variance 20% 18% 11% 
 Theory-of-intelligence items 
7 
No matter how much intelligence you have, you can 
always change it quite a bit. 
0.85   
8 
You can change even your basic intelligence level 
considerably. 
0.78 -0.25  
5 
You can always substantially change how intelligent 
you are. 
0.75   
3 
No matter who you are, you can significantly 
change your intelligence level. 
0.72 -0.21  
4 
To be honest, you can't really change how 
intelligent you are. 
-0.71 0.41  
6 
You can learn new things, but you can't really 
change your basic intelligence. 
-0.67 0.36 0.21 
1 
You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you 
can't really do much to change it. 
-0.62 0.44 0.20 
2 
Your intelligence is something about you that you 
can't change very much.  
-0.61 0.43 0.28 
 Self-efficacy for teaching mathematics items 
13 
When a student gets a better maths grade than 
he/she usually gets, it is usually because I found 
better ways of teaching that student.  
0.42 0.55  
22 
If I really try hard in my maths teaching, I can get 
through to even the most difficult or unmotivated 
students.  
0.35 0.64  
9 
When a student does better than usual in maths, 
many times it is because I exert a little extra effort. 
0.35 0.20 0.36 
21 
If one of my students couldn't do the maths work 
they were given, I would be able to accurately 
assess whether the work was at the correct level of 
difficulty.  
0.33 0.39  
12 
When a student is having difficulty with the maths 
work I have given them, I am usually able to adjust 
it his/her level.  
0.32 0.44 0.27 
14 
When I really try, I can get through to most difficult 
students in maths.  
0.28 0.55  
25 
My teacher training programme and/or experience 
has given me the necessary skills to be an effective 
teacher of maths. 
0.25 0.26 0.31 
18 
If a student masters a new maths concept quickly, 
this might be because I knew the necessary steps 
in teaching that concept.  
0.23 0.67  
11 
I have enough training to deal with almost any 
learning problem in maths.  
0.20 0.61  
19 
If a student did not remember information I gave in 
a previous maths lesson, I would know how to 
 0.52  
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  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
increase his/her retention in the next lesson.  
24 
Some students need to be placed in slower maths 
groups so they are not subjected to unrealistic 
expectations.  
  0.27 
16 
Teachers are not a very powerful influence on 
students' maths achievement when all factors are 
considered. 
 -0.44 0.38 
15 
A teacher is very limited in what he/she can achieve 
because a student's home environment has a large 
influence on his/her maths achievement. 
 -0.42 0.75 
17 
When the maths marks of my students improve, it is 
usually because I found more effective approaches.  
 0.67 0.25 
23 
When it comes right down to it, a teacher really 
can't do much because most of a student's 
motivation and performance in maths depends on 
his or her home environment. 
 -0.30 0.82 
20 
Even a teacher with good maths teaching abilities 
may not reach many students.  
 -0.44 0.44 
10 
The amount a student can learn in maths is 
primarily related to family background.  
  0.64 
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Appendix D: Theory-of-intelligence intervention lessons 
 
Mindset (Theory-of-Intelligence) Lessons 
 
It is intended that both lessons might be spread over two sessions each. 
Please note: The model is to be handled only by teachers, and can be carefully 
taken apart to illustrate different parts of the brain. (Supporting resources in the 
form of posters 1A to 2D were provided for teachers.) 
 
Lesson 1: Brain facts 
 
Learning intention:  
o To understand key anatomy and functions of the brain. 
 
Success criteria: 
o Show where the cerebrum is on a picture/model of the brain; 
o State what the cerebrum does. 
 
Suggested learning progression: 
o Show students model of brain and/or posters (1A & 1B). Use these to 
highlight: 
o Cerebrum [si-ree-brim] – the largest part of the brain, has two 
halves/hemispheres: right/left (model is of left hemisphere only). 
Right half of brain controls left side of body, and vice versa. The 
cerebrum is responsible for thinking (and is the part of the brain 
that we’re aiming to strengthen through exercise); 
o Cerebellum [sarah-bellim] – controls automatic body movements 
(balance, co-ordination); 
o Brain stem – connecting the brain to spinal cord, controlling body 
functions (breathing, digestion); 
o Thalamus [thal-amiss] – receives and re-directs signals from 
nerves. 
 
The following parts of the brain can be introduced too, but are not the main 
focus. 
o Hippocampus – memories; 
o Hypothalamus – senses hunger, tiredness, controls body temp; 
o Corpus callosum – thick band of nerve fibres that connects the 2 
halves/hemispheres. 
 
o “Fist for a brain” (1C) – activity to give students an idea of the size of their 
brain. Because students‟ hand sizes – and therefore their “brain” sizes – will 
vary, stress that it‟s not the size of the brain that makes you smart as much 
as how much you exercise your brain. 
o “Amazing facts about the brain” (1D) to wrap up. 
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Lesson 2: Making ourselves smarter 
 
Learning intention: 
o To understand what happens to your brain when you practise and learn new 
things 
 
Success criteria: 
o To be able to explain that the brain is like a muscle that gets stronger with 
exercise; 
o To identify making mistakes and practice as important factors in becoming 
smarter. 
 
Suggested learning progression: 
o Read “Why shouldn‟t I watch TV all day?” (2A) to students. Summarise by 
saying that when we learn something new, we build connections (synapses) 
between neurons in our brain. 
o Chinese whispers activity to demonstrate how messages are sent along a 
series of neurons. Alternatively, have students stand in a line, first person 
taps the shoulder of the second person, then second taps third, and so on.   
o Show “Nerve cells” (2B) to highlight the role of neurons and the connections 
between them. 
o Read How can I help my brain get smarter? (2C) to students to highlight how 
the brain is like a muscle that they can strengthen through exercise and 
practice. 
o What happens when you learn a new skill?  
o Have students share in groups a time they were learning a new 
skill (sport/music/ballet, etc are good examples; times tables/basic 
facts are maths examples that apply here), and the practice that 
was involved to become good at whatever it was.  
o Were they clever at it straightaway? (“Everything is hard before it 
is easy.”) Reinforce the importance of making mistakes.  
o What effects would practising have on their brain? (strengthening 
existing connections, and building connections, between neurons 
in your brain).  
o If your brain can get stronger with practice, how can that help 
you? 
“How can I get smarter?” (2D) – to summarise key points, and act as a 
reference.   
279 
 
Appendix E: Information sheets, consent forms, confidentiality agreements 
Student information sheet 
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Student consent form 
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Parent information sheet 
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Parent consent form 
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Teacher and Principal information sheet 
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Teacher consent form 
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Principal consent form 
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Transcriber confidentiality agreement 
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Appendix F: Missing data information for students 
Table F.1:  Missing data frequencies 
Frequencies of missing data for the student questionnaire and achievement test for Times 1, 2, 
and 3 for Year 4 and 5 students by treatment group, with percentage of students in brackets. All 
students completed the Time 1 questionnaire to be included in the study. Treatment groups are: 
Control group (Control); Mathematics self-efficacy intervention group (Maths self-efficacy); and 
Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-intelligence group (Combined). 
Treatment 
group 
Time 2 
questionnaire 
Time 3 
questionnaire 
Time 1 
achievement 
Time 2 
achievement 
Time 3 
achievement 
Control 
(n = 58) 
5 (9%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 
Maths self-
efficacy 
(n = 71) 
11 (15%) 10 (14%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 11 (15%) 
Combined 
(n = 87) 
12 (14%) 12 (14%) 2 (1%) 7 (8%) 8 (9%) 
 
Table F.2:  Individual students’ missing data  
Individual Year 4 and 5 students who had missing quantitative data by number and percentage 
of their group, by treatment group: Control group (Control); Mathematics self-efficacy 
intervention group (Maths self-efficacy); and Combined mathematics self-efficacy and theory-of-
intelligence interventions group (Combined). 
Treatment group Number of students with 
missing data 
Percentage of treatment 
group for whom some data 
were missing 
Control 
8 14 
Maths self-efficacy 
18 25 
Combined 
26 30 
 
